CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Topic
This project is an inquiry into the meaning of happiness [εὐδαιμονία] in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (EN). It seeks to offer a correct interpretation of Aristotle’s virtue ethic as found in EN. As such, it is not an inquiry in various contemporary developments of Aristotelian virtue ethics, so I will restrict my interlocutors to those scholars who focus on exegeting EN.
The conceptual background of my argument is given by the whole work of EN and all other works of Aristotle. Every major concept and idea found in EN will be interpreted in the context of the text read as a whole and then will be explored within the context of in the entire Aristotelian corpus for acquiring a better understanding of how Aristotle used and integrated that particular concept. Based on this method, then I will argue for a particular interpretation of the concept under investigation. In this way, I will try to allow Aristotle to speak for himself.
It is irrelevant whether I agree with Aristotle or not; what matters, for my argument, is to elucidate what Aristotle says about the matter under investigation. It is essential for the interpreter to be as aware as possible of his/her own framework of thought and not try to impose it on the subject of his/her research. For example, I am a Pauline scholar doing research in the Graeco-Roman world of antiquity. So, I am not an Aristotelian philosopher, but I will try as hard as possible to keep my own convictions away, and let Aristotle speak for himself. This book is not a dialogue between my ideas and Aristotle’s ideas about happiness.
This point is important because, as I will show later in this project, the vast majority of contemporary scholarly research on Aristotle’s ethics is done within a secular perspective, and because of this, it tries hard to eliminate everything in Aristotle that does not fit a secular reading of his writings. This is my major criticism towards my interlocutors: even if they say that their work is about what Aristotle wrote about a particular topic, they offer an interpretation of Aristotle through their own secular lenses, without letting all the Aristotelian available data to speak for itself. My point is that every major concept used by Aristotle, like “final end”/τέλος, “function of man”/ἔργον ἀνθρώπου, “contemplation”/θεωρία, “imprint”/τύπος, “intellect”/νοῦς, etc., has to be interpreted in the larger Aristotelian worldview. Thus, the conceptual background argued for in this book includes everything that we have from Aristotle about various topics relevant for my specific focus, which is the meaning of happiness in EN.
The ancient Greek conceptual background on εὐδαιμονία is presented in detail in a separate section: 3.3—From Sappho to Lycurgus: Pre-Aristotelian Literature on εὐδαιμονία.
1.2 The Thesis
My thesis about the meaning of happiness in EN is that Aristotle understands εὐδαιμονία as “actuality.” He uses two main metaphors to explain it: 1) the perimeter of the good, and 2) the imprint of happiness. These two metaphors are found in Aristotle’s argument in EN at two major signposts: I.7 1098a22 and X.9 1179a35.
I will argue that the “perimeter of the good” is a political metaphor used by Aristotle to delineate the perimeter of his inquiry. This delineation is achieved with the help of two distinct criteria: the criterion of finality and the criterion of the function. Aristotle understands happiness as the ultimate aim [τέλος] and as the function of man [ἔργον ἀνθρώπου]. These criteria are metaphysical concepts that integrate Aristotle’s ethical inquiry as a political, metaphysical, and teleological enterprise.
Then, I will argue that the “imprint of happiness” is an educational metaphor, which, in the delineated perimeter of the good, forms the best form of life, a life in which the virtuous intellect inquires and contemplates [θεωρία]. This “type of happiness” is the final end of the most authoritative science, the science of politics. Thus, for Aristotle εὐδαιμονία in EN is τέλος and ἔργον ἀνθρώπου as these reach completions in θεωρία.
Εὐδαιμονία as the ultimate aim of man, in EN, is understood correctly only if the larger metaphysical framework of Aristotle is in the background. Εὐδαιμονία in EN, as the main element of Aristotle’s ethics, positions the whole inquiry as a project in teleological metaphysical political ethics.
1.3 The Structure of the Argument
I will defend the above thesis by an argument that has the following structure. In Chapter 2, I will present an overview of Aristotle’s understanding of εὐδαιμονία in EN to explain the details of Aristotle project and also to identify the points of contention in explaining the meaning of εὐδαιμονία. Then, I will present and examine the state of research on εὐδαιμονία. This research focuses on three important questions: 1) what kind of good is happiness? 2) what is the relationship between happiness (EN, Books I and II) and complete happiness (EN, Book X)? and 3) what is the relationship between happiness and the external goods? The purpose of this second chapter is to present the advance of research done on happiness in EN and to show that there are other significant lines of inquiry that are not yet examined.
Then, in Chapter 3, I will present a case for a new reading of Aristotle’s entire inquiry on happiness in EN. This new reading is based on the importance of two significant signposts (one in EN I.7 1098a22, and the other in X.9 1179a35) used by Aristotle to explain his research into the meaning of εὐδαιμονία in EN. I will present the evidence for a different translation of the Greek phrases that are usually translated as the “outline of the good” (EN I.7 1098a22) and the “outline of happiness” (EN X.9 1179a35), which I maintain are better translated as the “perimeter of the good” and as the “imprint of happiness.” These different translations signal something of significance that has to be investigated, and that is done in the following two chapters (4 and 5).
In Chapter 4, I will explore the “perimeter of the good” by studying the distinct criteria of finality and function. Both these two distinct criteria are, in Aristotle’s worldview, metaphysical concepts. The criterion of finality [τέλος] establishes the overall movement and aim of his inquiry on εὐδαιμονία. Εὐδαιμονία as the “final end” is the self-sufficient aim of all human actions. Aristotle understands it in political terms: this final self-sufficient end is the aim of politics. Aristotle’s metaphysical political teleology is the foundation of his teleological ethics. Εὐδαιμονία is a relational political concept; it has to be understood in the light of metaphysics and politics.
The cr...