Approaches to Greek Poetry

Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, and Aeschylus in Ancient Exegesis

Marco Ercoles, Lara Pagani, Filippomaria Pontani, Giuseppe Ucciardello

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9783110629873
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Letteratura
• Subtopic: Critica letteraria antica e classica

In the last decades the field of research on ancient Greek scholarship has been the object of a remarkable surge of interest, with the publication of handbooks, reference works, and new editions of texts. This partly unexpected revival is very promising and it continues to enhance and modify both our knowledge of ancient scholarship and the way in which we are accustomed to discuss these texts and tackle the editorial and exegetical challenges they pose.

This volume deals with some pivotal aspects of this topic, being the outcome of a three-year project funded by the Italian Ministry for Education, University and Research (MIUR) on specific aspects of the critical re-appraisal of Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, and Aeschylus in Greek culture throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages. It tackles issues such as the material form of the transmission of the exegesis from papyri to codices, the examination of hitherto unexplored branches of the manuscript evidence, the discussion of some important scholia, and the role played by the indirect tradition and the assimilation of the exegetical heritage in grammatical and lexicographical works.

Some strands of the ancient and medieval scholarship are here re-evaluated afresh by adopting an interdisciplinary methodology which blends modern editorial techniques developed for 'problematic' or 'non-authorial' medieval texts with current trends in the history of philology and literary criticism. In their diversity of subject matter and approach the papers collected in the volume give intended readers an excellent overview of the topics of the project.

Part I:Homeric exegesis in antiquity

René Nünlist

Observations on Aristarchus’ Homeric studies

Abstract: The chapter combines three observations that all originate with a larger study on Aristarchus’ semantic explanations: (1) unlike Aristotle, in his influential model of metaphor, Aristarchus differentiates between metaphor and metonymy, a distinction already found in a papyrus treatise tentatively attributed to Theophrastus; (2) in discussing particular instances of synonymous words, Aristarchus observes that Homer ‘contrasts’ (ἀντιφράζει) two different words of essentially the same meaning, which testifies to his speech diversity; (3) contrary to the communis opinio on the matter, Aristarchus probably held the Homeric Hymns to be a genuine work of Homer.

1Metonymy vs. Metaphor

In order to reconstruct Aristarchus’ views on metonymy and metaphor respectively, it is useful to start with his semantic analysis of the adjective κωφός, which to his mind either means ‘mute’ or ‘deaf’.15 A chief witness is a bT-scholion that, in the wake of Friedländer (1853), has been attributed to Aristonicus and is therefore considered to represent Aristarchus’ opinion on the matter. The note in question deals with a well-known passage from Iliad 24. There Apollo expresses the view that by dragging Hector’s corpse around Patroclus’ tomb Achilles maltreats the earth, which is described as κωφή (Il. 24.54). The adjective’s meaning is discussed in the relevant scholion as follows:

(1) ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναίσθητον. κέχρηται δὲ τῷ <ε>ἰδικῷ ἀντὶ τοῦ γενικοῦ. κωφὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ προϊέμενον φωνήν· “κωφὸν γὰρ βέλος” (Il. 11.390) καὶ “κύματι κωφῷ” (Il. 14.16) (sch. bT Il. 24.54c Ariston.).

<κωφή is used here> in the sense of (i.e., has the meaning) ‘without sense (or feeling)’. For <Homer> has used the species instead of the genus. κωφόν also <designates> something that does not utter a voice (i.e., something that is mute), <e.g.> ‘mute missile’ and ‘mute wave’.16

In the first part of the scholion (on the second, see below), Aristarchus clearly uses a type of explanation for which several parallels can be adduced from other scholia that can be attributed to Aristonicus.17 Taken together, these notes demonstrate that Aristarchus considered αἴσθησις (‘sense-perception’) a genus (γένος), of which several species (εἴδη) exist: hearing, touch, vision, etc. This general analysis can be visualised in the form of a stemma. The top of the stemma is occupied by the one genus, αἴσθησις (‘sense-perception’), which branches into several species (εἴδη) at the lower level. Read against this backdrop, text (1) easily yields sense. Iliad 24.54 means that Achilles maltreats an earth that is literally deaf. But a trope is involved that allows readers to understand that the earth actually has no sense-perception. It is ἀναίσθητος to Achilles’ activity. The trope in question is to use the species ‘hearing’ instead of the genus ‘sense-perception’. Text (1) does not expressly state that κωφή means ‘deaf’ here. But the second part leaves little room for doubt. “κωφόν also <designates> something that does not utter a voice (i.e., something that is mute)”, for which two Homeric parallels are given, the mute missile and the mute wave (on which see below). This second meaning (‘mute’) clearly presupposes a first meaning ‘deaf’ from which it is set apart.

The opposition between genus (γένος) and species (εἶδος) in all likelihood originates with Aristotelian philosophy and is a standard tool in Aristarchus’ grammatical system, as Matthaios has shown.18 The same scholar also suggests a connection to a papyrus treatise that has tentatively been attributed to Theophrastus (P.Hamb. 128 = Theophrastus Appendix F 9 Fortenbaugh). Irrespective of whether Theophrastus is indeed the author, the papyrus’ date (ca. 250–200 BC) in any case predates that of Aristarchus’ career. It is thus perfectly possible that he was familiar with the theory expounded in the papyrus. Matthaios’ argument in favour of a connection is plausible and can even be pushed a little further.

Of the treatise’s many interesting points, the crucial one in the present context is where its author actually parts with Aristotle’s well-known model of metaphor and its four categories, as explained in chapter 21 of the Poetics:

(2) μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον (Arist. Po. 1457b6–9).

A metaphor is the application of a word that belongs to another thing: either from genus to species, species to genus, species to species, or by analogy (trans. Halliwell).

According to the papyrus treatise, however, Aristotle’s first two types of metaphor, from genus to species and vice versa, do not actually belong to the rubric μεταφορά. Instead, the author considers them a form of μετουσία (lit. ‘participation’, col. 2, ll. 27–33). The term μετουσία and its pedigree are a particular problem that lies beyond the scope of this paper. It is, nevertheless, clear that μετουσία roughly designates ‘synekdoche’. Whereas the term μεταφορά (‘metaphor’) assumes that a word is ‘transferred’ from its literal surroundings to an area that is essentially foreign to it, its counterpart μετουσία (‘synekdoche’) expresses that one element ‘partakes’ of the other. The two elements essentially belong to the same domain. Hearing, for instance, is one possible species (εἶδος) of the genus (γένος) sense-perception and can thus metonymically represent it; it is not metaphorically transferred to another domain. I am suggesting, in other words, that Aristarchus is following the papyrus treatise’s model and not Aristotle’s.

The relevant argument is not entirely watertight because it must resort to evidence that has its problems, especially with this type of material. No one is ignorant of the fact that scholia have gone through multiple stages of transmission. One consequence is that modern scholars can never be certain that the scholia “represent the ipsissima verba of the grammarians”.19 This in turn means that caution is called for when their argument is built on considerations of terminology. This said, it is nevertheless remarkable that Aristarchus’ numerous examples of μεταφορά (and cognates) never deal with a transition from genus to species or vice versa.20 All his examples of μεταφορά nicely fit into the remaining two Aristotelian categories, that is, from species to species and by analogy.21 On the other hand, those Aristarchean notes that, like text (1), comment on the transition from genus to species and vice versa do not normally make use of additional terminology that would help to understand his categories and their boundaries. There is, however, one exception. A note on Iliad 4.343 explains that Homer uses the verb ἀκούω (‘to hear’) in the meaning ἐπαισθάνεσθαι (‘to perceive’), “because hearing is a species of sense-perception” (εἶδος αἰσθήσεως, sch. A Il. 4.343a). And this figurative usage of the verb is referred to with the adverb τροπικῶς (‘figuratively, by means of a trope’). Unfortunately, there is no parallel for this term in the other notes that can be attributed to Aristarchus. So it cannot be ruled out that this note is the proverbial swallow that does not make a summer. Still, the fact that Aristarchus never uses the term μεταφορά (and cognates) for the transition from genus to species or vice versa and the fact that such a transition is at least once referred to by a different term, τροπικῶς, both make it more likely than not that he followed the model of the papyrus treatise (and not Aristotle). He too considered the transition from genus to species and vice versa a form of (semantic) synekdoche – or at least not a form of metaphor.22

Another complicating factor must not go unmentioned. The second part of text (1) argues that Iliad 11.390 should be understood as ‘mute missile’ (κωφὸν βέλος). In the Homeric passage, Diomedes, who has just been hit by Paris’ arrow, emphatically downplays its effect (‘Ah, it’s nothing, a mere ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Part I: Homeric exegesis in antiquity
• Part II: Homeric and Hesiodic exegesis in Byzantine manuscripts and texts
• Part III: Pindar between scholia and lexica
• Part IV: Aeschylus in the exegetical tradition
• Afterword
• List of Contributors
• Index rerum
• Index locorum