The US-Iran Relationship

The Impact of Political Identity on Foreign Policy

Penelope Kinch

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780857729385
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de l'armée et de la marine

Since the Revolution of 1978/79, which eventually brought to power Ayatollah Khomeini and his circle of conservative, though politically active, clerics, the relationship between Iran and the USA has represented one of the world's most complex and hostile international entanglements. In this book, Penelope Kinch analyses the extent to which political identity has contributed to challenges in the relationship and the role of myths in foreign policy. Kinch first examines the construction of political identity in each country, and thereby traces the imagined norms which have their impact on international behaviour. Looking at the misperceptions that have precluded closer communication between the two states, Kinch examines both historical issues, such as the 1979 US embassy hostage crisis as well as more contemporary crises, most notably over Iran's nuclear power programme.

CHAPTER 1

IDENTITY AND MYTH

Political Identity

The primary theoretical challenge presented by this book is that of how to approach the question of identity, and more specifically political identity. ‘Identity has been indissociable from the business of politics, much of which is about the formation and dissolution of such identities.’¹ Forming a definition of political identity and how to negotiate its development requires a review of the theoretical approaches in international relations that could be applied to the study of identity. The constructivist school of thought is intuitive to the scope of research undertaken here. Alexander Wendt defines this approach to international relations theory:

Constructivism is a structural theory of international politics that makes the following core claims: 1) states are the principal actors in the system; 2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and 3) state identities and interests are in a large part constructed.²

Wendt's definition clarifies the assumptions that form the basis of the theoretical approach taken in this book.

John Baylis and Steve Smith define identity as:

The understanding of the self in relationship to an ‘other’. Identities are social and thus are always formed in relationship to others. Constructivists generally hold that identities shape interests; we cannot know what we want unless we know who we are.³

It is imperative, at this point, to differentiate political identity, as it relates to this research, from national identity. Political identity describes the identity of the state and the role of state actors, rather than the sociological interpretation of identity as ‘sense of self’, which relates to national identity.⁴ I do not seek to define the Iranian or American ‘sense of self’ here; rather I specifically examine political identity in foreign policy development and international relations. As a result, the definition of Baylis and Smith applies to the identity of the state as an actor, how its identity in the international arena influences foreign policy, and the impact of domestic policy concerns on the projection of political identity in international relations. It is the relationships between state actors that presuppose the development of political identity. However, it is important to note that political identity is not created only by interaction with other states; it is also created and reinforced domestically.⁵ It is for this reason that the construction of political identity in the US and Iran must be addressed individually before an analysis of the interaction between those identities on the international stage can be attempted.

Parameters need to be defined within which to determine the construction of political identity. Christian Reus-Smit offers three mechanisms that assist in explaining how political identity is developed, and how interest is shaped by these forces: ⁶

1. Imagination: Limitations, perceived or otherwise, impose institutionalised norms in society that condition what the actor (state or individual) can imagine. An actor forms its understanding of other actors through norms and practices in its imagined experience. Ted Hopf develops this concept one step further, suggesting that an actor requires an acknowledgement of legitimacy from the relevant community in a social context before it is ‘even able to act as its identity’.⁷ Cultural memory as an aspect of the development of political identity is closely linked to this mechanism, providing an accepted socio-cultural environment in which that identity can operate. Cultural memory also provides a narrative within which political myth is constructed. An appreciation of how myths of identity develop benefits greatly from an understanding of Reus-Smit's concept of imagination. For example, the myth of the US as the ‘Great Satan’ has become an institutionalised, or even ideologised, norm in conservative Iranian political rhetoric, to the extent that a departure from this expected condition would require an acknowledgment of legitimacy. The use, and even manipulation, of the media as an ongoing means to reinforce expected conditions makes this force all the more potent. This phenomenon allows political rhetoric to resonate within the realities of political culture, because it is understood in terms of imagined and accepted norms. This leads to Reus-Smit's second mechanism for the construction of political identity.

2. Communication: This mechanism operates within the imagined norms in society as outlined above. Actors appeal to accepted norms of conduct in the international arena, and in this manner an exchange of information ‘stabilises expectations about the future’.⁸ International institutions, as non-state actors, are a key element of communication, whether in the form of organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or the International Criminal Court, or in the form of treaties or protocols.⁹ The United States and Iran have been lacking the framework of communicative action both as a result of severing diplomatic ties following the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the degree of belligerence exercised on both sides with regard to international institutions. Instead, communication takes the form of political rhetoric via secondary conduits of information such as the media, which has accompanying complications. Debate and reasoning in diplomacy must have legitimate rules of conduct, which can only ‘resonate with pre-existing, mutually recognised higher order values’.¹⁰ As such, political rhetoric can only be communicated through imagined political identity; rhetoric has no value if it is not practised and understood within imagined norms. The limits of communication have an impact in a variety of areas of international relations. One such example is that of intervention in the domestic affairs of other state actors, which can be rationalised in terms of internationally accepted judgment operating through forums such as the UN. Similarly, conflict can arise from the violation of perceived norms in the rules of intervention.

3. Constraint: Ideas can only be rationalised if the social context provides them with moral force. Justification is a constraint on action because behaviour must be consistent with accepted principles. Even if constructivism does not allow that international affairs are controlled by a ‘central enforcer’ or immutable rules, institutions, economic factors and social context can have an impact on state interests, operating as a constraint on the state actor.¹¹ Constraints can assume a variety of guises, such as systems of material incentives or the balance of power, but significant to the constructivist argument is how these constraints act to reproduce identity.¹² Excessively dramatic foreign policy rhetoric in both the US and Iran is understood and rationalised because of experience and socially accepted sentiments. In this sense, accepted norms that provide a mechanism for the development of political identity also act as a constraint.

An example of Reus-Smit's mechanisms in operation may be seen in the lengthy US occupation and descent into sectarian conflict in Iraq following the 2003 invasion: the assumptions of state actors such as the US and Iran may be in opposition because of differing perceptions of the accepted rights of international intervention. The imagined norms of international intervention are a product of the political identity of each state actor, but cannot necessarily be reconciled in the international community. This coincides with Hans Morgenthau's claims that states cannot be obliged to observe a common morality or right because no such universal order exists.¹³ Wendt describes this function as follows:

A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.¹⁴

As a consequence of this principle, political identity is a crucial function in comprehending challenging scenarios in international relations, and the interests that inform them.

Interest and Identity

In terms of the relationship between interest and identity – a central theme of constructivist research – the term ‘interests’ is understood in the sense of ‘policy interests’, which James Bill defines as ‘the personal, economic and political interests’ pursued by state actors.¹⁵ This takes into account national security interests, material interests and socio-cultural interests, all of which bear a relationship to political identity, and to the development of foreign policy. David Campbell defines foreign policy in the constructivist frame as follows:

Foreign policy (conventionally understood as the external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities) is […] to be retheorized as one of the boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates.¹⁶

The intertwined construction of interest, foreign policy development and political identity is fundamental.

Interests, as identified here, ‘depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others’.¹⁷ Or to express this in another fashion, ‘identity is a relational concept insofar as it only makes sense to talk about the self when a relationship with the other is present.’¹⁸ The definitions of terms such as ‘enemies’ and ‘friends’ are determined on the basis of those experiences that have collective meaning, or what is described as ‘organisational learning’.¹⁹ Identity is acquired through the activity of participating in a group, community or society with organisational learning or collective meaning. It is the vehicle that allows an actor to comprehend its relationship to the external environment.²⁰ This also applies between state actors; if more than one state actor develops a sense of collective identity, this becomes the basis for ‘common purposes or interests’.²¹ It is by this means that alliances are created, but the inverse process does not necessarily follow: having common purposes or interests does not establish a sense of collective identity. This is a key facet of the challenges facing the US and Iran in international relations (see Chapter 6).

International relations can only be comprehended through what people believe.²² Political actors seek to use value systems, history and ideology to strengthen their positions and discredit opponents, and emotionally charged terms imbue meaning to discourse.²³ ‘Others’ are defined in the same way; they are identified as acting outside of the group. When dealing with friends, ‘one's identity is reinforced by affirming the links and characteristics that make that specific other an ally’, while an opposite process occurs when dealing with an enemy.²⁴ ‘Categories help us order the environment and make it meaningful’, allowing similarities within a group and differences between groups to be identified.²⁵ Political identity describes this process on the level of state actors operating within the accepted constraints of the collective meaning of that state.

Political identity is defined by political interest, which is, in turn, determined in the process of defining situations.²⁶ This is closely aligned to the 1950s theory of Nelson Foote, who claimed that identity must be formed by motivating factors, which provide the actor with ‘the energy appropriate for performing’.²⁷ The foreign policy stances of Iran and the US are replete with this ‘energy’, as both derive domestic and international results from the projection of their political identity. In addition, Wendt tells us that ‘conceptions of self and interest tend to ‘mirror’ the practices of significant others over time.’²⁸ Iran and the US are ‘significant others’ in the foreign policy formulation of each as a state actor. The relationship reflects the three principles of constructivism, which suggest that actions are constrained by experience and imagination.

Identities and interests are not only created by interactions between state actors, they are also sustained this way, which creates certain expectations about these identities. The previous experience of one actor classifies its understanding of another's political identity and presupposes its response to new experiences.²⁹ By construing an event in a particular way, an actor is unduly confident that others will view the event in a similar way, creating expectations.³⁰ Attainable expectation introduces a level of predictability that is a necessity in the international order, predictability that can be maintained through stable identities. Interested parties in the politi...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1. Identity and Myth
• 2. Iranian Political Identity
• 3. American Political Identity
• 4. Myths and Foreign Policy Challenges
• 5. Foreign Policy Challenge: Iran’s Nuclear Programme
• 6. Intersection of Interest and Identity in Regional Issues
• 7. Communication and Prospects for Change
• Notes
• Bibliography