A History of the Royal Navy

Napoleonic Wars

Martin Robson

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9780857735089
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Militär- & Seefahrtsgeschichte

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were the first truly global conflicts. The Royal Navy was a key player in the wider wars and, for Britain, the key factor in her eventual emergence as the only naval power capable of sustained global hegemony. The most iconic battles of any era were fought at sea during these years - from the Battle of the Nile in 1798 to Nelson's momentous victory at Trafalgar in October 1805. In this period, the Navy had reached a peak of efficiency and was unrivalled in manpower and technological strength. The eradication of scurvy in the 1790s had a significant impact on the health of sailors and, along with regular supplies of food and water, gave the British an advantage over their rivals in battle. As well as naval battles, the Navy also undertook amphibious operations, capturing many of France's Caribbean colonies and Dutch colonies in the East Indies and Ceylon; this Imperial dimension was integral to British strength and counteracting French success on continental Europe.
This book looks at the history of the Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, from a broad perspective, examining the strategy, operations and tactics of British seapower. While it delves into the details of Royal Navy operations such as battle, blockade, commerce protection and exploration, it also covers a myriad of other aspects often overlooked in narrative histories such as the importance of naval logistics, transport, relations with the army and manning. An assessment of key naval figures and combined eyewitness accounts situate the reader firmly in Nelson's navy. Through an exploration of the relationship between the Navy, trade and empire, Martin Robson highlights the contribution Royal Navy made to Britain's rise to global hegemony through the nineteenth century Pax Britannica.

CHAPTER 1

‘Never was a more hard fought action in the Seas’

Home Waters, 1793–1802

Given the importance of the Low Countries in British thinking, it is not surprising that British involvement in the wars against France began in that theatre. With France at war with Austria then Prussia in April 1792, it was not until 1 February 1793 that France declared war on Britain. In response, British troops were transported from Greenwich to Helvoetsluis in the Republic of the United Provinces. The naval part of the expedition was under the command of Captain John Manley in the 32-gun frigate HMS Syren. The night of 15 March was calm and foggy, perfect for an attack by gunboats under the command of Lieutenant John Western. This little force succeeded in driving the enemy out of five forts constructed to bombard Willemstadt. On the 21st, while laying a 12pdr cannon in his gunboat, Western was shot through the head. He was the first Royal Navy officer casualty of the war, lost not in a great battle but during an inshore gunboat action providing fire support to allied forces ashore.¹

On 29 May a brigade of cavalry arrived in Ostend carried in 40 transports, and further reinforcements continued to arrive during the autumn of 1793. Royal Naval assistance to the forces ashore was evident in the army’s failed attempt to capture Dunkirk in August and September 1793. On 27 August transports arrived with gunners for the siege (but no heavy artillery) and on the 29th the frigate HMS Brilliant and a number of armed cutters were off the coast. Taking command of the naval forces the following day was Admiral John MacBride. Given the nature of his task, support to the army ashore and the importance of cordial relations between the services, he was to operate under the direct command of Henry Dundas, from 1794 Secretary of State for War, rather than the Admiralty.

The army was critical of the Navy’s lack of apparent support leading to the failure of the siege. This was replicated at the highest levels, with the army’s commander, the Duke of York, criticizing Lord Chatham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, for not providing gunboats. York’s view also overlooked the role of the Navy in supplying stores, provisions and guns to the army, for between 4 August and 18 September a number of storeships laden with ordnance and stores arrived in Flanders. In fact the apparent lack of naval support was a smokescreen; in reality it was far too late in the year for the army to mount a successful siege.²

MacBride’s flotilla had been temporarily blown off station only three days after arriving at Dunkirk, highlighting the perennial problem of bad weather interfering with naval operations. With land operations winding down in October 1793, MacBride was given a wide-ranging role, though still under the command of Dundas, whose prime concern at that time was a French invasion attempt. By 31 October MacBride’s squadron consisted of his flagship, the 32-gun Quebec, a further frigate, a sloop and a floating battery as he cooperated with British forces ashore in removing the French from Ostend and Nieuport. In November the army asked the Navy to provide a hundred sailors to man the artillery batteries at Nieuport.³

The naval officer who received this request was Lieutenant Home Riggs Popham. In September 1793 Popham had been appointed as Agent for Transport to the British Army. Operating out of Ostend, which would serve as the major logistical port until evacuated in June 1794, he was in familiar territory, as he had lived in the town for the previous five years. Alongside his core duty of organizing the stream of inward and outbound transport ships and disembarking and embarking troops and stores for the army, he organized local fishermen into a Sea Fencibles force to defend the town. With the army wintering in the Low Countries in late December 1793 the Experiment transport was typical of the traffic Popham had to deal with. She was made ready at Deptford with a quantity of naval stores for use by the battalions of Foot Guards serving in York’s army, as well as transporting a number of officers, their baggage and servants. Such tasking required immense organizational skills, attention to detail and experience of shipping, and it is important to note that the army relied on a naval officer to supply this expertise.⁴

Popham was so successful in his supply role that in March 1794, in preparation for the coming campaigning season in a countryside criss-crossed by waterways, the Duke of York requested that Popham command the army’s inland navigation. This was approved, but Popham and the duke could do little to stem the French advance in June and July 1794 leading to the loss of Ostend. In all this the Duke of York noted Popham’s ‘unremitting zeal and active talents’ which saved much British property and stores during the British retreat, which by November had reached the River Waal at Nijmegen. Here a hundred sailors working under Popham maintained a key pontoon bridge.⁵

The campaign of 1794 had been a disaster and the Duke of York returned to England in December leaving behind an army with an increasing sick list, in constant retreat and harried by the zeal of French Revolutionary forces. As the army infrastructure disintegrated, Popham assisted as best he could, getting the army across waterways and organizing gunboats to patrol. In January 1795 French cavalry rode across the frozen Zuiderzee to capture the Dutch fleet. Popham continued sourcing, arming and manning gunboats, embarking the wounded and sick, as well as piloting ships and purchasing hammocks for transports that had arrived in a wholly unfit state to evacuate British troops back to England. Embarking the formed troops and the ragtag stragglers was a continuous duty throughout the autumn of 1795: ‘I was never so fag’d with Dogs and Devils,’ Popham wrote on 23 October. ‘I wish the business was at an end, and if I ever have anything more to do with Transports, you may Transport me to Botany Bay.’ Popham, never one to play down his role, estimated that in 1795 he had been responsible for the safe evacuation of 40,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. In January 1796 he left the continent, promoted to post captain and possessing the moniker of ‘The Duke of York’s Admiral’. Yet he had never commanded a naval ship. Instead he had used his expert seamanship and hydrographic skills to become a specialist in joint amphibious power projection; a role which he would continue to perform during the next 19 years of conflict.⁶

The Channel Fleet

The safety and security of British home waters was the job of the Channel Fleet and it was entrusted to the Royal Navy’s most experienced officer, Admiral Richard Howe, 1st Lord Howe. Keeping watch over the French fleet base at Brest, he preferred an open blockade, stationing his main fleet towards Spithead and using frigate and light squadrons to keep close watch on enemy ports. While this seemed contrary to the British tradition of the ‘Western Squadron’ positioned off Ushant, there was strategic rationale. As far back as 1784 Howe had thought that stationing a fleet directly off the French coast was ‘a very improper and hazardous measure’. Ships would be damaged and crews would become sick; keeping a close blockade of Brest was ‘a dangerous situation, and should never be taken but upon great emergencies’.⁷

There were other factors at play in 1793 which justified Howe favouring an open blockade, primarily the apparent naval superiority of Britain over France. Until 1795 Spain was an ally of Britain and her ships need not be factored into the equation. France was still embroiled in internal and external land campaigns which reduced the likelihood of an invasion against Britain or an expansionist colonial policy. Crucially the French naval officer class, which had tasted success during the American War, had suffered from republican purges and emigration, while there were problems sourcing and maintaining sufficient manpower. (For French successes against the Royal Navy in the American War see A History of the Royal Navy: The American Revolutionary War by Martin Robson.) In March 1793 a small French squadron had put to sea but its commander, Vice Admiral Morard de Galles, found his crews, although driven by republican fervour, unwilling to go aloft in a gale; ‘nothing can make them attend to their duties,’ he lamented. When news of a counter-revolution in Toulon reached the Brest fleet on 13 September 1793 they mutinied. The situation was only brought back under control by the replacement of Galles with Rear Admiral Louis-Thomas Villaret-Joyeuse and a new code of naval discipline enforced by Madame Guillotine. The French navy ‘was reduced to virtual impotence by the political conflicts on shore’.⁸

With Howe using the Channel Fleet to fulfil his mission of protecting British trade and troop convoys while annoying that of the enemy, he undertook a number of cruises in 1793 off the Scilly Isles, skirmishing with a French squadron on 18 October. By December Howe had 22 sail of the line under his command, though most of his ships rode out the winter storms at Spithead or Plymouth until he sailed again in early May 1794 leading to the first major fleet engagement of the war.

The Glorious First of June

In 1793 one of the Royal Navy’s less well-known officers, Sir Charles Knowles, was sent to North America in the Daedalus frigate. His job was to watch a French convoy preparing to sail from America and to report on general French movements in North American waters. He warned the British forces in the West Indies of the size and lucrative value (around £2 million) of the French convoy and the arrival of a number of French warships to provide an escort. He also noted that the Americans displayed ‘treachery and implacable hatred […] to the British Nation’. Knowles noted that the convoy sailed on 19 April.⁹

Across the Atlantic the French fleet at Brest under Villaret-Joyeuse had been ordered to put to sea and escort this convoy, carrying much needed grain safely into Brest for transport on to Paris. The resulting engagement with Howe’s fleet, known as the ‘Glorious First of June’, is rather unique. Most naval battles take place in the littoral – coastal waters – whereas this one occurred in open waters about 400 nautical miles west of Ushant. Over the course of several days a number of engagements were fought between Villaret-Joyeuse’s fleet of 26 sail of the line and Howe’s fleet, now numbering 25 sail of the line.

The Admiralty had informed Howe on 17 April of the ‘very large and valuable Fleet of Merchant ships […] shortly expected from America’. Intercepting that convoy ‘is an object of the most urgent importance to the success of the present war’. Howe sailed from Spithead on 2 May escorting outward-bound British convoys before taking up station in the western approaches off Ushant. He initially found the French fleet still in Brest, but Villaret-Joyeuse slipped out in a fog on 16/17 May. Howe gave chase and made contact with the French on 28 May. This was a partial action with both sides attempting to gain favourable positions, during which the 74-gun HMS Audacious suffered much damage in combat with the larger 110-gun Révolutionnaire. Both ships headed for their respective ports to repair.

Next day Howe attempted to gain the weather gauge on the French fleet, but Villaret-Joyeuse stuck to his task of frustrating the Royal Navy’s attempts to intercept the convoy. On the 29th there were further brushes between the fleets, with some British ships suffering damage to their rigging and masts, but this was more than compensated for by Howe’s seamanship which allowed him to finally take up the weather gauge. This would allow him to choose exactly when and where to attack the French fleet. Two days of thick fog frustrated his plan but the weather cleared early on the morning of 1 June.¹⁰

By now the fleets were about five miles apart and at 07:16 Howe’s flagship, the 100-gun three-decked Queen Charlotte, signalled his intent to attack the centre of the French fleet. The next signal, at 07:25, was for his fleet to pass through the French line and engage the enemy from the leeward side. After the British crews had breakfasted, Howe directed Queen Charlotte to bear down upon the French while signalling that each of his ships should engage its opposite number. In effect, instead of attacking in line ahead formation, his ships would turn and attack line abreast; each Royal Navy warship would cut the French line astern of an opponent before engaging them on the leeward side, thereby preventing their escape.

Fig. 1.1. The Glorious First of June. Plans for the fleet’s ‘order of sailing’ in three or two lines.

The French opened fire at 09:24 with the Queen Charlotte responding at 09:52. HMS Defence, captained by James Gambier, was the first British ship though the French line. Midshipman William Henry Dillon later recalled:

We retained our fire till in the act of passing under the Frenchman’s stern, then, throwing all our topsails aback, luffed up and poured in a destructive broadside. We heard most distinctly our shot striking the hull of the enemy.

Defence shattered the stern of the 74-gun Mucius before drawing up close alongside. Defence also found herself engaged by the Tourville. Dillon continues:

The lower deck was at times so completely filled with smoke that we could scarcely distinguish each other, and the guns were so heated that, when fired, they nearly kicked the upper deck beams. The metal became so hot that fearing some accident, we...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Author Biography
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Tables, Figures and Maps
• List of Colour Plates
• Series Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Preface: ‘The ever to be lamented death of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson’
• Introduction: ‘Wherever there is water to float a ship, we are sure to find you in our way’
• 1. ‘Never was a more hard fought action in the Seas’: Home Waters, 1793–1802
• 2. ‘Nelson’s Patent Bridge for Boarding First Rates’: The Mediterranean, 1793–1802
• 3. ‘The first point to make perfectly certain’: The Global War, 1793–1802
• 4. ‘I do not say they cannot come, I merely say they cannot come by sea’: The Invasion Threat, 1802–05
• 5. ‘Engage the Enemy more closely’: The Battle of Trafalgar, 1805
• 6. ‘I cannot too much lament not to have arrived a few days sooner’: Home Waters and the Baltic, 1805–15
• 7. ‘Our maritime superiority’: The Mediterranean and the Peninsular War, 1805–15
• 8. ‘The carrier of the commerce of the continent of Europe’: Economic Warfare, 1805–15
• 9. ‘A complete stop to all trade and intercourse by Sea’: The War of 1812
• Epilogue: ‘That will do […] Fire, my fine fellows’: Algiers, 1816
• Conclusion: ‘Lords of the sea’
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Plates