Shi'i Sectarianism in the Middle East

Modernisation and the Quest for Islamic Universalism

Elisheva Machlis

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9780857737786
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

The eruption of violent sectarianism in Iraq following the US invasion in 2003 brought the question of Sunni-Shi'i relations in the country to the forefront of the international public agenda. It also strengthened the popular belief that contemporary Shi'ism is inherently sectarian. Yet several decades earlier, Ayatollah Khomeini had declared an Islamic revolution and downplayed its Shi'i origins and links. So what is the true orientation of Shi'i Islam in the contemporary era and how did modernisation alter its sectarian affiliation? This book contends that early Shi'i reformist thought set the foundations for a more universal-oriented Shi'ism. Prominent reformists in the first half of the twentieth century from the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf in Iraq and from the Shi'i centres in Southern Lebanon played a significant role in the renewal of Shi'ism and laid the groundwork for its reinvention in the modern era. Exploring this shift towards a more ecumenical perception of Islam, Elisheva Machlis here provides a fresh perspective on inter-sectarian relations in contemporary Iraq and illuminates the intellectual roots of the Islamic revolution, by examining networks of Shi'i scholars such as Mu?ammad?usayn K?shif al-Ghi??' and Mu?sin al-Am?n al-'?mil?, operating within a more globalised Muslim world. Drawing on the experiences of early Shi'i reformists, such as 'Abd al-?usayn Sharaf al-D?n al-M?saw? in Lebanon and Mu?ammad Jaw?d Mughniyya in Damascus, this book gives new insight on the future of inter-Muslim relations at a time of growing inter-sectarian contention, from the Iran-Iraq war to the post-2003 Sunni-Shi'i conflict in Iraq and al-Qa'ida's anti-Shi'i message, taking into account questions of theology, historiography, jurisprudence and politics which all played a vital role in the transition to the contemporary era. The author here analyses the broad scholarly connections between Iran, Iraq and Lebanon in the twentieth century, while debating paramount questions of leadership, identity and group membership in the development of modern Shi'ism. Examining the relationship between intellectual thought and socio-political development in the region, this book provides a new perspective concerning the future of an increasingly globalised Muslim world and will prove essential reading for students and specialists.

CHAPTER 1

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE CONTEST FOR COMMUNAL LEADERSHIP

Dramatic changes swept through the Shi‘i communities in the Arab world and Iran during the twentieth century, weakening the traditional leadership of the clerics and altering communal dynamics. Development of transportation, urbanisation, the rise of new social classes and the spread of state education shook the frameworks that bound these communities together. Similar processes took place in many countries of the Middle East from the late nineteenth century onward. Yet, these changes, particularly the rise of a new secularised elite, had a unique impact on Shi‘is in the region due to the significance of clerical authority in the Imami world and the ‘ulamā's historical control over the dissemination of knowledge.

In the pre-modern world, the diverse Shi‘i localities were very parochial and, at the same time, had a clear international dimension. For centuries, the majority of Shi‘is in the geographical area of Iraq and Lebanon resided in tight-knit communities, providing for themselves by means of agriculture. Their isolation from the wider Sunni milieu was the result of poor road-links as well as a self-imposed desire to maintain their independence in the face of a hostile Sunni milieu. Concurrently, the religious elite of the ‘ulamā’ developed broad-ranging scholarly networks with their fellow Shi‘is beyond their immediate surroundings. These networks were established over centuries through the Shi‘i centres of learning, which shifted in the course of history from Hilla in the region of Iraq to Jabal ‘āmil in Lebanon, and later on to Najaf and Karbalā’. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Qum in Iran began to challenge Najaf in this rivalry for scholarly supremacy.¹ Interaction between the ‘ulamā’ of the various parts of the Shi‘i world also continued after they graduated and returned to their local communities. Shi‘is were permitted to follow the rulings of an ‘ālim, whom they knew by reputation, even if he lived beyond the limits of their own localities, which further solidified the international dimension of Shi‘ism. It was therefore common, for example, for a Shi‘i in Lebanon to emulate a mujtahid from the shrine cities of Iraq.² Pilgrimage to the holy cities (‘atabāt) of Najaf and Karbalā’ and the custom of burying the dead in these shrine cities added another element to Shi‘i inter-connectivity. Trade was another factor. The Shi‘i centres of learning in Najaf and Karbalā’ did not live off agriculture due to low levels of rainfall in these desert cities. Instead, they developed a vibrant network of trade, which was conducted with the Shi‘i south as well as with Persia.³

Shi‘i exposure to modern change in the twentieth century created a new sense of Muslim internationalism. Contact among clerical circles was no longer the primary channel of networking. Scholarly networks expanded in the contemporary era, while new social forces that emerged within the community, including an embryonic intelligentsia, established political and intellectual links that cut across sectarian divides. Transportation and mass education developed, opening these segregated communities to the wider world and enabling growing numbers of Shi‘is to venture beyond their secluded existence. Knowledge began to be dispersed – not only within the religious elite – but among a wider educated population, too. Contemporary journals facilitated greater contacts within the Imami community and between Shi‘is and Sunnis. The development of travel and the proliferation of contemporary ideas not only strengthened networks within the Shi‘i world but also enabled greater contact between Sunnis and Shi‘is, both within the boundaries of new nation-states and beyond them. In the twentieth century, Shi‘is began to accept the reality of nationalism but also the emergence of a new sense of Muslim internationalism that existed alongside a core Imami identity.⁴

In the course of the twentieth century, Shi‘is living in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon were exposed to modernisation and social change. Road and rail links, mass migration from the countryside to urban centres and the expansion of state education were just some of the innovations that began to change their lives. Modernisation also contributed to the emergence of new social forces – the urban poor and a middle class of bureaucrats, businessmen and intellectuals. All three communities were subjected to similar currents of development during this period, although each country embarked on a unique path of state-building and at a distinctive pace of modernisation and secularisation. Social change in Iran had already begun in the late nineteenth century, prior to similar developments among the Shi‘is of Iraq and Lebanon. As secluded and marginalised communities, modern development only reached the Shi‘is of Iraq and Lebanon in the first half of the twentieth century. This was several decades after the wider Sunni population was exposed to modern change, following the wide-ranging reforms, known as the Tanzimat (1839–76), undertaken by the Ottoman Empire.⁵

The Shi‘i bourgeois was also a factor in the changes sweeping through these communities, although there were clear differences in the relative size, significance and orientation of this middle class in each of the three localities and the nature of the threat it posed to the leadership of the ‘ulamā’. Iran had a strong merchant class (bazaari), which had developed a symbiotic relationship with the ‘ulamā’. The bazaaris provided for the maintenance of the clerical community while relying on the clerics for their religious and political needs.⁶ In contrast, in Iraq the mujtahids lacked religious and financial backing from the merchants. Therefore, the rise of new forces in the transition to the modern era – and particularly the embryonic Shi‘i intelligentsia – greatly threatened the clerics’ position. Compelled to react, they sought to regain their authority in this new leadership competition by initiating wide-ranging reforms and presenting themselves as progressive clerics attuned to the needs of a modernised society. As exposure to social change unfolded during the twentieth century, communal dynamics began to shift among the diverse Shi‘i communities in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.

Iran and the Rise of New Social Forces

Significant social changes began to sweep through Iran from as early as the nineteenth century, when the Qajar dynasty (1796–1925) ruled.⁷ In the nineteenth century, the tribal population in Iran began undergoing a process of sedentation.

There was also a growth in cash crops in the countryside, including opium, cotton and fruit, as Iran expanded its trade with the outside world. Starting from the mid-nineteenth century, Iran also witnessed the emergence of an embryonic middle class of intellectuals and businessmen, who became acquainted with Western ideas on constitutionalism, individual freedoms and modern progress. Public education was also developing. The first modern primary school was founded in Tabriz in 1839, and by 1901 Iran had 17 primary schools, one high school and one institute of higher education. New technology and transport were also introduced. In the late 1860s, Iran built a 4,000-mile telegraph network, and in 1888 the first railway track, 8 miles long, was laid. Iran also modernised its banking system, and in the last decades of this century, foreign banks opened branches in key urban centres. By the end of the century, over 500 miles of roads were built, primarily with Russian financial backing.⁸

During this period, Iran experienced the beginning of urbanisation. From ancient times, cities played a role in the political, economic and cultural development of the country. They functioned as governing centres, and also as channels of trade and cultural routes for transporting Iranian civilisation to the West. Despite this, in the pre-modern period, Iran's cities were not very big. They were organised around the traditional institutions of the Friday mosque, the bazaar and public baths, similar to other medieval Muslim cities. The bazaar was the commercial centre of the city and also functioned as a community center, and the bazaari served as the financial backbone of the ‘ulamā’ and the religious institutions. In the late Qajar era, there was a small increase in Iran's urban population, although up until the 1930s most urban centres still had fewer than 100,000 residents. Urbanisation was expanded under Reza Shāh Pahlavi (r. 1925–41) but only gathered significant momentum under the rule of his son Mohammad Reza Shāh, with the promulgation of the White Revolution.⁹

From the late nineteenth century onward, modernisation began accelerating in Iran, as the West increased its economic penetration. Members of the rising Iranian bourgeois together with progressive elements of the nobility began expressing their dismay over the dismal state of the Qajar Empire, following its defeats in the wars against Imperial Russia and Great Britain. These forces of change sought to emulate progress in Europe and called for an overall reform in the system of governance to resolve its incompetence and corruption. Yet, their success was limited due to the reluctance of the absolute monarchy to relinquish power and support far-reaching changes similar to those undertaken at the time by the rival Ottoman Empire in the legal, administrative and economic domains.¹⁰ Only with the Constitutional Revolution and the rise of Reza Shāh did Iran begin to embark upon a significant process of modernisation.

Still, the forces for change were formidable. Notions of progress and self-governance brought together diverse social classes that launched an armed rebellion against the autocratic rule of the Qajars. Under the banner of constitutionalism, the revolution, which began in 1905/6, enjoyed the support of both the traditional classes of the bazaaris and the clerics as well as the new middle class, who joined forces to bring about political change. It brought together intellectuals, members of the bureaucracy, merchants and religious leaders, each with a different vision of governance and the rule of law. All these segments of Iranian society were united in opposing Iran's growing ties with foreign powers and the despotic rule of the Qajars.¹¹

Reza Shāh Pahlavi put an end to this dynasty's control over the country. With his rise to power, Reza Shāh began advancing an all-encompassing modernisation project. As he became increasingly despotic, Reza Shāh equated progress with secularisation, undertaking forced measures of modernisation. The Shāh established a state-run education system and a secular legal framework, thus undermining the traditional seminars and the mujtahids' judicial authority. Education became a vehicle to promote national pride, based on a pre-Islamic Iranian culture and on the glory of kingship. The mission was to enlighten society and re-create the splendour of the ancient Persian civilisation. Toward this end, Reza Shāh nationalised the education system, while simultaneously introducing new text books and advancing contemporary knowledge. The Shāh also sent students abroad to gain higher education and, in 1934/5, established Tehran University as the first Western-style institute for higher education in Iran.¹²

Reza Shāh's grand modernisation project was built on a strong centralised state and a programme of legal reforms. He also reformed the bureaucracy, established a European-style dress code, created a national army and health system and industrialised the country. Iran's traditional cities were remodelled by restructuring the old city centres, erecting new administrative buildings, improving public services, developing new residential areas and establishing towns in place of existing villages. His multifaceted modernisation project led to the expansion of a new Iranian middle class of civil servants, intellectuals and entrepreneurs. It also weakened the traditional religious leadership of the mujtahids, whom the Shāh considered detrimental to Iran's progress. Many members of Iran's growing bourgeois supported Reza Shāh, at least in his early years in power. They endorsed his secular notion of Iranian nationalism and championed his effort at organising the state system and limiting the power of the ‘ulamā’.¹³

The Iranian intelligentsia began to be exposed to Western thought, particularly to that of the French Enlightenment, through cultural ties between the two countries that developed during this period. Ahmad Fardīd (1912–94), the prominent Iranian scholar of philosophy who studied in Germany and France, introduced German philosophies, in particular Heidegger's critique of Western modernity, to the Iranian intelligentsia.¹⁴ The Iranian intelligentsia's exposure to Western thought gained ground during the second half of the twentieth century. This process followed Mohammad Reza Shāh's rise to power (r. 1941–79) and his strong ties with the West, as well as the growth of the numbers of Iranian students that gained their education abroad.

Mohammad Reza Shāh took his father's modernisation mission even further. In 1962–3, the Shāh launched the White Revolution, aimed at reviving Iran's past glories and transforming it into a ‘Great Civilisation’. The White Revolution included six principles: land reform, nationalisation of the forests, profit-sharing for industrial workers, sale of state factories, enfranchising women and creating a literary corps. Through these measures, the Shāh sought to secure the Pahlavis’ control over society. His aim was to weaken the power-base of the rural landlords and to enhance the loyalty of Iran's disadvantaged classes, including its rural population and the growing urban poor, towards the regime.¹⁵

The White Revolution was later supplemented by rapid urbanisation and rising state despotism. To advance Iran's past splendour, Mohammad Reza Shāh expanded his father's monarchy-centred vision of nationalism and created a strategic alliance with the US. The monarchy and Iran were depicted as one, as the Shāh conducted lavish celebrations marking 2,500 years of Iranian kingship. He also replaced the Islamic calendar with a dating system beginning with the first pre-Islamic monarchy of the glorious Persian civilisation. The Shāh's cultural orientation alienated the traditional classes of the clerics, the peasantry, the bazaaris, and the urban poor.

In fact, the Shāh's ambitious project of social change ultimately contributed to his own demise. His grand industrial, agricultural and infrastructural projects were remarkable achievements. Yet, the beneficiaries of these initiatives were the top echelons of the bourgeois and the growing numbers of foreign investors. Meanwhile, the Shāh's agricultural reforms did not lead to a dramatic improvement in the lives of the peasants, who began migrating en-masse to the cities, as many landlords evaded land redistribution. The agricultural labourers and village proletariat were not included in the redistribution, since only the sharecroppers benefitted from this process. These tenant farmers received some land through the White Revolution, yet, the improvement of their conditions did not translate into clear support for the Shāh. The large landowners who functioned as liaisons between the peasants and the government were removed from the picture and the farmers’ grievances were now aimed directly at the authorities.¹⁶

Between 1966 and 1976, following these changes in the countr...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Note on transliteration
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Social Change and the Contest for Communal Leadership
• 2. Muslim Unity: A Contemporary Reading to Historiography
• 3. Modern Shi‘i Theology: Pursuing a Rational Cross-Sectarian Worldview
• 4. From fiqh to Shari‘a: The Creation of an all-Islamic Judicial System
• 5. The Politicisation of Shi‘ism
• Conclusion – Muslim Networks: The Islamic Revolution in Shi‘ism
• Notes
• Bibliography