Christian-Muslim Relations in Egypt

Politics, Society and Interfaith Encounters

Henrik Lindberg Hansen

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9780857738400
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Teologia e religione
• Subtopic: Denominazioni cristiane

The subject of Christian-Muslim relations in the Middle East and indeed in the West attracts much academic and media attention. Nowhere is this more the case than in Egypt, which has the largest Christian community in the Middle East, estimated at 6-10 per cent of the national population. Henrik Lindberg Hansen analyzes this relationship, offering an examination of the nature and role of religious dialogue in Egyptian society and politics. Analysing the three main religious organizations and institutions in Egypt (namely the Azhar University, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Coptic Orthodox Church) as well as a range of smaller dialogue initiatives (such as those of CEOSS, the Anglican and Catholic Churches and youth organisations), Hansen argues that religious dialogue involves a close examination of societal relations, and how these are understood and approached.
The books includes analysis of the occasions of violence against and dialogue initiatives involving Christian communities in 2011 and the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in 2013, and thus provides a wide-ranging exploration of the importance of religion in Egyptian society and everyday encounters with a religious other. The book is consequently vital for practitioners as well as researchers dealing with religious minorities in the Middle East and interfaith dialogue in a wider context.

CHAPTER 1

DIALOGUE AS THE
NEGOTIATION OR NAVIGATION
OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS

The meaning of the concept of “dialogue” is disputed and some argue that the multiple uses of the term obscure its meaning, and other concepts, such as “Muslim–Christian relations”, are preferred. This book sees the concept of dialogue as a signifier in the discursive response to growing regional and international pluralism: it features a discussion on how growing pluralism and other communities should be approached, and the common determinant in this debate is the term dialogue. If other concepts are used, then they are likely to adopt a similar plastic meaning that allows for the discussants to have a term placed at the centre of the discussion. In other words, the term signifies the discussion of how pluralism should be approached and consequently what interreligious dialogue should be, as much as the activity involved in dialogue. In this book, the concept of Muslim–Christian relations is used to describe social dynamics and how other communities are imagined, while religious dialogue is used to refer to the different ways in which different communities try to influence these relations. The multiplicity of the term dialogue is thus the topic of the book.

This chapter is a theoretical discussion of what religious dialogue is, enabling the later examination of the practice of religious dialogue in Egypt. As the introduction outlined, current theological thinking primarily utilises philosophy of religion to understand the differences between dialogical practices; applying this theoretical framework to the Egyptian setting is found to produce an impoverished understanding of what dialogue is in Egypt. Dialogue deals with more than how the other religion is thought (cognitive structures); religious relations permeate all of society and are negotiated in multiple ways. The first task of this book is consequently to outline a theoretical framework that can be used to understand the richness of methods, aims, and goals of dialogue and how these have social relevance. To this end, existing theological thinking has been bracketed to allow time and space to delve into other theories. In this regard, the following definition of dialogue is helpful:

Religious dialogue is a tool for the negotiation and navigation of intergroup relations within and between groups having religion as a significant delimiter.

People gather as social beings in communities to feel safe. Part of what makes people feel safe is that we participate in an interpretation of the world that enables us to function in the world together as a community. Because of this, belonging and interpretation of the world are directly connected. The reason for joining these communities of interpretation is consequently positive, but as several communities exist they might confront each other. This confrontation can feel like or actually be a threat to the physical existence and the interpretation of the world of the confronting communities. Based on this, the variables found to be important to research in dialogue are: (i) the socio-political structuring of society into social categories, (ii) the social positioning of individuals through social identities, and how these influence (iii) emotional patterns, and (iv) cognitive structures ordering the access the world and divinity.

(i) The socio-political structuring of society: recent thinkers from political science and sociology understand societies as constructs (Laclau 2007; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) comprising different groups. The fluent structures of society define the relationship between religion and politics and between different groups in society and contingent identities – and consequently also the societal fabric religious dialogue consists of: dialogue thus differs between regions of the world.

(ii) The social positioning of individuals through social identities: the Social Identity Approach (Postmes and Branscombe 2010) looks into the dynamics of intergroup relations; people react to other people, not only based on their personal relation to these people, but rather based on how the person understands him- or herself as part of a social group (social identity) compared to the social groups of other people (Tajfel 2010b, 80–1). In so far as people identify with religiously defined groups, and religious dialogue is influencing relations between two groups in society, social psychology can shed light on many of the dynamics by which dialogue functions. Dialogue thus also differs within a country depending on the needs of the participating social groups.

(iii) Emotional patterns and (iv) cognitive structures: people group together because they are social beings who need to belong to a group to feel at peace with themselves and to feel that they have a place in the world (Turner 2010a, 260–7; Honneth 2006; White 2001, 139). These groups help define how other groups are understood (Race 2001; Knitter 2002) and what feelings they provoke based on the relations between groups (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Mackie and Smith 2003). If religious dialogue aims to influence relations between religious groups, one therefore needs to look into both emotional patterns and cognitive structures, as these define the attitude of a person towards another person or group (Pettigrew 1998).

These four variables will structure the theoretical chapter as well as the book in general. Chapter 2s explains the socio-political structuring of Egyptian society relevant to understanding the role of religion in Egyptian society and Egyptian dialogue initiatives. The third chapter focuses on emotional patterns and cognitive structures and how they have materialised into behavioural patterns. The fourth chapter then describes how dialogue (the negotiation of social positioning) is conducted in Egypt, and how it relates to socio-political structures and attitudes. Finally, the fifth chapter discusses the relevance of clientelist structures after the revolution in 2011 and consequently the adaptation of pre-revolutionary dialogical endeavours. Now, after a brief discussion of the relation between religion and politics/society, each of the four variables essential to the understanding of dialogue will be explained theoretically.

The relation between religion and society/politics

This book deals with religious dialogue as a social phenomenon, but this is only possible if religion is understood as having social relevance. Before we can progress to looking into the theoretical framework of the book, we will therefore first need to discuss how religion is conceptualised in relation to society and politics.

The contemporary distinction between religion and society is often connected to the idea of separation between church and state. On the one hand, drawing on Max Weber, the state is often defined as the human community, which, as one central feature of the state, lays claim to a monopoly on legitimate physical violence in society (Chavura 2011, 72). This eventually led to the myth of states that are completely separate from religion, which is especially evident in the theories of John Rawls (Chavura 2011, 82), where whatever religion is left in governance eventually will disappear as progress advances. Martin Luther has a similar distinction between the “two swords”; while the carnal sword preserves peace and justice, the spiritual sword provides a means of salvation (Lerfeldt 1967, 174–81), though he believes the carnal sword is in place to protect the interests of the spiritual sword.

Despite this relatively sharp theoretical distinction, the separation of state (and society) and religion has always been negotiated in different ways. The separation of state and religion is a human distinction settled with the purpose of managing the influence of different social entities, which is obvious when looking at the extent to which these entities are defined differently around the world, now and throughout history (Barbalet, Possamai, and Turner 2011). The social importance of churches and other religious communities leads to social significance and therefore to political relevance (Zrinscak 2011, 167), even in societies where there is a sharp theoretical distinction between religion and society/politics.

Analytically it is prudent to start deliberations from the idea that there is no difference in “reality”; the notions of the religious, social, economical and political are notions academics and practitioners use to understand reality through distinction:

This means that, instead of using generic notions of religion and the state that purport to be valid for all times and places, I prefer to focus on the social processes whereby the meanings of these terms are generated, attributed, deployed and contested in particular social and cultural contexts. This allows me to work with rough and ready definitions that merely identify the outer limits of common usage. (Beckford 2011, 43)

With these words, we are in the analytical realm of discourses (Howarth 2000; Fairclough 1993), where the construction of reality is the human endeavour of finding a way in life (Wittgenstein 2001, 42; Das 1998). Looking at discourses means trailing how people dynamically use their language, leading to meanings arising, instead of normatively assuming a certain inflexible structure of reality. Religion and society are consequently concepts that move with time and the development of human reality. The relation between religion, society, and politics in Egypt of relevance to this book will be described in Chapter 2.

Religion and sociology

It is the fundamental human need for belonging and a sense of locatedness that is the connecting point between religion and society – or theology and sociology or social psychology in this book. While specific dogmatic (i.e. doctrinal aspects) or religious (i.e. the practice of a religion) content has little bearing on this book (and when it does it is as a cognitive structure producing either a positive or negative attitude towards others, depending on the context), it instead focuses on how religion and religiosity influence relations between groups. Religion is an extraordinarily suitable carrier of identity because religious communities often define the contours of social groups, as succinctly formulated by Jeffrey R. Seul:

In all their multifarious expressions and dimensions, the world’s religions answer the individual’s need for a sense of locatedness – socially, sometimes geographically, cosmologically, temporally, and metaphysically. Religious meaning systems define the contours of the broadest possible range of relationships – to self; to others near and distant, friendly and unfriendly; to the non-human world; to the universe; and to God, or that which one considers ultimately real or true. (Seul 1999, 558)

If religions make for stronger identities than other groups, such as political groups, then it also follows that the dangers of this identity producing negative relations – under circumstances conducive to negativity – is equally high. Religious groups function by the same principles as any other group (Jackson and Hunsberger 1999, 510), and the knowledge of the group is influenced by its social relations to the same extent as any other group with similar structures and functions in society. This does not mean that being an efficient carrier of identity is the sole function of religion; it is merely the focus of this book as it is believed to further research in and attempts at dialogue.

Whether religions have certain structures fundamental to the communication of spirituality is not essential to this book, where the focus is on religion as a social reality. It is, however, tentatively suggested that knowledge of spiritual life can be likened to a religious language, which is developed locally.¹ In the vocabulary of Wittgenstein, all knowledge is formulated in language – and, from the perspective of sociology, is as such a social endeavour. Jean-Francois Lyotard (2001) points to the very centre of Wittgenstein’s second philosophical phase, when writing that Wittgenstein’s major contribution to philosophy is that all knowledge is formulated in language (Wittgenstein 2001, 90). While Lyotard, drawing on Wittgenstein, signals the beginning of a new paradigm of thinking termed “the Postmodern” in his influential book (Lyotard 2001), it does not mean a complete break with all aspects of “Modern” thinking. Wittgenstein is in fact building on the ideas of Immanuel Kant, known as the father of modernism, in so far as he separates between “das Ding an sich” (the thing in itself) and “das Ding für mich” (the thing as it appears to me) – “das Ding an sich” being unreachable to human understanding (Kant 1996). A major difference between Kant and Wittgenstein is that while Kant talks about a universal (i.e. interpersonal) access to “das Ding für mich” through reason, Wittgenstein is describing understanding as something more local through language and communication: with language at the centre, understanding becomes a way of finding your way in the world (Wittgenstein 2001, 42; Das 1998), and this way is built between people through communication (Wittgenstein 1995). Wittgenstein’s focus on language as the basis for understanding clarifies how knowledge of one’s own group and other groups is something situated locally within a community, from where the world is interpreted. This is fundamental to understand the connection between knowledge and social dynamics elaborated in the rest of this chapter.

The main interest of Wittgenstein is in the formation of knowledge as an integrated part of the formation of language. It is obvious from Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 2001) that this is something done within a community, but he does not elaborate much on the impact of the surrounding society and the individual as a social being on the formation of language. This is, however, at the very centre of Foucault’s theories, where one finds a focus on the relationship between knowledge and power. In his book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault (1995) points to knowledge not being insight found in a power vacuum, but something produced as a result of power relations in society (Rouse 2005). Foucault understands knowledge as the product of the dominant power-creating norms, which increases the productive value of the individuals for society, and empowers people who strive to stay within the settled norm and thus remain politically manageable (Foucault 1995, 138; Lindgren 2007). The agent behind this power is, however, not fortunate individuals or groups in terms of power (Rouse 2005, 112), but it is the average citizen him- or herself who propagates a specific body of knowledge, defining what is the norm and tolerated in society and who the deviants are: who cannot be allowed by society and are thus ostracised, for example by being declared a criminal or insane in extreme cases (Foucault 1995, 194; Ritzer and Goodman 2003, 589). Normalisation consequently becomes a central concept to the power structures of society: “normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power … indicating membership of a homogeneous social body but also playing a part in classification, hierarchisation and the distribution of rank” (Foucault 1995, 184).

Spirituality “in itself” (the thing in itself) is then not necessarily a social construct, but spirituality “for us” necessarily is, using Kantian terms. Human knowledge is built between people in communities in the attempt to understand and act in the world together. This would explain why apparitions of the Virgin Mary are more likely to be interpreted as such by Egyptian Protestants than Danish Protestants. It also explains why some people are non-religious and others are religious, and why some are Muslims and some Christians: these are different communities interpreting the world in an attempt to find their way in life. Each of these communities of interpretation then constitute a social entity, which will appear alien to both their own interpretation of the world and the social entity – some of these communities of interpretation will appear as a threat at times, to the extent that we feel compelled to defend ourselves and our way of life. The negotiation of these relations between the communities of interpretation is what is termed “dialogue” and what will be explored in this book.

It would, however, be too much of a detour to focus on the question of spirituality specifically – it is sufficient to indicate that the formulation of spirituality can also be seen as a local endeavour partaking in the general attempt to navigate reality. The interpretation of theology and dogma (how religion is actually lived, thought, and how it influences the interpretation of other communities) is understood as part of the local, social interpretation of the world, making it possible for people to live their lives with other people in communities as social beings.

It should be underlined that religion being defined as part of general social dynamics does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the contents of religion are entirely settled by humans with no interference of divinity. It would be close to solipsism, believing the world does not exist independent of human thought, if it is brought to mean that sociological thought unveils religion as a social construct with no place for divine interference; sociology merely traces the sociological aspects of religion, but can hardly comment on issues alien to its perspective. However, it does mean that religion (religion for us, but not necessarily in itself) does not have a settled meaning without variation, which necessitates looking into the differences in belief within all religions leading to different approaches to other religions. The sociological background for the differences within a religion then becomes crucial to the study of dialogue, as religious dialogue is precisely the negotiation of attitudes towards other religions that takes place in society.

Having defined the approach to religion and society, it is now time to discuss the crucial role of groups in the construction of society.

The Socio-Political Structuring of Society

Investigating social relations from the perspective of groups, each group can be seen as its own magnetic field. Society as a whole is constructed by the network of magnetic fields, each of which attracts some fields while keeping others at a distance – this process of pushing and pulling groups in society shapes each group in relation to the other groups. The groups are thus never isolated entities functioning independently from the rest of society, but always changing depending on the growth or decline of other groups. It follows that relations between groups become central to understanding groups and their knowledge about themselves and each other and how they change over time. The theoretical interest of groups to the analysis is that the constellation of groups in a society – how one group is distinguished from another – determines what role religion has in society and if or how religious dialogue takes part in the construction of society, and consequently if or how religious dialogue has any social relevance; if religion is a social signifier then social groups will dist...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables and Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1. Dialogue as the Negotiation or Navigation of Intergroup Relations
• 2. Politics, Religion, and Society in Mubarak’s Egypt
• 3. The Interpretation of Muslim–Christian Incidents
• 4. The Dialogical Navigation and Negotiation of Egyptian Society
• 5. Egypt and Dialogue in a Time of Revolutions
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Back cover