International Politics and the Northern Ireland Conflict

The USA, Diplomacy and the Troubles

Alan MacLeod

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781786720115
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de l'Irlande

British troops, which arrived as a temporary measure, would remain in Ireland for the next 38 years. Successive British governments initially claimed the Northern Ireland conflict to be an internal matter but the Republic of Ireland had repeatedly demanded a role, appealing to the UN and US, while across the Atlantic, Irish-American groups applied pressure on Nixon's largely apathetic administration to intervene. Following the introduction of internment and the events of Bloody Sunday, the British were forced to recognise the international dimension of the conflict and begrudgingly began to concede that any solution would rely on Washington and Dublin's involvement. Irish governments seized every opportunity to shape the political initiative that led to Sunningdale and Senator Edward Kennedy became the leading US advocate of American intervention while Nixon, who wanted Britain onside for his Cold War objectives, was faced with increasingly influential domestic pressure groups.
Eventually, international involvement in Northern Ireland would play a vital role in shaping the principles on which political agreement was reached - even after the breakdown of the Sunningdale Agreement in May 1974. Using recently released archives in the United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland and United States, Alan MacLeod offers a new interpretation of the early period of Northern Ireland's 'Troubles'.

CHAPTER 1

INTERNMENT

In the early hours of Monday 9 August 1971 the British Army, in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), began Operation DEMETRIUS – the arrest and internment without trial of suspected republican terrorists. Brian Faulkner, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, claimed the decision to introduce internment had been forced upon him by the IRA campaign of violence over the summer of 1971.¹ Although Northern Ireland enjoyed a significant degree of political autonomy from the rest of the United Kingdom and the decision over internment was Faulkner's to make, the agreement of the UK Prime Minister, Edward Heath, was necessary, as the participation of British troops was required to mount an operation of this scale. Despite reservations, Heath agreed to the introduction of internment, concluding that the levels of violence in the Province would have to be reduced before any meaningful political peace process could be developed.²

Rather than create the peaceful conditions necessary for a political solution, a wave of violence erupted across the Province. The Catholic minority saw internment as yet another sectarian attack on them by the Stormont Government. Not one Protestant paramilitary was picked up during Operation DEMETRIUS. Moreover, the RUC Special Branch list of active IRA men was so inaccurate that many of those detained had to be quickly released.³ The introduction of internment precipitated rioting that lasted for several days, followed by a mass civil disobedience campaign by the minority community. This included the non-payment of rent and rates and the resignation of Catholics from public bodies.⁴ Minority opinion was further enraged by the tales of Army brutality, and even of torture, from those arrested and interrogated in the operation.⁵ In the eight months prior to the introduction of internment, 34 people had died as a result of the Troubles. In the four months between the introduction of internment and the end of the year, a further 140 people were killed.⁶

The Irish Reaction

Anglo–Irish relations deteriorated sharply following the introduction of internment. Jack Lynch, the Irish Taoiseach, condemned the introduction of internment in Northern Ireland as ‘deplorable evidence of the political poverty of the policies which have been pursued there for some time’.⁷ Frustrated by the British refusal to acknowledge Dublin's right to involvement in resolving the conflict or to heed Irish concerns, the Lynch Government developed an increasingly aggressive policy towards the UK Government. Over the month following the introduction of internment this moved from public attacks on the Heath Government's policy to actions aimed at undermining Northern Ireland's Unionist Government. Yet this was not a reckless policy borne of emotion. Rather, this was a carefully calculated policy enabled by the Irish Government's accurate analysis of the restrictions that prevented the British from retaliating. By the end of August 1971 this had inserted the Irish Government into the international dimension of the Troubles as Heath was forced to invite Lynch for talks.

Dublin was in a much better position to react to the introduction of internment than earlier crises in Northern Ireland. During the first major disturbances in 1968, the Fianna Fáil Government had shown itself to be largely ignorant of conditions in Northern Ireland. Moreover, the Irish Cabinet was split between hardliners, who contemplated armed Irish intervention in Northern Ireland, and more moderate voices who would countenance only peaceful involvement in the North. In the years since then most of the hardliners had left the Government thanks to the Arms Crisis of 1970, leaving Jack Lynch to follow his more ‘moderate’ policy relatively unhindered.⁸ Furthermore, the Irish Government had taken steps to better inform itself on Northern Ireland and to better formulate policy. In 1969 Lynch had created the Inter-Departmental Unit on Northern Ireland (IDU). The IDU was comprised of senior officials from across the Irish civil service and was charged with investigating issues referred to it by the Taoiseach and to report back, making recommendations.⁹ In addition, Eamonn Gallagher, an official from the trade section of the Irish foreign ministry, had developed contacts with leading members of the minority community in Northern Ireland. Gallagher became an important advisor to Lynch on issues relating to the North and following the introduction of internment became the head of a new Anglo-Irish section in the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs. This section also included Sean Donlon. Donlon was recalled to Dublin from the United States the day after internment was introduced, to act as a conduit between the Irish Government and politicians in the North.¹⁰

All this compared favourably to the confusion of responsibilities that existed in the UK. Northern Ireland enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy, having its own Parliament based at Stormont and its own government headed by a Prime Minister. While Stormont retained competence for all domestic issues in Northern Ireland, the British Government had been using its influence to pressure the Stormont Government to reform. Meanwhile, Westminster retained control of British forces deployed to the Province, while Army policy was the subject of negotiation between London and Belfast. Within the British Government things were no better. Northern Irish affairs were the responsibility of a small bureau in the Home Office, while Anglo-Irish relations were the responsibility of the Foreign Office and control of the British Army was the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence.¹¹ A Cabinet Subcommittee, meeting irregularly, attempted to coordinate policy, while the Home Secretary and Prime Minister were left to liaise with the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner.¹²

Internment crystallised the opposing approaches of the British and Irish governments to the Northern Ireland crisis. Both governments wanted peace in Northern Ireland. However, in the words of Sir John Peck, the then British Ambassador to Dublin, their ‘differences lay in their diagnosis and cure of the Northern sickness’.¹³ For the British, a political solution in Northern Ireland was essential. Westminster and Stormont were cooperating to implement an agreed programme of reforms in a process that dated back to the previous Labour Government and the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969.¹⁴ Yet the level of violence had increased over the summer of 1971 to the point where it was ‘threatening the life of the community’.¹⁵ As a result, the British Government concluded that it was first necessary to deal with the terrorists and this led to them agreeing to internment. The British Government's view was that reducing the level of violence was a necessary prerequisite to political reform and once achieved this would create the conditions in which progress could be made towards developing a fair and just society in Northern Ireland, one that was acceptable to both the minority and majority communities.¹⁶

Dublin's view was rather different. The Irish Government was convinced that only the reunification of Ireland could ultimately resolve the crisis in Northern Ireland. Until this could be achieved the Irish wanted to see the creation of a just society in the North. For Dublin, standing in the way of this was a Stormont Government and Parliament dominated by the Orange Order, that discriminated against the Catholic minority, and had no interest in implementing reforms.¹⁷ Furthermore, rather than bringing the two communities together, the Irish believed that the British focus on military solutions merely alienated the minority further. This, in turn, was increasing the minority's support for the IRA. The Irish Government argued that only a demonstration by the British Government that it would not allow the Unionists to obstruct meaningful reform and the ending of the Catholic community's exclusion from power would begin to persuade the minority to abandon their support for the IRA.¹⁸ Dublin's increasingly aggressive policy over the course of August 1971 was an attempt to force the British Government to recognise this and to alter its policy accordingly.

The introduction of internment convinced the Irish Government of two things. First, Stormont had to go. Secondly, its replacement should involve the equal sharing of power between the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. Dublin therefore attempted to convince the British Government of this through diplomatic contact and by endeavouring to bring British public opinion to bear on the Heath Administration. In a meeting on 11 August 1971 the Irish Foreign Minister, Patrick Hillery, told the British Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, that Stormont was finished. Hillery proposed that a commission comprised of equal numbers of representatives from both communities should replace it. In the exceptional circumstances of Northern Ireland, where the majority Protestant community held power permanently, Hillery argued that the normal processes of democracy did not work. A solution along the lines of a commission would help to build a responsible leadership for the minority community and provide an alternative to the IRA.¹⁹ Maudling demurred, but reported Hillery's proposal to Heath. The following day, in a telephone conversation between the British and Irish leaders, Lynch again pressed the British to consider the commission proposal. Heath rejected the idea, telling Lynch that he ‘couldn't consider anything that meant constitutional change’.²⁰

Having failed to persuade the British in private, Lynch decided to go public. Lynch warned Heath that he was under considerable domestic pressure to make a statement on the situation in Northern Ireland and that he was considering publicly floating the commission idea. The Taoiseach stressed that if he did raise the commission proposal he would not reveal that it had already been put to the British Government.²¹ Later that afternoon, 12 August 1971, Lynch released his statement, which was far more aggressive in tone than Heath felt he had been led to believe it would be.²² The statement launched a withering attack on Stormont, accusing it of delaying and distorting reform while attempting the repression of the minority through internment. It also included an appeal to the British public, who, it was argued, would be horrified by what was being done in their name, and at their expense, in Northern Ireland. Events had now demonstrated that Stormont could not be reformed and needed to be replaced.²³

Sir John Peck's analysis was that the statement emerged out of an Irish Cabinet meeting that had lasted all day and attempted to reflect the range of opinion in the governing Fianna Fáil party.²⁴ Yet this was not just empty posturing by Lynch. He clearly believed that Stormont could not be reformed and needed to be replaced. Any replacement had to include cross-community power-sharing. In addition, the security policy being pursued jointly by the Stormont and Westminster governments, Lynch believed, amounted to the ‘outright repression of the minority’.²⁵ Lynch's statement was motivated not only by domestic political considerations, but was primarily intended to bring further political pressure to bear on the British in an attempt to convince the Heath Government to reverse what Lynch considered were disastrous policies. Indeed, the Irish Government was now also attempting to go over the head of the British Government and appeal directly to the British people. According to Lynch's statement ‘the British public, if fully aware of the facts, would turn away in horror from what they have been asked to support’.²⁶ Lynch was attempting to rouse British public opinion as another source of pressure on British government policy toward Northern Ireland.

Although surprised by the aggressive tone of Lynch's statement, Heath ruled out any direct response to it. Instead, Heath decided to absorb the pressure coming from Dublin, arguing that time should be given for tempers to cool before replying.²⁷ Faulkner's response, however, was not as measured. The Northern Irish Prime Minister rejected Lynch's right to intrude in the affairs of a neighbouring country, arguing Lynch had demonstrated ‘cant and hypocrisy’ by trying to achieve by political means what the IRA were trying to obtain by terrorism.²⁸

Beyond calling for the abolition of Stormont and its replacement with a cross-community commission, Lynch restated the Irish Government's claim to have a role to play in Northern Ireland. Lynch sought to have this recognised by the British. On 19 August 1971, Brian Faulkner travelled to Chequers, the official country residence of the British Prime Minister, to meet with Heath. The Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and the Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, were also present. To coincide with this meeting Lynch sent a telegram to Heath, which was released to the press before it was received by the Prime Minister. Lynch's telegram stated that it should by now be obvious to the British that military solutions would not work in Northern Ireland and instead a political initiative was needed based on the principle of equality of treatment for all the people of Northern Ireland. If this change of policy did not happen then Lynch would support the passive resistance campaign of the nationalist minority in the North. Finally, Lynch declared himself ready to take part in ‘a meeting of all the interested parties’ aimed at resolving the issues affecting Ireland, ‘without prejudice to the aspiration of the great majority of the Irish people to the re-unification of Ireland’.²⁹

This was Lynch's third press statement in ten days attacking British policy in Northern Ireland. It was effectively an ultimatum. Unless the British changed their policy, Lynch would openly support a mass passive resistance campaign that was aimed at undermining the administrative structures in Northern Ireland. Lynch had moved from his statement of 12 August 1971 which called for the replacement of Stormont, to declaring his support for action that was aimed at bringing this about. However, if the British Government relented and reversed its policy, then Lynch stood ready to attend talks as the representative of one of the ‘interested parties’ to the conflict.

Heath's response was not as measured as it had been on 12 August. In the words of Sir John Peck, Heath's reply to Lynch was ‘a fair stinker’.³⁰ Heath rejected Lynch's assertion that the principle of equality of treatment was lacking from either British or Northern Irish policy. The purpose of the military action being taken was to protect the lives and property of all the people of the Province. Some assistance from the Irish Government in tackling the terrorists would be welcome. Heath also criticised Lynch's support for the campaign of passive resistance as ‘calculated to do maximum damage’ to cross-community cooperation, and went on to say that Lynch's whole approach would do nothing other than increase tensions in Northern Ireland. Finally, Heath rejected Lynch's proposals for talks including the Irish Government, as Heath could not accept that ‘anyone outside the United Kingdom can participate in meetings designed to promote the political development of any part of the United Kingdom’.³¹

While the British had been willing to absorb the pressure emanating from Dublin since the introduction of internment, by the time of the exchange of telegrams of 19–21 August 1971 they were no longer prepared to do so. Lynch's calls for the abolition of Stormont and now his willingness to support the passive resistance campaign of the minority community in Northern Ireland were calculated to undermine the authority of the Stormont Administration. With Brian Faulkner in a room with them, Heath and Maudling were placed in the position of having to support Faulkner and his policies. The British political establishment did not want direct rule. Brian Faulkner was seen as the only remaining acceptable Unionist figure capable of holding the position of Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. If Faulkner fell there was no one to replace him. The British Government would be forced to abolish Stormont and introduce direct rule from Westminster.³²

Furthermore, the British Government was sensitive to anything that might provoke a ‘Protestant backlash’ in Northern I...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Note on Terminology
• Introduction
• 1. Internment
• 2. Bloody Sunday
• 3. Direct Rule
• 4. The US Presidential Election
• 5. The Coalition
• 6. Sunningdale
• 7. The British General Election
• 8. Doomsday
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography