South Asia and the Great Powers

International Relations and Regional Security

Sten Rynning

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781786721341
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Indian & South Asian History
• Index: History

Where the implications of war and peace are open to question, the possibility of change depends more on politics than economics. This book asks whether the region's great powers can overcome opposing interests and commit to political restraint. The concept of regional security is based on great power support for regional order. However, there are many pitfalls to consider: notably, the politics of contested nationalisms; the Asia-Pacific rivalry of China and the US; and India's inclinations to function - or be seen - as a benevolent hegemon for the region. Yet there are signs of renewed determination to move the region in new directions. While China's Silk Road projects are long-term regional investments that hinge on regional stability, the US is attempting to fashion new partnerships and India strives to reconcile regional differences to promote a peaceful environment.This book, as it sets out the emerging agendas of the great powers and local powers, makes a significant contribution to a better understanding of the international relations and diplomatic politics of South Asia.

PART I

TRANSITIONS

CHAPTER 1

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA: A POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Ronald E. Neumann

It is a truism that regional cooperation depends on some degree of shared interests. In South Asia interests in stability and prosperity could, and perhaps should, draw Pakistan, Afghanistan and others in South Asia to work together and with NATO. However – and it is a big however – interests alone are not a sufficient basis for cooperation. There must be belief that the value of the shared common interests exceeds contrary individual interests. In addition there must be a degree of certainty about the policies of cooperating partners. Without trust cooperation is unlikely to be sustained. The two issues, of belief that common interests will dominate policy and that one party can trust the other, are two sides of the same coin. Actions of any state are usually taken by others as the basis for understanding a state's “real” policies, especially when actions appear to diverge from statements.

Unfortunately, at the moment there is neither clarity about nor trust in the policies of any of the key players in this discussion; not the United States, not Pakistan, not Afghanistan or Iran or Russia and certainly not NATO. This will need to change in order for there to be a possibility for substantial improvement in regional relations.

There are some hopeful signs. America is showing some renewed determination.¹ China is showing new activism. Above all, improved regional cooperation would need to bridge deep distrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As of this writing there are new efforts for cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, good words must be supported in the two areas of military cooperation and work on negotiations with the Taliban. Whether this will happen time will tell.

As of this writing, distrust seems to be the predominate characteristic of regional politics. Pakistan has made many statements about its support for peace negotiations with the Taliban. But to date its military actions have been directed entirely at suppressing the Pakistani Taliban, not the Afghan. Taliban fighters out of Pakistan continue to pour into Afghanistan for large-scale attacks and spectacular suicide attacks alike. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai seems to be willing to make a further effort at negotiations but distrust of Pakistan's intent remains rampant among Afghans, including many within the National Unity Government.²

China has become more active in calling for and participating in peace negotiations. However, there is no sign that China will use its influence with Pakistan to press the Pakistani government to take stronger measures to actually bring the Taliban to a settlement. Taliban statements in the recent Pugwash Trace II meeting in Doha³ continue to call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops – an action that would critically weaken the Afghan government – before the Taliban will engage in negotiations.

America's statements of support for the Afghan government are clouded by continued statements about how it is leaving, and by restrictions on the use of airpower that allow the Taliban to amass forces and manoeuvre without fear of American attack, and the completion of an Afghan air force to fill the gap is still several years away. This, plus the fact that the Obama administration is ending and no one knows what will be the policies of the next administration leave America's future policy in doubt. Several NATO nations, particularly Germany and Italy, have made clear that they think the forces deployed for NATO's current training mission should be expanded but without American leadership this is unlikely to happen. Thus there is profound regional uncertainty about how America's policy will unfold in the coming years.

The same lack of clarity is true of other regional parties. Indian–Pakistani relations have made no major breakthrough. Russia has begun limited military supply to Afghanistan⁴ but US–Russian relations are full of tension. No one knows how these tensions will affect Afghanistan. Iran has signed a nuclear agreement but its determination to carry out the agreement remains a subject of debate. And the intensification of Iranian–Arab tensions and Iranian engagement in Syria raise many problems to greater US or NATO cooperation with Iran.

Fear of exclusion has always been a part of the Afghan wars. Throughout the years of fighting between the Mujahedeen, and later with the Taliban, outside support for different parties continued strongly. Pakistani support for the Taliban, which continues, fed Indian fears that Afghanistan could become a bastion for the training of groups that led attacks on India. This was part of the reason that India supported other groups. Russian fears of an Islamic state in Afghanistan led to support for anti-Taliban groups and may be among the causes for Russia's slowly increasing military assistance to the current Kabul government. Iran supported Shia groups (Hazara parties) to keep them fighting. While much of the support was insufficient to allow any party to win it often appeared that it was motivated by a desire to exclude others from dominating the political outcome in Afghanistan. Pakistani statements of support for Pashtuns and concern that a Kabul government dominated by Tajiks or Uzbeks would suggest that the Pakistani fears of having its interests excluded from Afghanistan remain strong.

What is clear is that politics, far more than economics, will drive the pace and possibility of change. In terms of this book's three analytical themes, therefore, it is political restraint and the management of the fear of exclusion that must be seen as key enabling factors for the third theme of embedded opportunities for social and economic growth. Actions will continue to speak much larger than words alone. Hence it is not the form of dialogue or the organization of Track II meetings that are key to change but, rather, the need for visible change in the policies pursued by major regional actors. This essay will briefly examine the history of regional cooperation, the problematic actions of the major states to date and the need for change if regional cooperation is to become a reality.

A Brief Historical Perspective

There have been periods of more cooperative relations. However, it is useful to remember that each stemmed more from shared interests, often among outsiders, than from formal arrangements. Essentially, one may consider the history of the last two centuries as falling into four periods. The first was that of the so-called “Great Game” dominated by Anglo-Russian relations which transformed into a continuing neutrality between the Soviets and Americans, although the creation of Pakistan added an element of tension. The second was the period beginning with the Afghan domestic communist revolt that led to the Soviet invasion, increasing American and Pakistani support for the insurgents, then civil war and, finally, the rise of the Taliban. The third period began with the American and then international intervention after the September 11 2001 Al-Qaeda attack on New York. With the ending of NATO combat operations after 2014 and the election of a new Afghan government the area entered a new phase but whether it will mark a distinct departure from the past has yet to be seen.

There have been and are now efforts to promote economic cooperation in the region. However, what is clear is that politics have been the predominant element. If the political elements change then economics could become a major factor in keeping on track improvements in regional cooperation. Without political change there is nothing in the historical record to suggest faith in seeing economic interest become the driver, rather than the follower of political developments. The first and second Anglo-Afghan wars were both triggered by British fears that Russia, which had been steadily expanding across Central Asia as Britain consolidated its control of India, would arrive at a location touching India. This would have positioned Russia to attack directly into India.⁵ There were occasional interests from both, particularly the British, in expanding trade but the Afghan market was never large and political interests predominated.⁶

After the second Anglo-Afghan war, Afghanistan was essentially a neutral state in which Russian and Great Britain refrained from competing. As is well known, this state of affairs derived from Anglo-Russian views of avoiding conflict rather than from any particular policy about or for Afghanistan.

From 1929 to 1979 Afghanistan was largely at peace. There was some small fighting with Pakistan after its creation in 1947 and relations between the two were never particularly cordial but neither was there a particularly dangerous competition. For much of this period the Soviet Union did not try to bring Afghanistan directly under its influence. The United States, for its part, tried to balance Soviet influence and give the Afghan's room to manoeuvre politically without trying to match the size or composition of Soviet assistance. Thus most of Afghanistan's army was Soviet equipped but the US provided a number of training courses. There was even a measure of rough coordination in economic assistance; the US built the east-west Kabul to Kandahar highway while the Soviets built the north-south link (subsequently used for their invasion).

This is not the place for detailed consideration of this history. Rather, there are three points from it that are relevant to the subject of future cooperation. One is that the neutrality of Afghanistan and a measure of cooperation resulted not from policies about cooperation or neutrality so much as from the various parties, particularly the US and Soviets after mid-century, having larger interests elsewhere. There was no over-arching formal structure of cooperation or neutrality. Secondly, there were no strong doubts about the policies of the major players. The US took care not to challenge the Soviets too directly for influence in Afghanistan. The Soviets were fairly clear that Afghanistan was too far behind in development to be ready for Communism. Pakistan worried about possible Afghan hostility but was preoccupied with two Indo–Pak wars, the loss of East Pakistan, relations with China and the early development of its relations with the United States. Afghanistan was not a front burner issue.

This changed when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to rescue the failing revolution of the Afghan communists.⁷ Regional alliances did develop in opposition to the Soviets as America, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and others to a lesser extent acted to support the Mujahedeen. However, those alliances were part of that particular war. After 1992, following the withdrawal and later collapse of the Soviet Union the Americans essentially ignored Afghanistan.

What did change was the continuing involvement of outsiders in the long period of civil conflict after the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan remained heavily involved in support first of insurgent groups and later in support of the Taliban.⁸ India and Iran were drawn in, as were others. What was clear about this period is that defending political interests and groups was the central motivation. There were periodic discussions of economic interests, such as those concerning a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India (TAPI) but they neither succeeded nor did they drive the politics.

With the American invasion of 2001, Afghanistan returned to centre stage in international affairs. Afghanistan became a central issue because of American and NATO involvement in the outcome of the war. The re-emergence of the Taliban and the increasing evidence of the importance of their sanctuaries in Pakistan led to particularly bad Afghan–Pakistani relations. Afghan President Hamid Karzai became shrill in his denunciations of Pakistan and Pakistan saw Karzai as hostile and in league with India in an effort to encircle Pakistan.⁹

The same period also saw the growth of extremist movements in Pakistan to the extent that they increasingly threatened Pakistan as well as being directed at Afghanistan and India. The issues of terrorism and extremism that dominate so much of international concern are unlikely to ignore Afghanistan in the future. In fact, the emergence of the so-called Islamic State and the near collapse of Iraq seem to have slowed if not arrested the pace of attempted American disengagement from Afghanistan.

We may now be entering a new stage with changes in the Afghan government, new language from Pakistan, new Chinese involvement and signs of a resurgence of American interest in Afghanistan. All these elements, examined below, continue to evolve faster than the lethargic pace of book publishing. However, it is possible to look at the fundamentals of what remains unclear in the policies of the major state actors. These are the elements that must change to create confidence. And confidence, much more than formal agreements, is what would be necessary to regain the clarity of understanding, even though informal and not without suspicion, which undergirded regional quiet in an earlier period. Could one go even further into more explicit cooperation in order to enhance stability and prosperity? For the moment the answer is in doubt and there are many reasons to conclude that the answer will be no. That could change. I believe the region would gain from more cooperation. But change will require both different policies and greater alignment of words and actions from all major players than exists now.

Economics or Politics First?

Before World War I it was often thought that, because of economic interdependence, war between the major powers was not possible. That view was wrong. Today it is often noted that economics will strengthen c...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part I Transitions
• Part II National Interests
• Part III Perspectives
• Conclusion South Asia in Quest of Restraint
• Select Bibliography