The Origins of ISIS

The Collapse of Nations and Revolution in the Middle East

Simon Mabon, Stephen Royle

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781786721488
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Terrorism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The rapid expansion of ISIS and its swathe of territorial gains across the Middle East have been headline news since 2013. Yet much media attention and analysis has been focussed upon the military exploits, brutal tactics and radicalisation methods employed by the group. While ISIS remains a relatively new phenomenon, it is important to consider the historical and local dynamics that have shaped the emergence of the group in the past decade. In this book Simon Mabon and Stephen Royle provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of the roots, tactics and ideology of the group, exploring the interactions of the various participants involved in the formative stages of ISIS. Based on original scholarly sources and first-hand research in the region, this book provides an authoritative and closely-analysed look at the emergence of one of the defining forces of the early twenty-first century.

1

Sovereignty, Political Organisation and the Rise of ISIS

On 1 May 2016, the prime minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi, ordered the arrest of protestors who had stormed the Green Zone in Baghdad. The protestors, led by the Shi‘a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, had seized control of parliament in frustration at the political situation in Iraq. Al-Sadr and his followers were demanding reform of the political system imposed by the USA following the 2003 invasion, which relies on networks of patronage to function, allowing widespread corruption to flourish across the state. Since 2003, Iraq has been in the throes of an existential struggle. At stake is the very future of Iraq as a state. If it wishes to experience its centenary – in 2032 – it must resolve a number of problems that are pulling at the very fabric of the state. Ethnic, tribal and religious identities are clashing, and with these tensions the state of Iraq is fragmenting. As a number of these identities take on increasingly violent dimensions, Baghdad's position grows more precarious. Iraqi society has long been characterised by cleavages, along religious, ethnic and tribal lines. Across the history of Iraq, these identities have been mobilised for political ends, entrenching deep grievances that, when the fabric of the state was eviscerated in 2003, came to the fore. The story of the rise of ISIS in Iraq is best understood by exploring the creation and manipulation of these grievances, along with how they have manifested in violence.

Back in 2003, while standing on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq. In his speech, Bush articulated how:

our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country […] Men and women in every culture need liberty like they need food, and water, and air. Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity rejoices. And everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear […] We are helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. And then we will leave – and we will leave behind a free Iraq.¹

Recalling these words highlights the complexity of political authority and the difficulty of rebuilding a sovereign state. The failure to address problems that Iraq has experienced since Bush's speech in 2003 ultimately led to the rise of ISIS, a sentiment echoed by UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond in the aftermath of the Chilcot Inquiry.

In this chapter we set out to do two things: first, to set out an understanding of sovereignty and political organisation that will help to understand the issues explored in greater detail later in the book, and second, to locate the group within the wider Middle East. Such an approach helps us to understand that a combination of deteriorating socio-economic conditions and increased sectarian violence made Iraq a breeding ground for the establishment of militant groups, sectarian militias and criminal enterprises.

Sovereignty and political organisation in the Middle East

In order to understand the emergence of ISIS it is necessary to explore the context from which the group emerged. Although the capital of the caliphate is Raqqa, in Syria, the group controls territory in both Syria and Iraq, cutting across the border between the two states. Control of land in Syria and Iraq demonstrates the erosion of both states’ sovereignty. With the fragmentation of Syria and Iraq since 2003, peripheral groups gained power while the authority of Damascus and Baghdad diminished, raising questions about the extent to which these states can be considered sovereign. These questions can help us engage with political organisation on the ground and, ultimately, with the conditions that gave rise to ISIS.

Western understandings of sovereignty are typically grounded in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648,² which ended the Thirty Years’ War and was based on the principle that states possess exclusive authority within clearly defined territorial borders. This was later built upon with the principle of non-interference, which remains the cornerstone of International Relations discourse.³ International Relations scholars refer to a ‘Westphalian states system’, whereby a state is ‘a system of political authority based on territory and autonomy’.⁴ As such, one can derive equality between states, based upon the premise of non-interference, which is protected in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter. Article 2(1) stresses that ‘[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’,⁵ Members meaning member states of the UN.

Stephen Krasner distinguishes three component parts of sovereignty: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty and domestic sovereignty.⁶ The latter two are most important for this study, as the nature of internal and external understandings of sovereignty helps to determine how a state can operate. Historically, work on sovereignty is driven by the notion that it is ‘a unity, in itself indivisible’.⁷ This suggests that a zero-sum understanding of sovereignty operates, wherein a state is either sovereign or not. Yet, the rise of ISIS calls this into question. Conceptual work on understanding sovereignty broadens understandings of the term. For Max Weber, sovereignty can be found in ‘human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’,⁸ and thus a state is a ‘compulsory political association with continuous organisation [whose] administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of legitimate use of force in the enforcement of its order […] within a given territorial area’.⁹

This understanding of statehood contains three indicators: an administrative staff; a military that is able to legitimately monopolise violence; and the necessary structures to collect taxes.¹⁰ This understanding is problematic in the Middle Eastern context, given the existence of rentier economies in the Gulf, and the emergence of groups that challenge the state's monopoly of the use of violence. More contemporary understandings of sovereignty draw upon the interaction of authority, territoriality and citizenship in order to claim that an entity is sovereign.¹¹

For Krasner, understandings of Westphalian sovereignty include ‘an institutional arrangement for organising political life that is based on territoriality and autonomy. States exist in specific territories. Within these territories domestic political authorities are the only arbiters of legitimate behaviour.’¹² Yet, as Krasner notes, sovereignty is regularly ‘violated’, a process he refers to as ‘organised hypocrisy’. Violations typically occur through interactions with external actors, with some stemming from an inability to control trans-border flows or aspects of domestic behaviour. This inability has given rise to contractual arrangements that correspond to international legal understandings of sovereignty, but which violate the Westphalian model by compromising domestic autonomy or establishing new institutional arrangements that transcend territoriality. Thus it is important to note that violations can occur with the consent of rulers in addition to being imposed.

It is when sovereignty is unwillingly violated – against the wishes of rulers – that many of the conditions are created for the emergence of groups such as ISIS. The reduction of authority, coupled with violations of territorial integrity, has presented space and opportunities for groups to challenge the state. Many of the conditions integral to these violations are due to the nature of the state-building process in the region, leading to an artificial construction that comprises different tribal, ethnic and religious groups. In many cases, authority resides in the periphery of these states, rather than in the core. A number of states are home to ethnic groups who possess either irredentist or secessionist aspirations, which challenge both the territorial integrity of the state and the authority of the rulers.¹³ Further complicating this relationship is the religious dimension, whereby authority is often challenged by Islam.

In a more nuanced approach to the issue, James Caporaso¹⁴ suggests that four themes interact in sovereignty: autonomy, authority, territoriality and citizenship. In the Middle East, many of these component parts are problematic, given the legacy of colonialism, a lack of territorial clarity and competing sources of authority, be they tribal or religious. An awareness of these component parts of sovereignty can help elucidate tensions within a state, and the fragmentation of sovereignty can also raise awareness of the nature of power relations within a state.

State-building projects across the region have sought to bring together disparate identity groups within the context of a singular national identity, formed neatly within the confines of territorial boundaries. Within this, ideas of citizenship are clearly defined, and systems of governance have been developed to help states function. Yet when tensions between different identity groups begin to emerge and competition between different groups erodes the concept of a national identity, the consequences for ideas of citizenship – but also the sovereign state – are potentially serious.

When the interaction between identity groups begins to take on a violent form then the centralised authority is weakened and power is often diffused from the core – where the regime resides – to the periphery. This is rarely endorsed by ruling elites; rather, peripheral groups are able to increase their autonomy within particular areas on the periphery of the state. Given the perceived artificial nature of many states across the region, the clarity of borders is often lacking. This can result in increased insecurity and instability between as well as within states. Thus, when a group emerges that is able to lay greater claim to the loyalty of many of these identity groups than the state, claims to sovereignty appear infelicitous.

The Western-centric nature of much of the literature engaging with these questions is worth stressing at this point.¹⁵ Despite sovereignty being widely accepted as a norm of the international system, it is grounded in the Western philosophical tradition, which potentially poses problems when applied to non-Western domestic affairs, particularly when engaging with questions of territorial governance and citizenship. To provide a non-Western voice into political organisation, the remainder of the book draws upon the work of Ibn Khaldun, notably his concept of asabiyya, which expresses solidarity and kinship. However, the concept of sovereignty remains integral to understanding the rise of ISIS across the Middle East and provides innovative insight into exploring power relations within the state.

Syria and Iraq: fragmenting sovereignty and political disorder

From this initial exploration of the idea of fragmenting sovereignty, the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq can be traced back to the nature of political organisation within both states. Both have experienced fragmentation of the state in recent years: Iraq following the US-led invasion in 2003 and Syria in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings in 2011. When the sovereignty of a state is eroded, chaotic spaces emerge, wherein powerful groups are able to exercise autonomy over particular areas. Through various tactics (discussed in greater detail below), ISIS has been able to cultivate a fiercely loyal support base and also to lay claim to control over a much wider territory by creating a climate of fear. However, in order to reach a stage where this is possible, domestic conditions must be such that the group can emerge.

Syria has a population of approximately 18 million, of whom over 90 per cent are Arab and the rest a melange of other ethnicities including Kurds and Armenians. An estimated 74 per cent of the population are Sunni Muslim while 13 per cent are Shi‘a, Alawi and Ismaili. Christian denominations make up 10 per cent of the population and Druze 3 per cent.¹⁶ Despite its religious diversity, Syria, up until the 2011 uprisings, had been a bastion of stability in the region, with Alawi-aligned President Bashar al-Assad, like his father Hafez before him, having a relative degree of popularity. The upheaval began as part of a series of protests across the region, facilitating the expression of long-standing grievances against the regime, which had failed to deliver political and economic reform while simultaneously maintaining a securitised structure over society through the imposition of a ‘state of emergency’. While initially driven by local social, economic and political demands, like many others across the region, the protests soon took on sectarian overtones. In the beginning, Assad sought to appease some local political demands, even removing the ‘state of emergency’; however, this was done alongside brutal crackdowns on protests in Derra, Homs and Banias, which led to international condemnation and further escalation of the unrest.

External actors, seeing in the opposition's momentum and the worsening humanitarian situation an opportunity to destabilise and remove Assad's regime, cultivated links with members of rebel forces and used the situation to lobby for international intervention. Rebel groups rallied, placing Damascus under threat while cities such as Aleppo were left in a state of destruction. The conflict became increasingly internationalised, drawing in a range of regional and international actors, notably Saudi Arabia, Iran, Hizballah, the UK, the USA, Russia and Turkey. At this time, Syria became an arena of proxy competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran¹⁷ and between the USA and Russia. The humanitarian impact of the conflict is undeniable, with an estimated 300,000 deaths, 4 million people becoming refugees and a further 7 million displaced internally.

With regime control waning and borders becoming increasingly porous, international fighters filtered across the border from Turkey, strengthening radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda, Jabhat Al-Nusra and Jaish al-Islam who were quick to fill the power vacuum left in predominately Sunni areas to the east of Assad's control. Saudi Arabia, guided by former head of intelligence Prince Bandar, provided financial and logistical support to Jaish al-Islam, a group led by the Syrian Salafi Zahran Alloush, son of a Saudi-based cleric. While their operations gained increased publicity during 2012 and 2013, it is the emergence of ISIS that has commanded the most fear. Syria became the platform from which ISIS launched its operations, embedding itself in towns and villages spanning from Aleppo to the border with Iraq. As the conflict in Syria moves into its fifth year, the Assad regime has regained control over large parts of Syria, in no small part due to the influence of Hizballah fighters and Iranian military commanders.

Iraq has a population of around 32 million, ethnically divided amongst Arab (75–80 per cent), Kurdish (15–20 per cent) and smaller denominations such as Turkmen (5 per cent).¹⁸ Iraq's Sunni population accounts for approximately 35 per cent of the overall population (predominately Arab and Kurd) and Shi‘a 65 per cent. Amongst this ethnic and religious mix, there are also 150 recognised tribes, themselves made up from an estimated 2,000 smaller clans.¹⁹ The north of Iraq is predominately populated by Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds, and while the latter have largely benefited from the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the former have struggled to contend with a Shi‘a-controlled government. Indeed, numerous long-standing grievances have come to the fore and altered power relations over land, finances and resources, resulting in disharmony and open revolt.

The prevalence of organisations such as AQI during the aftermath of the 2003 invasion was typical of the chaotic circumstances in a country further burdened by the disbanding of its military and the process of de-Baathification. The creation of militias in predominately Sunni areas, notably in Anbar, in coordination with American security forces, gaining the title ‘Sons of Iraq’ or Sahwa, was designed to balance this threat and, in the long term, integrate Sunni members into the national army. However, despite its relative success in defeating AQI, al-Maliki's concern not to empower figures loyal to the former leader meant that this never happened and, instead, resulted in the slow evaporation of a programme that left 90,000 fighters without pay or position.²⁰ This lack of trust and further blocking of Sunni access to the public infrastructure hastened the divide within Iraq and in doing so weakened national security. The vacuum created in northern cities such as Tikrit, Mosul and Fallujah, coupled with frustration at the Shi‘a-led government, has thus left it open to new influences, such as ISIS.

The political marginalisation of Sunnis also created an environment within which the Sunni identity was securitised and persecuted by a range of actors across Iraq, creating a climate of fear. This persecution was largely undertaken by Shi‘a militias with implicit support – at times – from the state, furthering the notion of deep sectarian divisions within the fabric of the state. ISIS has b...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• List of Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Sovereignty, Political Organisation and the Rise of ISIS
• 2 Political Organisation and the State in Iraq
• 3 The Sectarian House of Cards?
• 4 Tribalism and the State
• 5 The Roots of Sunni Militancy and its Enduring Threat in Iraq
• 6 The Human Tragedy
• Conclusions
• Notes
• Bibliography