The Croatian Spring

Nationalism, Repression and Foreign Policy Under Tito

Ante Batovic

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781786721846
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Communism, Post-Communism & Socialism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Nationalism is a key topic within Balkan Studies, and one of the driving forces behind the bloody and difficult history of the region. Using primary sources not previously utilized by western scholars, this book documents the 'Croatian Spring' - a national and liberal movement that began in the mid-sixties after the fall of the vice president and head of the Yugoslav secret police Aleksandar Rankovic. The author chronicles these developments of democratisation and de-centralisation of communist Yugoslavia, placing them in the wider context of the Cold War and Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates. Tito managed to balance national stability and his relations with East and West, until he felt that the national-liberal movements challenged his authority, and thus threaten the very foundations of the Yugoslav state. From late 1971 onwards, the liberal political and cultural classes of Croatia and other republics were abruptly purged, impoverishing Yugoslav leadership for subsequent decades.Batovic also considers the role of the West, who felt a centralised and stable Yugoslavia was in their interests and quickly accommodated themselves to the repression of the reformist movement.

1

The Cold War World

The Impact of Détente

Global international relations in the immediate period after World War II were marked by a gradual escalation of tensions between the former Allies, led by the United States and the Soviet Union. From 1947 onwards, the conflict was primarily ideological, but in some parts of the world, such as Korea, it led to open war. The first phases of the Cold War lasted until Stalin’s death in 1953. In the short interim period of the thaw from 1953 to 1956, when the Soviet Union was under the collective leadership of the Politburo, it took the initiative in improving relations with the West. This period ended when an internal fight for supremacy within the Soviet leadership was resolved and Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the party leader in 1956.¹ The period of his leadership was marked by a stream of foreign policy crises: the intervention in Hungary and the Suez crisis in 1956, the confrontations in Berlin, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Such foreign policy risks, in a period of military and economic inferiority, further weakened the Soviet Union and compromised its international reputation. This was one of the key reasons for Khrushchev’s fall in October 1964. His successor, Leonid Brezhnev, would conduct a more prudent foreign policy, while expanding Soviet military capabilities to establish parity with the West. After Khrushchev’s fall, the Soviet Union would find itself for the second time under the leadership of the Politburo. With the USSR still humiliated by the Cuban crisis, Soviet policy towards the West took a more conservative course under Brezhnev’s leadership.²

In order to compensate for its global military weakness, the Soviets built a remarkable arsenal of strategic weapons in the period from 1965 to 1968 under the supervision of Brezhnev’s close associate, the Central Committee Secretary for Military Industry, Dmitri Ustinov. He ordered the development of intercontinental missiles, nuclear submarines and strategic bombers. This helped to establish a strategic equilibrium with the United States by 1969, but at the cost of 18 per cent of the Soviet defence budget.³

The danger of nuclear conflict and the high production cost of nuclear weapons were two of the key factors that led to détente and a period of decreased tensions between the superpowers. This period lasted from the early 1970s to the final breakdown of détente with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The first signs of détente could already be seen in the late 1960s, as a consequence of internal processes on both sides and their international activities. In the Soviet Union the economy was heavily burdened by huge military expenditure, as well as by the US’s superiority in technology, industrial power and international trade. In addition, the Soviet Union was involved in a long-standing ideological conflict with the People’s Republic of China that started immediately after Stalin’s death and culminated in an armed conflict on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969. The United States, on the other hand, was gradually losing its economic pre-eminence because of the rise of Western Europe and Japan. Simultaneously, it was involved in an expensive and unpopular war in Vietnam.

President Richard Nixon, elected in 1968, and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger recognised an opportunity in these international circumstances to improve the international position of the US. After 20 years of open hostility towards Mao’s China, Washington started a more conciliatory policy towards the communist regime in Beijing, while China was weakened by internal instability and international isolation caused by the Cultural Revolution. The American initiative resulted in the visits to Beijing of Kissinger in 1971 and Nixon in February 1972. Both Beijing and Washington had a mutual interest in limiting Soviet influence. By establishing relations with the People’s Republic, Washington achieved two goals. It weakened Moscow’s position and at the same time put diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union over the negotiations with North Vietnam to end the war in south-east Asia.⁴

Sino–American negotiations helped to end the American military engagement in Vietnam, but they also changed the balance between the Cold War blocs and significantly influenced the global détente process. The Sino–American rapprochement led the Soviets to take a more conciliatory position towards the West.⁵ Already in 1972 a first agreement on limiting the production of nuclear weapons was signed in Moscow (SALT I), and by 1974 several similar agreements were signed that drastically reduced the danger of nuclear destruction and led to improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁶

Global détente permitted the European détente that had already started in the mid-1960s and continued in the 1980s after global détente no longer existed. Unlike global détente, which focused on relations between the US and the USSR and on nuclear weapons, the European détente included a wider area of cultural and economic cooperation between East and West, along with cooperation on resolving European border disputes. The process of détente in Europe had several unique attributes. European leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain wanted to conduct a more independent policy from the Cold War superpowers. The best examples were De Gaulle’s France and Ceaușescu’s Romania. In addition, the Europeans were fully aware that a potential war between the blocs would first destroy Europe. In 1964 De Gaulle established diplomatic relations with communist China and signed cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union. In this way, he wanted to reduce European dependence on the United States. Naturally, he wanted to strengthen France’s influence and become leader of an independent European foreign policy. This initiative, however, was short-lived. France did not have the political strength to achieve major changes in Europe.⁷

An initiative that would have far greater influence in establishing European détente came from Bonn. The future West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, while mayor of West Berlin, was deeply aware of the negative impact of the division of Berlin that symbolised the division of Europe.⁸ The formation of the West German coalition government in 1966 in which Brandt became foreign minister marked a change in West German policy towards Eastern Europe and opened the door to Ostpolitik. Bonn started to establish diplomatic relations with Eastern European states, reversing the Hallstein doctrine of non-recognition of communist states that recognised East Germany (the German Democratic Republic, or GDR).⁹ Not by accident, Romania was the first Eastern European state with which Bonn established diplomatic relations in 1967. For years, Romania had tried to conduct a more independent foreign policy from Moscow. The further improvement of relations with other Eastern European states was blocked by the East German leader Walter Ulbricht, who accused Bonn of trying to dissolve the monolithic unity of the Communist bloc.¹⁰ In addition, Bonn’s unwillingness to recognise East Germany as an independent state, and its unresolved eastern borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia, prevented the establishment of better relations with both the GDR and the Soviet Union. The only visible progress between West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, or FRG) and the East was the establishment of relations with Yugoslavia in 1968.¹¹

Along with the conciliatory attitude coming from Bonn, the turning point that changed the course of Soviet policy towards better relations between the blocs in Europe was, paradoxically, the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The paradox was that the crackdown on the Prague Spring opened a deep chasm within the international communist movement, while at the same time enabling the beginning of détente in Europe.¹² While Brezhnev feared that the intervention in Czechoslovakia could lead to open war in Europe, it strengthened his position in the Soviet leadership, giving him the credibility to start negotiations with Western leaders. The intervention proved to all satellite states in Eastern Europe what they could expect if they tried to follow the Czechoslovakian path. In 1972 Brezhnev declared: ‘Without Czechoslovakia there would be no Brandt in Germany, nor Nixon in Moscow, and there would be no détente.’¹³

This time, the initiative for constructive solutions to Europe’s problems came from Moscow. Brezhnev could not count on support from the Nixon administration, and instead turned to Bonn. In their new approach, the Soviets did not insist on Western recognition of the Oder–Neisse border with Poland as a precondition for opening talks. The border issue was simply added to dialogue. The only precondition was international recognition of the GDR. The West responded with an initiative to improve the situation in Berlin, which Moscow did not oppose. Simultaneously, the Polish government proposed to resolve the border dispute in a bilateral agreement. The final move occurred with the election of a new West German government in September 1969, with Willy Brandt as its Chancellor. Brandt won the election with promises to pursue Ostpolitik and strengthen the bond between the Germanys. The FRG signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in November 1969, and in August 1970 Brandt and the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin signed the Moscow Treaty, which recognised Europe’s existing borders.¹⁴ Brandt performed a massive U-turn and supported the recognition of the GDR with the motto ‘One nation, two states’, which did not imply a recognition of the permanent division of Germany. The negotiations were difficult, because Ulbricht obstructed progress. But after his removal in 1971, events progressed more rapidly.¹⁵ By 1972 the FRG had signed several ‘eastern treaties’ that regulated relations with its eastern neighbours. The Moscow Treaty settled relations with the Soviet Union and in the Warsaw Treaty of 1970 West Germany accepted the Oder–Neisse border with reservations.¹⁶ In addition, Brandt’s symbolic act of showing remorse in the Warsaw ghetto in 1970 marked the end of open disputes between West Germany and Poland. The apogee of Ostpolitik was the settlement of the division of Berlin in September 1971, and the treaty with the GDR in December 1972, which coincided with the rise of Soviet–American détente.¹⁷

Soviet Interests in Yugoslavia

The key dilemma for Yugoslav foreign policy in the complex postwar international order was how to combine Yugoslavia’s attachment to the international communist movement with the policy of non-alignment and the system of economic ‘self-management’ that introduced elements of the free market. With this in mind, the relationship to the Soviet Union was of special importance. Similarly to the West, the Soviet Union had a strategic and ideological interest in strengthening its influence in Yugoslavia. Surrounded by the Soviet East European satellites, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, and in a strategically important position, the non-aligned Yugoslavia was particularly sensitive to the messages coming from Moscow that could be interpreted as interfering with its domestic policy. The Yugoslavs were also alarmed by any signs of increased Soviet influence in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. The key Yugoslav asset was its access to the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean. Western politicians and military officials often emphasised that the protection of Yugoslav independence from Moscow’s influence was a key strategic requirement for keeping the Soviets away from the Mediterranean.

The Soviet attempts to reach the Mediterranean were simply a continuation of a long-standing Russian policy to secure access to warm seas. The USSR had an option to use its Baltic and Far East bases and ports, but with a better climate the Black Sea and the Mediterranean offered more favourable strategic and economic benefits. In addition, this was the fastest way to the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and the Atlantic.¹⁸

The Black Sea, however, was limited by Turkish control over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles Straits, as well as by the Montreal Convention of 1936, which prevented unlimited passage to shipping without Turkish consent. In the interwar period such a policy suited the newly created Soviet state, which did not have a significant naval capability in the Black Sea. Turkish control also prevented other fleets from entering the Black Sea, and this protected the Soviet Union. After World War II and in the new circumstances of the Cold War, however, the Soviets increased their attempts to expand control to the Mediterranean.¹⁹ The Turkish crisis of 1945 revealed that the West would not simply allow Soviet expansion. Stalin’s attempt to gain control over the straits failed when the United States intervened by sending what would become the 6th Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, which thereafter remained under the firm naval and military control of the West.²⁰

The Suez crisis of 1956, however, changed the geostrategic relationship between the great powers in the Mediterranean. Great Britain and France lost a great deal of their influence in the region, and the United States filled the vacuum left behind after their retreat. After 1953, Moscow started to change Stalin’s uncompromising policy towards the Third World that resulted in rejecting potential allies.²¹ The new Soviet leadership had a far more flexible attitude towards anti-colonial movements and newly formed Third World states. They emphasised the ‘Soviet readiness to cooperate in the national development of non-socialist countries’.²² The Soviets found new allies in decolonised countries. These were not necessarily interested in Soviet communist ideology, but welcomed Soviet material and political support in their fight against neo-colonialism. At the same time, many Third World countries saw in the Soviet socialist model a means to modernise their economies. They were also forced to implement this model because they were unable to adapt fast enough to market-driven capitalist economies, which involved an unpleasant relationship with their former colonial masters.²³ Egypt and Syria were the champions of such models in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt was of particular interest to Moscow for its strategic position and the role it had as the leader of Arab resistance to western neo-colonialism. Before 1961, however, Egypt did not interest the Soviets in strategic terms, because the USSR’s key stronghold in the Mediterranean was the Albanian port of Valona. Only after Tirana’s split with Moscow in 1961 over the Soviet conflict with China did Moscow start to intensify the build-up of its naval capabilities in Egypt and Syria. By 1964, the Soviets were establishing the 5th Eskadra (fleet) to balance the American 6th Fleet. The height of Soviet military and political expansion coincided with the Arab–Israel Six-Day War in June 1967. Until the war, Nasser was not at ease with Soviet attempts to strengthen their military influence in Egypt. The Arab defeat, however, completely changed the perspective. It damaged Nasser’s reputation in both Egypt and the Arab world, while Israeli military supremacy along with the occupation of Sinai became a serious threat to Egypt’s security. In order to preserve his position in power and prevent further Israeli actions, Nasser was forced to ask the Soviets for extensive military and economic support. In the period after 1967, Soviet military and economic assistance, along with a military presence, brought Egypt to a state of complete dependence on Moscow. It also allowed the Soviets to strengthen their position in the Mediterranean.²⁴ The Soviet position would be endangered in 1972 when Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, requested the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Egypt, although that did not prevent the Soviet Union from assisting Egypt militarily in the Yom Kippur war of October 1973.²⁵ Eventually in 1976 the Soviets were completely thrown out of Egypt when Sadat decided to establish cl...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Author Bio
• Endorsement
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• Acknowledgements
• Foreword
• Introduction
• 1 The Cold War World
• 2 Yugoslavia, 1945–65
• 3 Economic Reforms and the Fall of Aleksandar Ranković
• 4 The Language Question
• 5 Liberal Reforms
• 6 Democratising Foreign Policy
• 7 Nixon in Yugoslavia
• 8 1971: Yugoslavia in Crisis
• 9 Two Visits
• 10 Purge
• 11 1972: Aftermath
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography