Suppressing Illicit Opium Production

Successful Intervention in Asia and the Middle East

James Windle

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780857729569
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Geopolitics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Conventional analysis of the illicit opium market suggests that source country interventions have at best achieved minimal results. Yet there are countries that have eliminated, or significantly reduced, the illicit production of opium from their territory. Drawing on a wide range of academic, official and non-governmental sources, including previously unidentified records, James Windle provides detailed narratives of countries that have achieved national success, including China, Iran, Turkey, the People s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Thailand, Pakistan, Vietnam and Laos, and identifies key factors necessary for successful intervention. Suppressing Illicit Opium Production makes a valuable contribution to our scarce knowledge of source country drug policy and draws out important lessons to be learned for improving the effectiveness of future interventions. It will be essential reference for all practitioners, policy makers and academics concerned with a subject of significant contemporary relevance."

CHAPTER 1

CONTEXT, THEORY AND CONCEPTS

This chapter provides a foundation for the remainder of the book by outlining key concepts and terms, and key areas of theory. This means that concepts and terms defined here can be repeated throughout the book without definitional ambiguity. Most of the theory outlined in this section is common to all the country-level case studies that follow. This allows the individual case study chapters to maintain their focus on the empirical evidence and particular nuances of theory as it relates to individual countries. This will, in turn, facilitate the identification of common themes and issues across countries that will form the cross-case comparison.

As the book is concerned with both within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons, it has been guided, to a large extent, by methods of process-tracing and structured comparisons developed by George and Bennett (2005). Process-tracing permits the investigator to test and create theory by examining the interplay of multiple causal factors in the process (George and Bennett, 2005). That is, each chapter traces the factors which combined to allow a major opium-producing nation to reduce production by 90 percent to below 20mt.¹

Prior theories are presented in this chapter in order to establish potential causal factors to be accounted for in the narrative. Each case study chapter thus represents a detailed narrative guided by the employment of theoretical factors drawn from previous research findings. Each individual case will, furthermore, engage with established theories to place the interventions in context whilst elucidating the steps taken (see George and Bennett, 2005). The causal factors identified in this chapter will then be used in the cross-case analysis in Chapter 8.

Overview: objectives of source country interventions

The focus of this book is the first stage of the illicit opiate supply chain: opium poppy cultivation and opium production. This area of strategy is often termed source control as it is based in source countries. Proponents of source control suggest that locating and destroying opiates at source removes the greatest quantity of drugs from global markets (ONDCP, 2009), whilst being easier and more cost-effective than interventions in consumer markets. It is suggested that poppy fields are easier to detect than concealed packages of heroin. Furthermore, as the farm gate represents the cheapest link in the distribution chain, traffickers invest fewer resources in its protection (Perl, 2007; Wrobleski, 1989; Wyler, 2009; US State Department, 2008).

That opium is cheapest at the farm gate is the origin of what is probably the single most critical argument against source control policy (Tullis, 1994, also Mejia and Posada, 2010): because opium is produced in areas with low risk and profuse cheap labour, traffickers can absorb farm gate price increases with minimal effect on profit or retail price (Holahan and Henningsen, 1972; Kleiman and Reuter, 1986; also, Caulkins et al., 2010; Keefer et al., 2010). A recent estimate of the price mark-up between Afghan farm gate prices and UK street retail prices is about 15,800 percent (Wilson and Stevens, 2008). As such, interventions at source are widely considered to be the least cost-effective means of controlling consumption (Moore, 1990).

Depending on the analyst's perspective, a second key area of theoretical criticism of source control strategies is that Western markets are ‘buffered’ by markets closer to the source (Caulkins and Hao, 2008; Caulkins et al., 2010). For example, Pietschmann (2005; also Paoli et al., 2009) found that a reduction in Afghan opium production in 2000 was felt most intensely in the neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan rather than Western Europe. As profits to be made from the industrialised west are typically greater, traffickers ensure that any short-term reduction in supply is absorbed by reduced sales in more local markets with little impact on the more lucrative markets elsewhere.

This all said, international and national drug policy is about more than stopping consumption in Western countries. Opium-producing areas tend to possess higher than the global average levels of opium and heroin consumption (Westermeyer, 1981, 2004; also, Epprecht, 2000; Gebert and Kesmanee, 1999) and reducing consumption does motivate governments to suppress opium production. Consumption is, however, one of many factors motivating governments to try to stop farmers producing opium. Alternative or parallel objectives, discussed in the case study chapters, have included:

• (1) Decreasing the negative effects of large-scale production and trafficking²
• (2) State extension into remote areas
• (3) Counter-insurgency
• (4) Attracting foreign aid
• (5) Improving foreign and international relations

Conversely, drug-control objectives are often subverted by political or economic objectives³ (see McCoy, 2003; Mercille, 2013; Walker, 1991, 2007; Windle, 2011, 2013). Supply reduction policy and practice is far from simple. It is often mired in a political context of competing and sometimes contradictory national and local policies and programmes: the consumer is often a minor consideration. This complicates the implementation of strategies (Windle, 2014), as will become apparent in relation to many of the country-level studies.

Theories and strategies of source control

There are three broad, and often overlapping, means of suppressing opium, which we will call: development-orientated approaches, bans, and forced eradication. Development-orientated approaches range from basic crop-substitution programmes, in which farmers are provided alternative crops and little else in terms of social welfare or market development, through to more sophisticated alternative development programmes, to the most current incarnation – alternative livelihood programmes, which seeks to address ‘the structural and institutional factors that shape... [farmers'] decisions to grow' (Youngers and Walsh, 2010: 11; see Forsyth and Michaud, 2011; Morey, 2014 for more general discussions on livelihoods in development). Alternative development and livelihoods are primarily separated by their objectives and implementation. The primary objective of alternative development is drug control. The primary objective of alternative livelihoods is development. As such, alternative development programmes are implemented by drug control agencies, whilst livelihood programmes are implemented by development agencies supported by drug control agencies (Mansfield, 2007; Mansfield and Pain, 2005). This means, alternative livelihood programmes resemble more traditional rural development projects, with the addition of ‘sequenced law enforcement’ when appropriate and as a last resort (World Bank, 2005:122).

While development-orientated approaches provide incentives to ceasing production, punitive strategies provide disincentives to continuing production. Forced eradication is conducted either manually (i.e., ploughing, burning, beating or slashing poppy fields) or by herbicides sprayed from the ground or air, and is often administered or supported by the police or military. Under George Bush, the US government considered forced eradication to be the

… most cost-effective means of cutting supply. Drugs cannot enter the system from crops that were never planted, or have been destroyed or left unharvested; without the crops there would be no need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations (US State Department, 2007:15).

Bans differ from forced eradication by the introduction of direct punishments.

In practice, the three areas overlap because, in a cost–benefit formulation of these strategies, development assistance equates roughly to benefits and, eradication and bans equate roughly to costs. Hence, the strategic manipulation of these costs and benefits (which include cultural, psychological and other elements in addition to monetary costs and benefits) is the overarching theoretical framework within which this discussion takes place.

During the mid-1980s, UN-sponsored projects began to perceive development alone as insufficient to reduce opium production. Thus, negotiated or ‘voluntary’ eradication became central to crop substitution and alternative development. Projects negotiated contracts with target populations or local elites specifying that the project will provide development assistance in exchange for farmers' observing scheduled decreases in opium poppy cultivation. Here, the key theoretical development is the addition of an explicit disincentive to the policy formula, introduced via the contract and threats of law enforcement. The key theoretical element of the contract was termed ‘conditionality’, wherein farmers only receive development assistance as a condition of meeting specified drug-control goals. Such contracts often contain caveats providing for forced eradication or punishment if the agreed schedule is not adhered to (see Farrell, 1996; UNDCP, 1993). This law-enforcement disincentive was a politically contentious development for some parties in a context where farmers of illicit crops were, rightly or wrongly, perceived as the victims of impoverishment. The corollary to this argument was that, while most farmers clearly lived in impoverished areas, not all people in these areas resorted to illicit crop cultivation, and people in other parts of the world in similar conditions also did not resort to illicit crop cultivation (Farrell, 1996). While eradication was – and remains – contentious, in some USAID projects non-adherence can result in the removal of aid (Mansfield, 2007). There was also some diversification in strategy as more international agencies undertook efforts. In some instances, farmers have been offered compensation for ‘voluntarily’ ceasing production, though this approach was seldom used by UN projects and was found to largely fail as a strategy when employed in Afghanistan in the early 2000s.

‘Sequencing’ is a closely related concept representing the choice of when to enforce prohibitions. US-sponsored projects have often eradicated crops and then presented populations with aid or demanded cessation of production as a precondition for aid (Blanchard, 2009; Veillette and Navarrete-Frias, 2007; Wert, 1994). Many other donors – following UN General Assembly (1998; CND, 2009) guidelines – have postponed punitive measures until alternative incomes have been established (Mansfield and Pain, 2005, 2006; World Bank, 2005). A conference convened by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and UNODCCP, and attended by NGO and government practitioners, concluded that development-orientated approaches

… should neither be made conditional on a prior elimination of drug crop cultivation nor should a reduction be enforced until licit components of livelihood strategies have been sufficiently strengthened. (Feldafing Declaration, 2002:art. 4).

What constitutes an appropriate sequence has been narrowed further by some to exclude law enforcement during violent conflicts (Chouvy, 2009; Hagan, 2001; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007; Rubin and Sherman, 2009). This is partly to avoid conflicting with counter-insurgency or state-building objectives (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Caulkins et al., 2010).

While bans and eradication may increase operational risks, they can also generate negative outcomes. As shall be illustrated in the case studies, punishments for opium farming have often been draconian and eradication and the incapacity of farmers through imprisonment or death can intensify impoverishment, as many opium farmers survive on or below the poverty line (Chouvy, 2009; Mansfield, 2009; Rubin and Sherman, 2009; Ward et al., 2008).

Generally, any measure damaging the interests of opium farmers can be detrimental to rural–state relationships (Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Paoli, et al., 2009; Ward et al., 2008; Windle, 2013). Interventions have resulted in political (Jelsma, 2001; Lee, 1991; Tullis, 1994; Windle, 2014b) and violent opposition (Hafvenstein, 2007; Lee, 1991; Youngers and Walsh, 2010), including inflating support or incomes for insurgent groups (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Paoli et al., 2009; Rubin and Sherman, 2009). Law enforcement may further alienate rural peoples from the state, which can augment regime destabilisation and erect barriers to democratic governance (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007; Rubin and Sherman, 2009; Windle, 2011, 2013) whilst inflating military budgets and authority in rural areas. This can strengthen the military against civilian rule (see Chouvy, 2009; Healey, 1994; see Diamond, 1999). Furthermore, as will be discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, the alienation of farmers through law enforcement may be counterproductive: greater state authority in an area facilitates more effective, easier and sustainable drug-control interventions (Thoumi, 2005; Thoumi and Navarrete-Frias, 2005; UNODC, 2005, 2009).

Law enforcement may also reinforce the drivers of production (Byrd, 2010; Chouvy, 2009) whilst inflating the farm-gate price of opium, thus encouraging greater production (Atkins, 1996; Byrd, 2010; Clawson and Lee, 1996; Mansfield and Pain, 2008). Farmers may not stop but instead develop ‘adaptive responses’ (Farrell, 1998), such as camouflaging fields, moving location, improving yields, and increasing the area under cultivation (see Atkins, 1996; Clawson and Lee, 1996; Farrell, 1996; GOA, 1979; ICG, 2008; Thoumi, 2005; Youngers and Walsh, 2010).

For example, in 2010, some 32 of 36 Afghan villages that had experienced forced eradication re-planted and ‘eradication did not seem to have a significant influence on [the] decision to continue or stop opium cultivation’ (UNODC, 2010b:12). This may be because, without access to alternative incomes, farmers may have had little choice but to re-plant (Atkins, 1996; Hagan, 2001; Youngers and Walsh, 2010) in order to repay debts or re-establish assets (Byrd, 2010; Jelsma and Kramer, 2005; Mansfield and Pain, 2006, 2008). In short, under certain conditions, poorly sequenced interventions may negatively impact farming communities, increase output and have significant political repercussions.

All interventions are expensive and are implemented in extremely challenging environments. Opium farming tends to be concentrated in areas where the terrain is inhospitable, state authority is minimal (ICG, 2008; Smith, 1992), and the state lacks the means to deter or punish illicit activity (Felbab-Brown, 2009). Criminal justice institutions are often inefficient (Hagan, 2001; Navarrete-Frias and Thoumi, 2005; Windle and Farrell, 2010) and corrupt (see Lee, 1991; Windle and Farrell, 2010), while the population may be heavily armed (ICG, 2008; Sadeque, 1992). Some national and local state actors may tolerate or facilitate the illicit trade for personal, military or political interests (Lifschultz, 1992; McCoy, 2003; Windle, 2011). In short, some of the issues that make opium cultivation attractive to farmers make the implementation of effective suppression difficult.

Structural factors

While each producing country presents unique characteristics, several commentators have posited that certain structural factors reduce the risk premiums of engaging in illicit narcotic activities (Thoumi, 2005). Hence, the suppression of production may require altering these socio-economic/political conditions. A key factor for Morrison (1997, also Thoumi, 2010b) is a weak state. While undefined by Morrison, a weak state can be characterised as being governed by unstable⁴ (Eizenstat et. al., 2005) and inefficient institutions (Krasner and Pascual, 2005). Connected to institutional effectiveness is the existence of medium-to-high levels of official corruption (Morrison, 1997; also Lee, 1991; Kramer et al., 2009).

The concept of a weak state can be narrowed further to include a lack of authority over rural areas (Byrd and Ward, 2004; Gibson and Haseman, 2001; Lee, 1991; Renard, 2001; Paoli et al., 2009; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2009; Thoumi, 2005), including geographical isolation (Morrison, 1997). This is often through a lack of transport infrastructure and the existence of dense forest or mountains and populations which afford greater loyalty to family, ethnic or tribal groups than the state (Paoli et al., 2009; Thoumi, 2005).

In addition, there may be medium-to-high levels of armed conflict (Morrison, 1997; Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Cornell, 2007; Kramer et al., 2009; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2009) and the population will likely be highly impoverished (Berg, 2003; Byrd and Ward, 2004; also Kramer et al., 2009; Potulski, 1991). In short, opium production tends ‘to concentrate in the areas where enforcement of prohibition is less intense’ (Paoli et al., 2009:237) and the population is willing to risk being punished due to a lack of alternative income generators. Thus, illicit production is theorised to be attracted to areas:

• (1) Where state authority is low
• (2) That are geographically isolated
• (3) With high levels of rural impoverishment
• (4) With medium/high levels of corruption
• (5) That are politically unstable
• (6) With medium/high levels of violent conflict
• (7) That possess inefficient state institutions

The theory that such factors must change before sustainable reductions can be accomplished parallels theories of institution change posited by alternative livelihood theorists (see Byrd, 2010; Mansfield et al., 2006; Mansfield and Pain, 2005; World Bank, 2005).

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Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acronyms/Abbreviations
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1. Context, Theory and Concepts
• 2. China
• 3. Iran
• 4. Turkey
• 5. Thailand
• 6. Pakistan
• 7. Vietnam and Laos
• 8. Synthesis and Comparison
• 9. Policy Implications for Afghanistan
• Conclusion
• Appendix 1: Measurement Issues
• Appendix 2: Specification of Outcome Measurement of Success
• Appendix 3: Case Selection
• Appendix 4: Worldwide Governance Indicators
• Notes
• Bibliography