The Secret War in Afghanistan

The Soviet Union, China and Anglo-American Intelligence in the Afghan War

Panagiotis Dimitrakis

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9780857733771
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: North American History
• Index: History

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in support of a Marxist-Leninist government, and the subsequent nine-year conflict with the indigenous Afghan Mujahedeen was one of the bloodiest conflicts of the Cold War. Key details of the circumstances surrounding the invasion and its ultimate conclusion only months before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 have long remained unclear; it is a confidential narrative of clandestine correspondence, covert operations and failed intelligence. The Secret War in Afghanistan undertakes a full analysis of recently declassified intelligence archives in order to asses Anglo-American secret intelligence and diplomacy relating to the invasion of Afghanistan and unveil the Cold War realities behind the rhetoric. Rooted at every turn in close examination of the primary evidence, it outlines the secret operations of the CIA, MI6 and the KGB, and the full extent of the aid and intelligence from the West which armed and trained the Afghan fighters.
Drawing from US, UK and Russian archives, Panagiotis Dimitrakis analyses the Chinese arms deals with the CIA, the multiple recorded intelligence failures of KGB intelligence and secret letters from the office of Margaret Thatcher to Jimmy Carter. In so doing, this study brings a new scholarly perspective to some of the most controversial events of Cold War history. Dimitrakis also outlines the full extent of China's involvement in arming the Mujahedeen, which led to the PRC effectively fighting the Soviet Union by proxy. This will be essential reading for scholars and students of the Cold War, American History and the Modern Middle East.

1

AFGHAN FEUDS AND SECRET INTELLIGENCE

The political process in Afghanistan was influenced by three long-lasting factors: successive coups, murder and terror. In the catalogue of Afghan rulers during the Cold War, only two died peacefully: Babrak Karmal, the coup leader supported by the Soviet Union in 1979, and King Zahir Shah, who abdicated. All their predecessors and antecedents, either communists or nationalists, together with their close associates, met a grim fate, either dying in a firefight in the palace or executed after a coup. Anglo-American intelligence and diplomacy had to keep track of the evolving hatred among Afghan leaders so as to have a reasonable chance of predicting the events in this lethal political arena. But keeping track of animosities and ambitions among Afghan leaders proved a frustrating business for Washington and London, as indeed for Moscow. The KGB, despite their immense espionage apparatus in Kabul, failed to predict the coups of June 1973, April 1978 and September 1979. Unsurprisingly, these consecutive coups and the invasion of December 1979 also took British and American agencies by surprise, lacking as they did the local resources of the KGB.

Afghanistan had been the first state to recognise the Bolshevik government after the October revolution of 1917. In 1933, the 19-year-old Zahir Shah was crowned king following the assassination of his father, Nadir Shah. In the early days of the Cold War, Afghanistan under Zahir Shah and his prime minister (a Royal Prince), Sadar Mohammed Daoud, joined the non-aligned movement, but developed strong economic and military ties with Moscow. This leaning towards the Soviets was interpreted by the Americans as Daoud’s strategic realpolitik – he had witnessed the US arming of Iran and Pakistan, two traditional contenders for influence with his country; meanwhile, there was no strong American interest in arming and aiding Afghanistan. In 1963, Daoud was ousted from the government on the apparent grounds that he provided military backing for Afghan claims over Pashtunistan (a region of Pakistan with a large Afghan-Pashtun minority), but Soviet–Afghan relations continued to develop – by 1973 one-third of the Afghan officer corps had been trained in the USSR. Development projects, the provision of military hardware and an ever-expanding contingent of military advisers showed the extent to which the Soviets considered it was in their strategic interest to influence events in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the Afghan communist factions were involved in internecine strife. Both called themselves the ‘People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan’ (PDPA) and adhered to strict Marxist doctrine, but their leaders were power-hungry enough to frustrate the Soviets (who monotonously appealed for union). In the September 1965 parliamentary elections, the PDPA under Babrak Karmal (born in 1929) won four seats; the PDPA of journalist Nur Muhammad Taraki (a Pashtun, born in 1917) and his second-in-command Hafizullah Amin (also a Pashtun, born in 1929) failed to win any. Taraki and Karmal had been agents of the KGB since the 1950s.¹ During the last years of Zahir Shah’s reign, Taraki accused Karmal of being a ‘royal communist’, supporting the king, and Karmal deplored the ‘leftist adventurism’ of the Taraki faction. In essence, Karmal (whom the Soviets deemed more obedient to their policy over Afghanistan) sought to take advantage of the new constitution, and one day to take power. In contrast, Taraki was considered by the KGB as ‘a complex and contradictory character. He was painfully vain, often took jokes made about him in the wrong way and liked to be given a lot of attention.’² Furthermore, he sought the overthrow of the government. Both communist parties were identified by their newspapers, Karmal publishing Parchman (‘Red Banner’) – his supporters thus being known as ‘Parchamists’ – and Taraki being supported by Khalq (‘Masses’), thus ‘Khalqists’. Each faction accused the other of betraying Marxism, while Daoud planned his own advancement.³ Taraki suspected Daoud’s aspirations, and as early as October 1972 warned the KGB that Daoud was planning a coup. Another Afghan agent, Azhar Abdullah Samad, a Parchamist, gave further warning in May 1973 that Daoud was ready to seize power.⁴

On 17 July 1973, the 65-year-old Daoud toppled King Zahir (who at the time was on holiday in Rome), declaring a republic with himself as president. The king had no choice but to abdicate, which he did on 24 August. The coup was conducted with the support of Soviet-trained Afghan officers who remained strong nationalists, believing that Daoud was the sole leader to promote national interests. US Ambassador Ted Elliot, in his first post-coup telegram to Washington, noted:

Daoud has executed brilliantly organized takeover of country. Supported primarily by small number of dissident military officers ... coup has been greeted with some visible public jubilation ... new government likely to be authoritarian, highly nationalistic, puritanical and reformist ... Daoud government will undoubtedly seek maintain close and friendly relations with USSR as well as the non-aligned ... relations with the United States most likely will be cordial and correct but beyond that, we will have to wait and see. With luck and delicate handling, new regime need not necessarily present threat to any major US interests.⁵

But soon the ambassador was complaining of problems with intelligence sources. In mid-September 1973 he stated:

We are operating in an environment which inevitably produces some differences in perspective, depending on the sources from which our reports are taken. Kabul is even more that usual a hotbed of rumor, half truths, and hardly disinterested informants. Access to former sources is being steadily restricted or made less useful as the new regime moves to replace many individuals formerly in key positions. And the extraordinary centralized nature of decision-making makes it even more difficult to rely on information obtained from middle or upper level contacts. In the mosaic we can only see certain pieces, and they reflect only dimly those which are missing ... all foreign observers {are} cut off from old friends or traditional sources of information and watching unhappily the steady reimposition of a police state atmosphere, largely absent during the past decade while Daoud was out of power.⁶

With reference to the role of the Soviet Union, the embassy concluded:

The Soviet role in these events, both pre and post coup, remains mysterious. Thus far we have no reliable sources of intelligence on which to depend. Logic sides with those who believe the Soviets were at most aware that something was coming and have subsequently moved to exploit the results to the degree possible without risking overt signs of interference ... we believe Daoud is very unlikely to play deliberately into Soviet hands, while undoubtedly {he is} ready to milk the Soviets for all possible economic and political support for his scheme.⁷

The CIA suffered also from the lack of informed sources, a fact which could not be hidden post hoc by officers’ reports of political developments after the coup. In August 1973, in Khanabad, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups protested against the Parcham communists, but soon turned their anger against Daoud, who ordered the use of the military to crush the protests, while avoiding a confrontation with the leftists. Late the same month, when an ex-deputy called on the people to revolt, the regime immediately dispatched helicopter-borne paratroopers to deal with the demonstrators; the deputy was eventually arrested and imprisoned.⁸ On 20 September former Prime Minister Maiwandwal was taken into custody; this, it was announced, was due to his ‘anti-regime activities’, and on 1 October a broadcast claimed that he had committed suicide by hanging himself in his cell. Agents in the local CIA station, trying to make sense of the regime’s attitude, estimated that it would have either to continue the repression or to offer meaningful reform that would appease Maiwandwal’s followers – who might have assumed that by dying in prison he would become a martyr in the eyes of his supporters and inspire more protests. According to intelligence reports, Daoud and his brother Naim (also his political advisor) had asked for copies of the constitutions of Algeria, Tunisia and France in an attempt to draft a constitution that would suit them: ‘Naim has probably told Daoud that they must think ahead and cannot leave matters to the “Central Committee” {of the revolution} and their ilk. The request for the constitution is an encouraging spot in an otherwise bleak picture.’ In mid-October the CIA reported back to Washington that, according to secret intelligence, the former prime minister was beaten to death in the Ministry of the Interior:

The final fatal beating of Maiwandwal was administered by Engineer Ghausuddin Faid, GOA {Government of Afghanistan} Minister of Public Works. A witness who had seen Maiwandwal’s body after his death reported eight of his finger nails had been extracted during the course of interrogations and there was evidence of electric torture {two and a half lines erased} the two other alleged leaders of the counter-coup plot, General Khan Mohammad (former governor of Nangrahar), and General Abdul Razak (former chief of Royal Afghan Air Force) are allegedly being tortured and beaten severely in order to extract confessions. Very recently General Khan Mohammad was, at President Daoud’s order, beaten in front of him and then severely reproached by Daoud for accepting his aid in the past and then repaying this with conspiracy ... Among the Afghan populace there is much skepticism regarding Mainwandwal’s suicide ... there is a strong feeling that Maiwandwal had been involved in a counter-coup plan, that he had been too hasty in trying to bring this about and that he was in fact in collusion with Government of Pakistan.⁹

Meanwhile, Karmal had already established contact with the army, and, once the coup of Daoud succeeded, found himself in the coalition government, sidelining Taraki and Amin. Parchamists were appointed to the cabinet, as ministers variously of education, the interior, information and culture. Moscow welcomed Daoud’s coming to power, while investing in Karmal’s aspirations to succeed him. In his turn, the new president signed a new US$600-million economic aid agreement with the Soviets in 1974. But Daoud was not a communist, and explored policies that would expand Afghanistan’s international relations (for instance, he signed a military agreement with Egypt to facilitate Afghan military and police training). For Moscow, Sadat’s policy of approaching the West and ousting the Russians’ mission was anathema; and Daoud had made the mistake (in Soviet eyes) of cultivating relations with him.¹⁰

Brezhnev agreed to a visit by Daoud in June 1974, praising his leadership. The KGB resident in Kabul was ordered to tell Karmal and Taraki that they should consolidate their forces and work with Daoud (despite the fact that in February and March 1974 Daoud had turned against them by declaring their parties illegal): both communist leaders should understand ‘the need to cease internecine fighting, unite both groups in a single party, and concentrate their combined efforts on comprehensive support of the republican regime in the country’.¹¹ The KGB resident was informed of the very positive results of the Daoud visit to Moscow, and instructed to try to reason with the communist leaders.¹²

Iran and Pakistan considered that, unless something was offered to the nationalist Daoud, Moscow would turn Afghanistan into a base that would facilitate the long-feared advance in the Indian Ocean. In 1974 the Shah readily offered a $40-million credit to Daoud; the Iranian economic aid would escalate, and overshadow even that provided by the Russians. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger paid a brief visit to Kabul on 1 November 1974, signalling increased American interest in the country. He held a discussion with Mohammed Naim, Daoud’s brother and foreign policy adviser; they touched upon the Pashtunistan and Baluchistan questions, the Afghan line being that the new Pakistani constitution should grant equal rights to the tribes there.¹³ The US Agency for International Development offered economic and technical aid packages, though Washington felt it could not raise the level of such aid, given the likelihood of protests by Afghanistan’s neighbours. Pakistan complained strongly about Afghan claims over Pashtunistan; there was also a revolt in Baluchistan (a region of Pakistan) in 1974, and Iran also had troubles with its Baluch minority. Daoud was presumed to be at least tolerant of the Baluch rebels who had found safe haven in Afghanistan.¹⁴

Pakistan’s reaction came in the form of aiding those tribes who resisted Daoud’s secular reforms. As early as May 1978, the Mujahedeen had set up camps in Pakistan with the help of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI),¹⁵ and Iran also provided arms to these groups; there was a ‘loose collaboration’ with the CIA on this.¹⁶ Soon Saudi Arabia entered the arena with a bid to help the Islamists.¹⁷

On 30 June 1976, Naim met Kissinger at the latter’s office and asked explicitly for the American presence in his country to become ‘more apparent’, with development projects and economic aid. But he also requested secret intelligence on external and internal threats to his country; Kissinger agreed in principle, but warned that he could not help with intelligence against either Iran or Pakistan. Naim’s reply was carefully phrased:

Intelligence against Pakistan and Iran is not the question. The security of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan is interlinked ... we want to be more informed about ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Author biography
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• 1. Afghan Feuds and Secret Intelligence
• 2. Wrong Estimates and the Invasion
• 3. International Reactions
• 4. Assessing the Kremlin’s Intentions, and its Fears
• 5. Espionage and Clandestine Arming
• 6. Discovering Chinese Intentions
• 7. The CIA and Gorbachev
• Aftermath: Continuing Covert Action
• Notes
• Bibliography