Zone of Crisis

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq

Amin Saikal

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9780857735126
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Sozialwissenschaften
• Subtopic: Kultur- & Sozialanthropologie

The West Asian states of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran have over the last few decades represented an arc of crisis. Characterised by fractured and dysfunctional political elites, fraught economic policies, and ideological struggles between the forces of authoritarianism and democratisation, neo-fundamentalism and pluralism, they embody a mosaic of ethnicities. Amin Saikal, a distinguished Afghan-born scholar of international affairs, provides a sweeping new understanding of the complex contemporary political and social instability encompassing the region. Saikal takes the reader on a journey throughout the history and current affairs of the four countries, highlighting how these states have been repeatedly invaded by major powers such as Tsarist and Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States. With each seeking, often in competition with one another, to redirect the domestic and foreign policy objectives and priorities of this region in accordance with their individual geopolitical and ideological preferences, the region finds itself today in a state of crisis.
Critically comparing democratisation and counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, and examining both recent Western intervention and the history of foreign influence in the region, this book looks at how US entanglement has affected Pakistani and Iranian domestic politics and foreign affairs. How has this influenced the success or failure of the occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq? What solutions can be taken to ensure regional security? Despite the critical importance of historical legacies in understanding present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran, the past has often been overlooked or misunderstood by outsiders, with frequently serious consequences. An improved understanding of the region among foreign policymakers is imperative to enhancing prospects for stability and mutually beneficial international relations. Bearing this in mind, Zone of Crisis offers an informed and balanced overview on a troubled region. This book will fascinate general readers and prove essential reading for specialists.

1

INTRODUCTION

A Mosaic Region: Past and Present

Situated at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, and at the intersection of Central, South and West Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq form a strategic landmass that has historically been the site of both internal turmoil and violence, and outside invasions and interferences in one form or another. At times, deep in the past, the peoples inhabiting these modern-day states either ruled their own great empires or were part of one another’s domains. The region comprising the territories of modern Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq stretched from the Indus River to the Caucasus, and from the shores of the Persian Gulf* to the northernmost border of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan at the Oxus River, and was the birthplace of many great empires and ancient civilisations that rose and fell long before the advent of Islam in the early seventh century. The Median Confederation (725–550 BC) was conquered by the armies of the Persian King Cyrus the Great, founder of the Achaemenid Empire (550–330 BC), an empire which was in turn destroyed by Alexander the Great, whose death resulted in the formation of the Seleucid Empire and soon after its replacement by the Parthian Empire (250 BC–AD 225). The last of the great pre-Islamic empires, that of the Sassanids, came to power in the wake of dynastic power struggles among the Parthians. The Sassanids ruled for four centuries until their ultimate defeat by the invading Arab-Islamic armies in AD 651.

The cultural heritage of the region was further enriched and, some might argue, undermined by cross-cutting invasions and influences throughout history. The influx of Hellenic culture and ideas and the introduction of East Asian philosophies (such as Buddhism, which first arrived in Afghanistan in 305 BC, and was subsequently expanded to the west of the country by Mongol armies), followed by the spread of Arab and Islamic influences, and finally the invasion by the Turkic forces of Timur the Lame of today’s Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the fourteenth century and Iraq in the next century, were all critical in shaping the evolving cultural and intellectual landscape of the region. The area itself has also been a wellspring of religions and thought, giving rise to Zoroastrianism, the oldest monotheistic faith from the sixth century BC, before the latter’s eclipse by Islam in the early seventh century AD. It is no surprise, therefore, that the region today remains defined by its intrinsically mosaic character. Afghanistan, for example, formerly an important link in the Silk Road trading network, is known today as the ‘Central Asian roundabout’.

Major Power Rivalry and Foreign Interference

In modern times, the region’s constituent states have been repeatedly invaded or intervened in by major powers such as Tsarist and Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States, with each seeking, often in competition with one another, to redirect the domestic and foreign policy objectives and priorities of the constituent states in accordance with their individual geopolitical and ideological preferences. Ultimately, none of these powers have been able to achieve their goals entirely to their satisfaction, and all have, at times, bowed out of the arena in one way or another, at high costs to themselves and to the subjected peoples. This proved to be the case first with the British, whose many decades of colonial domination and interference ultimately bore little fruit. The same proved true for Tsarist and Soviet Russia, whose empires collapsed and ambitions shrank during the Anglo-Russian rivalry from the mid-nineteenth century to the Second World War and, subsequently, during the course of the US–Soviet superpower competition that lasted from shortly after the Second World War to the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. As for the United States, since its rise to global hegemony from the end of the Second World War, its efforts in taming Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq at different times and in different manners, according to its preferences and in defiance of other powers, seem to have been equally unrewarding. It is still unclear as to what extent China’s emergence as a global and regional power, with its growing need for natural resources and concomitant quest for strategic influence, will impact on the countries that are the focus of this book.

Divided Societies and Historical Legacies

Shaped by different legacies, the modern states of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq nevertheless retain many similar characteristics as a result of their common historical heritage and experiences. All four are defined by the mosaic composition of their societies, which are made up of various ethnic, tribal, linguistic, sectarian and cultural units. Their territorial boundaries have often been shaped by Western influence, with the result that their social entities or micro-societies frequently straddle national lines and retain cross-border ties with neighbouring populations. Tribal, clan, family and sectarian divisions remain prominent, especially along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, and in both countries the ethnic cleavage continues to spill over into the political realm.

Two case studies, discussed later in this book, illuminate the on-going importance of cross-border ties in these states today. Pashtun nationalism is one important phenomenon that has the potential to disrupt and even cause the fragmentation of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iranian influence among Iraq’s Shi‘a population is another highly important example elaborated here, with a focus on the historical interplay between the Iraqi and Iranian Shi‘as. Both phenomena provide insight into the perennial challenges faced by all four states and societies as a result of invested cross-interests and the continuing involvement of outside actors.

Internal divisions and sectarian rivalries form a common theme across the region, but it is Afghanistan and Pakistan that are truly the lands of minorities. Ethnic Pashtuns form the largest (but not majority) cluster in Afghanistan, followed by significant Tajik, Hazara, Turkmen, Uzbek and Nooristani minorities. The Punjabis form the largest ethnic group in Pakistan, followed by Sindhi, Pashtun, Baluchi and Seraiki minorities. The ethnic composition of Iraq and Iran is somewhat less complex, made up of clear Arab and Persian majorities respectively. Nevertheless, the presence of Kurdish minorities in both countries, Turkmen in Iraq, and Azeris, Baluchis and Arabs in Iran, complicate the ethnic landscape.

Sectarian Divisions

Religious cleavages, the most prominent of which is the Shi‘a–Sunni division among the Muslim community, further fragment the populations of all four states. The schism dates from a dispute over the leadership (khalifa) of the Muslim community (ummah) following the death of Prophet Muhammad in AD 632. Those who supported the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Talib, as the rightful leader (caliph), became known as the Shi‘atu ’Ali (‘the party of ’Ali’; later, the Shi‘a). The Shi‘as held that only ’Ali and his direct descendants (imams) could be the rightful leaders of the ummah. The majority, on the other hand, who favoured the succession of the Prophet’s societal leadership by his four companions in the order of seniority, with ’Ali coming last, rejected the notion of birthright and insisted that the caliph be elected by the ummah itself. Those who held this opinion became known as the ‘people of the tradition’ (sunna), or Sunnis.

Although the instigating cause of the Sunni–Shi‘a division was more political than doctrinal, real differences in religious and political outlooks have, over time, become deeply ingrained in the two sectarian communities. Addressing these differences is somewhat complicated by the fact that both sects encompass a large number of sub-groups and traditions: Shi‘a Islam includes three dominant branches, each with their own legal school (Twelver, Zaidi and Ismaili), and the Sunni world is similarly divided into four dominant schools of thought (Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi’i). Despite the complexity and nuances within both sects, a number of important differences between Shi‘a and Sunni Islam may be broadly identified. In Shi‘a Islam, the emphasis on the lineage of ’Ali and, in Twelver Islam, the doctrine of the Occultation (which holds that the last imam, or Mahdi, was born and disappeared (869–941), and that his authority is to be exercised in absentia by clerics), has contributed to the evolution of religious hierarchy and the institutionalisation of clerical authority. Shi‘a clerics, particularly those who have attained a high rank, are believed to be divinely guided and inspired, and their rulings (fatwas) are considered binding. This is not the case in Sunni Islam, which lacks an established clergy and where the rulings of religious scholars (ulama) are largely recognised as fallible and non-binding. Lacking the strict hierarchy of the Shi‘a religious establishment, Sunni Islam has produced a substantial number of breakaway leaders whose authority derives less from religious education than from personal charisma and popular appeal.

Today, the Sunni–Shi‘a split is the most prominent source of tension in the Muslim world. The minority sect, whether Shi‘a or Sunni, is often ill-treated, discriminated against, or repressed by the majority sect. In some cases, however, the reverse has been true, as in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s Sunni leadership. Iraq and Iran are unusual in the fact that they are the only countries in the world, along with Bahrain and the highly secularised, former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, with a Shi‘a majority population. With some 15 per cent of the global Muslim population belonging to the Shi‘a sect, Iraq’s and Iran’s Shi‘a communities represent around 60 and 90 per cent of their countries’ populations respectively. The remainder of Iraq’s and Iran’s populations are overwhelmingly Sunni, although very small minorities of non-Muslims are present in both. Afghanistan and Pakistan, on the other hand, are predominantly Sunni states, with majorities of around 80 and 85 per cent respectively, and the remainder predominantly Shi‘a in each case.

A Misunderstood Past

Modern-day tensions and divisions, therefore, have a long history in the region. Yet despite the critical importance of historical legacies in understanding present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, the past has often been overlooked or misunderstood by outsiders, with frequently serious consequences. An improved understanding of the region among foreign policymakers is imperative to enhancing prospects for stability and mutually beneficial international relations. Indeed, deleterious foreign influence and involvement pervades the histories of all four states, and remains prominent today.

We can see this first in the case of Afghanistan, which, since its consolidation as a modern state from 1747, has been perennially subjected to invasions and interference by foreign powers, although in the early decades of its existence it too had invaded neighbouring territories. Afghanistan is the only country to have been invaded by each of the three great powers of their times: Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. This raises the question: what is it about Afghanistan that has made it so much the focus of regional and world players, and for so long? Throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, Great Britain and Russia competed for influence in the country. During the Cold War, Afghanistan was subjected to geostrategic competition between the two superpowers at the time, the United States and the USSR, with the latter gaining the upper hand, given Afghanistan’s geographical proximity to it. Since 2001, it has been the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and non-NATO allies that have struggled to shape the Afghan political and strategic landscapes. This has been accompanied by a number of regional players also competing for influence in the war-weary country for often conflicting geopolitical interests.

The involvement of so many external players has helped to ensure that the Afghan state has remained weak, and Afghanistan’s historical legacy of local strongmen remains a critical feature of its political landscape. Pakistan’s support of the Mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and later the Taliban and their affiliates (including the Hekmatyar group), provides a recent and ongoing example of this. The persistent power vacuum in the wake of the US-led invasion of 2001 gave rise to a new generation of ‘strongmen’ of various shades and capacities competing for control of Afghan lands.

Founded in 1947 and a by-product of Indian independence from Britain, modern-day Pakistan is, in effect, an accident of history. Pakistan was the paradoxical product of the efforts of the All India Muslim League, which had pushed its agenda in anticipation of concessions within the framework of a united India. Since the unexpected partition, Pakistan has found itself at odds with its larger and more powerful neighbour, India, particularly over the contested territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan’s strategic imperative with regard to India has defined its history since its emergence as a state.

For most of Pakistan’s history, the military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have consistently played a central role in holding the country together and influencing its politics, while civilian governments have remained corrupt, self-centred and nepotistic. Whenever civilian leaders have come to power through what has transpired as quasi-democratic phases, they have found themselves largely at the mercy of the military and ISI, and have done whatever possible to expand their political and financial largesse and patronage, despite incurring the public’s resentment. The export of Sunni extremism has also become an entrenched feature of Pakistani politics since the military rule of General Zia ul-Haq (1977–88), and has been used both against India and in support of perceived Pakistani interests in Afghanistan, although Islamabad has always been in a state of denial about this. The May 2013 democratically elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif may change the equation, but serious doubts linger about its chances of success.

Modern Iraq, a country shaped very much by British colonialist designs in the 1920s, has undergone a reversal of some of its most persistent trends since the US-led invasion of 2003. Historically a rich and relatively strong modernising state under the long years of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial leadership, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the political power vacuum in post-invasion Iraq strengthened various societal groups at the expense of the state. After his toppling, however, the backlash against his brutal regime became tragically apparent. The Kurds and the Shi‘a Arab majority, marginalised and persecuted under Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-centred Arab Ba’athist regime, emerged as powerful players in Iraqi politics, deepening sectarian divisions and impeding national unity. These sectarian groups are in turn often divided into competing factions, such as the Iranian-supported Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) (representing some of Iraq’s middle-class Shi‘as) and the Sadrists (representing some of the more marginalised and lower-class Shi‘as). These divisions have become extremely entrenched in post-invasion Iraq through the spilling of blood over time. Just as Afghanistan has served as a battleground for various outside actors by proxy, Iraq has suffered from a similar fate since the 2003 invasion and occupation of the country that lasted until the end of 2011 – a withdrawal that left unfulfilled the goal of creating a stable and democratic Iraq.

Although never directly colonised, Iran has historically been fearful of foreign intervention and often subjected to direct and indirect external influence. Like Afghanistan, Iran under the Qajar dynasty (1796–1925) was caught up in the ‘Great Game’, in which Great Britain and Russia competed for primacy in Central and West Asia. Foreign influence dramatically re-entered the Iranian scene in 1953 in the form of a US and British-orchestrated coup, which saw the removal of the reformist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and the reinstalment on his throne of the pro-Western Mohammad Reza Shah, who had been forced to leave Iran for a stay abroad.

Following the deposition of the Shah in the 1978–79 Revolution that brought to power the Islamic regime of Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini, with its anti-US and anti-Israeli posture, Iran’s relations with the United States and many of its allies grew tense and intrinsically adversarial. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s attempt at exporting its radical Shi‘a Islamism and the American hostage crisis (4 November 1979–20 January 1981) engrained a pattern of US–Iranian hostility, reflected in both US support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) and serious political debates, particularly over Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran’s attempts to expand its regional influence, especially in the wake of US debacles on the Iraqi, Afghan, Lebanese and Israeli–Palestinian fronts, have also strained Tehran’s relations with the neighbouring oil-rich Gulf Arab states. The election of moderate Islamist Hassan Rouhani to Iran’s presidency in June 2013 raised hopes about an improvement in Iran’s relations with its Gulf Arab neighbours and the West, but the obstacles remained formidable.

Dysfunctional Governance and Fragmented Elites

Dysfunctional elites characterise all four states, in various guises. Factional, fragmented and self-aggrandising elites produce nepotistic, corrupt and ineffectual governance, divorced from the desires of the people they govern and incapable of meeting many of their most pressing needs. These elites nevertheless reflect the mosaic nature of their respective societies, as well as the historical imperatives that have shaped their political actions.

Regional strongmen, dominant families and political dynasties continue to underpin the personalisation rather than institutionalisation of politics in all four countries, although in varying forms and to different degrees of magnitude. Despite the int...

Table of contents

• Author Biography
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• Map
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Afghanistan: Turbulent and on the Brink
• 3 Pakistan: Fragile and Violent
• 4 Iran: Between ‘Sovereignty of God’ and ‘Sovereignty of the People’
• 5 Iraq: Divided and Threatened
• 6 Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography