The Liberal Unionist Party

A History

Ian Cawood

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9780857736529
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Parties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Liberal Unionist party was one of the shortest-lived political parties in British history. It was formed in 1886 by a faction of the Liberal party, led by Lord Hartington, which opposed Irish home rule. In 1895, it entered into a coalition government with the Conservative party and in 1912, now under the leadership of Joseph Chamberlain, it amalgamated with the Conservatives. Ian Cawood here uses previously unpublished archival material to provide the first complete study of the Liberal Unionist party. He argues that the party was a genuinely successful political movement with widespread activist and popular support which resulted in the development of an authentic Liberal Unionist culture across Britain in the mid-1890s. The issues which this book explores are central to an understanding of the development of the twentieth century Conservative party, the emergence of a 'national' political culture, and the problems, both organisational and ideological, of a sustained period of coalition in the British parliamentary system.

CHAPTER 1

‘DAGON MUST BE THROWN DOWN’: THE ORIGINS OF THE LIBER AL UNIONIST PARTY

Gerald Goodman first claimed that ‘Liberal Unionism in its origins was a movement of political leadership. Uninstructed by the electorate, the Whig leaders refused to accept Gladstone’s Home Rule Bill; in company with a section of radicalism, defeated it in parliament; and then, as an independent political party allied with the Conservatives, won a general election.’¹ Thirty years later, W. C. Lubenow agreed, ‘policy on Ireland, like other policy, had its origins at Westminster, not in constituency pressure. Therefore it is in the parliamentary Liberal Party in 1886 that the origins of the great separation in the Party are to be found.’² Cooke and Vincent similarly explain the crisis entirely in terms of activity in the parliamentary lobbies.³ This chapter seeks to prove that while the debate was centred on Westminster, it was influenced by electoral concerns and organised political support in the localities. Secondly, while the split certainly took place in Westminster, it would never have developed into a full political movement without strong bases of support in the constituencies and would have remained a parliamentary rebellion. The split was, as Peter Ghosh puts it, ‘a party issue’ in which rival interpretations of the Liberal tradition were mobilised to justify the parliamentary behaviour of the combatants, but it was not one solely confined to Westminster in either its conception or its realisation.⁴

The ‘Skeleton’ and the Queen

The origin of the Liberal Unionist Party has conventionally been seen as the issuing of the ‘Hawarden Kite’ simultaneously in the Standard and the Leeds Mercury in December 1885. The shock and surprise caused by this event, the ‘earthquake and eclipse’ as J. L. Garvin has it, goes some way to explaining the nature of the opposition that emerged once Gladstone’s commitment to Home Rule was confirmed.⁵ Gladstone’s sudden public conversion to Home Rule in December 1885 actually came from his long-term, traditionally Liberal attitude to national self-determination. He had been troubled by his own government’s actions in Egypt in 1882 and later in Sudan.⁶ By adopting a policy of Home Rule while in opposition, he felt he was returning to a truer, more moral form of Liberalism after the compromises of his second administration.⁷ He had not, however, shared his moral struggle with his Cabinet colleagues, many of whom consequently interpreted the Liberal Party’s duty towards Ireland (and the wider Empire) in a very different fashion, although he was supported by Earl Spencer who had, as Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, implemented a coercive regime from 1882 to 1885.⁸

On the other hand, the support that Parnell had offered to the Conservatives in the general election of 1885 meant, in Angus Hawkins’ memorable phrase, that ‘an extraordinary fluidity prevailed over the political situation.’⁹ In these circumstances, with Churchill and Carnarvon wooing Parnell, while Chamberlain floated his central board scheme, some type of political reorientation seemed inevitable. The only question was the extent and origin of the alteration.

The splits within the Liberal Party that had been problematic before 1886 became intolerable, once the election result of December 1885, which gave the balance of power to the Nationalists, became known. Lord Derby wrote in his diary:

The state of things I imagine to be this – Gladstone has no time to spare and wants to get back to Downing St. The Whigs or moderate section, incline in that direction, but with less eagerness. On the other hand, the Radicals, Chamberlain and co., are not in a hurry. They had rather wait to get rid of Gladstone, Granville and the Whig party in general, thinking themselves strong enough to form a purely Radical cabinet.¹⁰

Most Liberals felt ambivalent about Gladstone’s method of announcing the new policy, even if they supported the principle. Moreover, the announcement had been so unexpected that those who felt inclined to resist this strategy took a long time to organise their forces as they needed to assess the policy itself and the best cause of affecting, adjusting or aborting it.¹¹ Secondly, Liberals of all hues needed time to assess the attitudes of their followers. Even Chamberlain, who might have been expected to have led the revolt openly, given his role as the alternative figurehead of Liberalism between 1880 and 1885, chose to bide his time and actually to join Gladstone’s third Cabinet, while promoting his own alternative approach to the Irish problem.

If the Liberal Unionist movement was to be anything more than a refusal to vote for a particular measure by disgruntled back-benchers, it needed a leader of national reputation and unquestioned political seniority around whom dissenting Liberals could coalesce. Although Hartington’s position as this leader may seem to be inevitable in light of his early denunciation of the policy of Home Rule at Waterfoot on 29 August 1885,¹² he had, at this point, been more inclined to consider resignation and retirement from politics.¹³ In November he expressed the same intention to Gladstone himself. ‘More than ever, it would be the happiest moment of my life if I could see … the possibility of my giving up any further part in politics.’ On this occasion he revealed the cause for his feelings, asking Gladstone to take a ‘strong and decided line against the Radicals’ to prevent a ‘state of disruption’ once the G.O.M. retired.¹⁴ As late as January 1886 he had expressed to Derby a willingness to allow an Irish Parliament, as long as the Westminster Parliament had the power to overrule when it chose. As Derby noted in his diary, ‘in short he would restore the Irish parliament as it was before Grattan and 1780.’¹⁵ It was, however, precisely this flexibility and willingness to consider (if not necessarily endorse) reform on its merits, combined with a proven competence in high office, that made this quintessentially Whig figure able to act as a figurehead for radicals as well as moderates.

The task of persuading Hartington to take on the task of leadership of a rebellion fell to George Goschen, described by Cooke and Vincent as ‘the creative manipulator.’¹⁶ In September 1885, while Hartington was still regarded as Chamberlain’s chief opponent in the battle to succeed Gladstone, and Chamberlain and John Morley were still close radical allies, Morley informed Chamberlain of Goschen’s influence. ‘I suspect from one or two casual phrases that Goschen is working Hartington’s “sourdement.”’¹⁷ The genesis of the Liberal Unionist Party was written when Chamberlain, for quite different reasons to Hartington, also came out against Home Rule at Warrington on 9 September.¹⁸ Chamberlain regarded Ireland as an unnecessary distraction from the ‘unauthorised programme’ of reform, but Gladstone had by this point made it clear both in public and in private to those such as Lord Derby, that ‘his demand that the party shall adopt his programme [was] unreasonable.’¹⁹ As Derby noted himself in January 1886:

I strongly suspect that Chamberlain’s attitude is not solely due to dislike of Home Rule, or fear of what the constituencies may say; but that he does not wish to come into office again under circumstances where his section of the party will be, as he thinks, inadequately represented.²⁰

Goschen himself was unable to take on the role of leader for, as Mary Jeune put it, ‘though in earlier life he had joined the Liberal party, I think his sympathies were always on the other side.’²¹ Goschen was also unable to lead the Party due to his distance from the Liberals since 1874 and because of his unstinting opposition to any aspect of Chamberlain’s radicalism.²² As an indication of his lack of Liberalism, Goschen was one of the very few Liberals (outside Scotland) willing to attend meetings organised by the Orange Lodge-dominated Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union.²³ In his more expressive moments, Goschen foresaw the breaking up of the Liberal Party and a situation emerging where ‘I should be able to act and come forward in defence of Moderate Liberalism, as one of the joint heirs of Gladstone and his “sound economic school” instead of as malcontent and outsider’, but he was deluding himself.²⁴ As Northbrook noted to Hartington when Goschen was being considered as Randolph Churchill’s replacement as Chancellor in January 1887, ‘Goschen has always been in some respects something of a Conservative’ and as far as the radicals in the Party were concerned, Goschen was hardly considered a Liberal at all.²⁵

If Morley had discounted Goschen’s ability to persuade Hartington, this was because he was unaware of the force behind Goschen’s influence. Queen Victoria was united with Goschen in her suspicion of Gladstone who she regarded as ‘a half-mad … ridiculous old man’ and she had refused to open Parliament throughout Gladstone’s second administration.²⁶ She now bombarded Goschen with letters demanding that he persuade Hartington to act decisively.²⁷ ‘You must keep Lord Hartington up to the mark and not let him slide back (as so often before) into following Mr Gladstone and trying to keep the party together.’²⁸ Victoria knew both Hartington and Gladstone well enough for this to be a genuine concern. Cooke and Vincent concur, believing the two figures not to have fallen out over Home Rule until late in March 1886.²⁹ This is usually explained as due to Gladstone’s deliberate decision to keep the policy hidden, both in essence before the ‘Hawarden Kite’ and in detail afterwards. As late as 16 December 1885, Hartington was writing to ask Gladstone to respond to the rumours in ‘all the newspapers … about the existence of some plan which you have in preparation’ and complaining that ‘I am entirely ignorant of what may be going on.’³⁰ Gladstone cannot be accused of dissembling on this occasion, for he immediately responded and told Hartington that ‘I consider that Ireland has now spoken’ and that as a consequence an effort should be made ‘to meet the demands for the management by an Irish legislative body of Irish as opposed to Imperial affairs.’³¹ Hartington’s reply was brusque, simply stating that he was ‘unable to share your [Gladstone’s] opinions,’ but he failed to begin to prepare any resistance. Goschen unknowingly confirmed Hartington’s apathetic reaction and revealed that he himself was given no indication of the thunderbolt about to be hurled from Hawarden, writing to Albert Grey on 20 December 1885, ‘I saw Hartington yesterday. He was not combative at all.’³²

Once the ‘Harwarden Kite’ was flown by Herbert Gladstone, Victoria’s partisan attitude became clearer. She encouraged Goschen to appeal to ‘moderate, loyal and patriotic men’ and urged him to consider ‘an amalgamation or rather juncture of Conservatives and Whigs.’³³ She never forgave the Nationalists for their refusal to participate in the Prince of Wales’ Irish tour of April 1885, when he had been abused and threatened.³⁴ Salisbury now encouraged her as well, describing Home Rule to her as ‘a concession to the forces of disorder’ and ‘a betrayal of the Loyalists of Ulster.’³⁵ Goschen was clearly more determined than ever to enforce the Royal Will, as he revealed in a letter to his wife in January: ‘I spoke to Hartington in the stronge...

Table of contents

• Cover
• About the Author
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1. ‘Dagon must be thrown down’: The Origins of the Liberal Unionist Party
• 2. Whiggery or Socialism? The Ideologies of Liberal Unionism
• 3. ‘Liberal Yeast to Leaven the Conservative Lump’: The Unionist Alliance
• 4. Party Organisation – Cave or Caucus?
• 5. Liberal Unionism and the Electorate – ‘A Farce and a Fraud’?
• 6. ‘Strangled by Its Own Parent’: The Strange Death of Liberal Unionism
• Conclusion: Who were the Liberal Unionists?
• Appendix 1: The Unionist ‘Compact’: ‘Resolutions’ (N.D. – 1889) (Devonshire Papers 340.2205A)
• Appendix 2: Liberal Unionist Organising Council (The Times, 21 March 1889)
• Appendix 3: Members present at National Radical Union Conference, 1 June 1887, Birmingham Town Hall (Cartwright Papers, C(A)1, box 99, unnumbered bundle)
• Appendix 4: Liberal Unionist General Election Performance, 1886–1900
• Appendix 5: Regional Distribution of Liberal Unionist Constituencies, 1886–1918
• Appendix 6: Liberal Unionist MPs with Constituency and Dates Held
• Appendix 7: Liberal Unionist By-Elections, 1886–1912 (Not Including Unopposed Elections)
• Notes
• Bibliography