Democracy in Lebanon

Political Parties and the Struggle for Power Since Syrian Withdrawal

Abbas Assi

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781786720047
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Advertising
• Index: Business

Minister Rafiq Hariri on 14 February 2005, was seen by many as an opportunity for Lebanon's fragile political system to move towards a more stable form of democracy. But contrary to these expectations, in the years since Syrian military withdrawal in April 2005, Lebanon has been plagued with sectarian and political unrest and conflict. Abbas Assi here explores the obstacles that impeded the democratic transition process and how subsequent events since 2005 have bolstered this trend. By looking at these, Assi examines how the intersection of the influence of external factors and powers with domestic conflicts has shaped the behaviour of political parties and has had implications on their ability to reach compromises and initiate democratic reforms. This book is a vital reference for those studying politics of Lebanon and the Middle East more broadly.

CHAPTER 1

CONSOCIATION

The consociational form of governance is widely considered as the most suitable political system for societies that are divided along ethnic lines (Lijphart, 1969; McGarry & O'Leary, 2006). The nature of ethnic divisions in a multi-ethnic state can make the formation of a stable government almost impossible. Therefore, the consociational model proposes mechanisms for forming and managing a stable government, such as segmental autonomy and proportional representation of ethnic groups. However, this model has failed in several states, such as Lebanon. Instead of promoting stability and democracy, the consociational model has played a significant role in sparking conflicts between ethnic communities.

This chapter will argue that the consociational model and theory contain several weaknesses. It aims to contribute to the answers to the following questions: how does the consociational model lead to political instability? How does it help entrench ethnic identity? Why is it sometimes unable to ensure political stability without foreign support? How does this form of governance lead to inter-ethnic conflicts? And finally, how does this form of governance generate adverse effects on the behaviour of political parties and the democratization process?

Firstly, the chapter will provide a discussion of the consociational form of governance, its background conditions, and the four components. Secondly, it will provide a critique of the background conditions, spelled out by scholars, such as Lijphart (1996) and Lehmbruch (1975). Thirdly, it will criticize its democratic quality and its ability to ensure stability in plural societies. Fourthly, it will examine the consociational state's ability to inhibit foreign intervention, and how foreign intervention is often essential for the stability of this form of governance. Finally, the chapter will explore the negative implications of the consociational model on the nature and behaviour of political parties.

The Consociational Form of Governance

Consociational Theory

There is a widespread assumption in the political science literature that the formation of stable democratic systems in divided societies is almost impossible (Lipset, 1960; Mill, 1991). Deep ethnic segmentation plagues these societies and prevents the formation of a shared sense of national identity. ‘Plural societies are characterized by mutually reinforcing cleavages’ which prevent the development of a shared sense of national identity (Lijphart, 1977b: 117). John Stuart Mill (1991: 310) contends that ‘[f]ree institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist’. Seymour Lipset shares Mill's point that shared national identity is necessary for the formation of a stable democratic system. He (1960: 88–9) argues that ‘the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations’. What might complicate more the formation of democratic systems in deeply divided societies is their existence in turbulent and unstable regions which could make them vulnerable to foreign intervention, especially if the ethnic communities are distributed across several states. Brenda Seaver (2000: 248) asserts that ‘[t]he challenge of building democratic regimes in deeply divided societies becomes even more complicated in regions where groups with shared identities transcend state boundaries. The transnational nature of many communal groups has the potential of transforming domestic policy issues into regional crises involving several states.’

However, the challenges to the formation of a stable democratic system in deeply divided societies are not insurmountable. Arend Lijphart (1977a: 1) claims that although the formation of a stable democratic system in plural societies is ‘difficult’, it is not ‘impossible’. He suggests the adoption of the consociational form of governance for plural societies as the only alternative for regulating the conflicts that might emerge in these societies. Consociationalism is a ‘government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy’ (Lijphart, 1969: 216).¹ Lijphart (1969), one of the prominent scholars who developed this concept, considers that the consociational form of governance will lead to political stability in multi-ethnic states. The existence of diverse ethnic communities within the same state might lead them to enter into conflicts over, for instance, the distribution of state positions and revenues. Therefore, this form of governance has the ability to neutralize ‘the destabilising effects of subcultural segmentation […] at the elite level by embracing non-majoritarian mechanisms for conflict resolution’ (Andeweg, 2000: 509). According to Lijphart (1989: 39), ‘cooperative and coalescent elite behaviour can turn a potentially unstable political system into a stable one’. This form of governance ensures that the decision-making process is taken with the agreement of all political parties and elites that represent the ethnic communities in the political system.

The importance of the consociational theory and model, according to Lijphart, rests on two main points. Firstly, this theory can be used for empirical analysis to explain stability in divided societies (Lijphart, 1977a: 1). Seaver (2000: 251) considers that Lijphart's theory ‘is able to explain the stability of democracy in the smaller European countries better than other theories that predicted democratic failure in societies lacking overlapping memberships, cross-cutting cleavages, and a considerable degree of homogeneity or cultural-ideological consensus’. It can serve as an explanation of the political stability in the states that have plural societies, such as Belgium, and the Netherlands. Secondly, the consociational model can be suggested as a form of governance for deeply divided societies which can help build stable democratic systems (Lijphart, 1977a: 1–2). Consociationalism is able to mitigate ‘the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society […] by the cooperative attitudes and behaviour of the leaders of the different segments of the population’ (Lijphart, 1977a: 1).

The Four Components of the Consociational Model

Lijphart (1977a: 25) identifies four main components that define the consociational form of governance: grand coalition, high degree of autonomy for each ethnic group to run its own internal affairs, proportionality as the principle standard of political representation, and the mutual veto of ethnic communities. The aim of these four components is to weaken the negative implications of the majoritarian rule in societies divided along ethnic lines. He (1977a: 37) considers that these four components are ‘closely related to each other, and they all entail deviations from pure majority rule’.

The first component is the grand coalition which is considered, according to Lijphart, the most important component of the consociational model. He (1977a: 25) defines the grand coalition as ‘a “grand” council or committee with important advisory functions, or a grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders in a presidential system’. An executive power-sharing ‘is government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society’ (Lijphart, 1977a: 25). Lijphart (1977a: 28–9) argues that common consensus between citizens is more democratic than majority rule in divided societies. The rationale behind Lijphart's support of the formation of a grand coalition is that in societies divided along ethnic lines the decisions taken by the government might be comprehended by a certain ethnic group as targeting it, especially in a case when it is not in the governing coalition (Lijphart, 1977a: 28). Therefore, he suggests the formation of a grand coalition that includes representatives of all ethnic groups in the political system.

What complements the grand coalition principle, according to Lijphart, is the second consociational component, that of segmental autonomy. Due to the existence of segmental cleavages which can be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, racial or ethnic nature, the segmental autonomy component can accommodate these cleavages by providing a high degree of autonomy for any such ethnic groups in plural societies. This component prescribes the delegation of as much decision making as possible to the separate segments. Lijphart suggests that all the decisions on the issues of common concern between the ethnic groups, such as foreign policy, should be made jointly by representatives of the segments in a grand coalition. However, in all other issues that concern the internal affairs of the ethnic group, such as education, the ethnic group has the right to decide on and manage them (Lijphart, 1987: 137). The underlying assumption of segmental autonomy is that the existence of a ‘subcultural encapsulation and autonomy’ can help reduce the prospects for the eruption of conflict between the ethnicities (Luther, 2001: 92). Lijphart (1977a: 42) contends that the aim of segmental autonomy ‘is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy’. The best form of segmental autonomy is the geographic separation of ethnic groups, since this can lead to the success of the ‘consociational democracy’ and ensure political stability (Lijphart, 1969: 219). Segmental autonomy can also be achieved through governmental or constitutional guarantees for the ethnic groups to preserve their distinct cultural heritage through ideological tools, such as schools and media, or through a federal system that can grant autonomy to each ethnic community to manage its internal affairs.

In addition to the two components discussed above, the consociational model includes a third component, the proportionality principle, which is based on the proportional distribution of state positions between ethnic groups. According to Lijphart, proportionality serves two main functions in divided societies. Firstly, it is a way of distributing state positions and revenues between the different communal groups (Lijphart, 1977a: 38). Secondly, it aims to delegate the important decisions to the leaders of the communal groups (Lijphart, 1977a: 40). The objective of proportionality is to guarantee fair representation of minorities in divided societies. As Lijphart (1995: 278) remarks, there are two positive implications of the proportionality principle for minorities: ‘the over-representation of small segments and parity of representation (when the minority or minorities are over-represented to such an extent that they reach a level of equality with the majority or largest group)’. Parity and overrepresentation are tools aimed at ensuring protection and security to minorities (Lijphart, 1977a: 41).

The last component is the mutual veto. According to Lijphart (cited in Assaf, Noura, 2004: 10), the mutual veto is designed to guarantee ‘to each segment that it will not be outvoted by the majority when its vital interests are at stake’. The aim of the mutual veto is therefore to guarantee for each ethnic group complete political protection from the undermining of its interests in the political system by other groups (Lijphart, 1977a: 36–7). It can be an informal agreement between the ethnic groups or a law that is stated in the constitution. Lijphart lists several characteristics of mutual veto that can help encourage ethnic groups to reach agreements on contestable issues. Firstly, the frequent use of the mutual veto by segmental groups is not likely since it might be used by other groups against them (Lijphart, 1977a: 37). When a certain group uses the veto to block, for instance, a government policy because the policy may undermine its interests, other groups may use the veto against it when the same segment wants to promote its own policy. Secondly, ‘the very fact that the veto is available as a potential weapon gives a feeling of security which makes the actual use of it improbable’ (Lijphart, 1977a: 37). Finally, each ethnic community will be aware of the dangers of the frequent use of the veto, since it might cause paralysis in the state institutions (Lijphart, 1977a: 37).

Background Conditions

The success of the consociational form of governance depends on the existence of a certain set of background conditions. However, the background conditions identified in the literature cannot be employed separately to assess the success or the failure of the consociational model in divided societies. This is because each scholar developed his or her list of conditions from examining specific cases. This seems to suggest the point that in every state there should be a certain set of background conditions that should exist to enhance the success of the model. The absence of a specific set of background conditions that ensures the success of the model also undermines the ability of the consociational theory to prescribe solutions for political instability and absence of democracy in divided societies.

Lijphart lists several background conditions that can enhance the success of the consociational model. These conditions are considered conducive for the success of the model, although they might not be necessary or sufficient. It is worthwhile quoting Lijphart (1977a: 54) in full on this crucial point:

It is […] worth emphasizing that the favorable conditions […] are factors that are helpful but neither indispensable nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of consociational democracy. Even when all the conditions are unfavorable, consociationalism, though perhaps difficult, should not be considered impossible. Conversely, a completely favourable configuration of background conditions greatly facilitates but does not guarantee consociational choices or success.

The negative impacts of the absence of the background conditions might be mitigated by the role of the politicians. Lijphart (1977a: 165) maintains that even when all the conditions are absent, Consociationalism should not be considered impossible, because what really counts is the ability and willingness of the political elites to overcome ‘the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural societies and a deliberate effort to counteract these dangers’.

In his article, ‘The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation’, published in 1996, Lijphart listed nine background conditions that he considered as conducive to consociational governance in divided societies. He (1969, 1975, 1977a) developed those nine conditions after refining them over several years. The first background condition is the absence of a major ethnic group (Lijphart, 1996: 262). A major ethnic community might prefer pure majority rule and therefore might cause concerns for the minorities (Lijphart, 1996: 262). It might seek to dominate the political system instead of cooperating with the minorities. The second background condition is the absence of large socio-economic inequalities, since the existence of socio-economic differences between ethnic groups might lead ‘to demands for redistribution, which constitute the kind of zero-sum game that is a severe challenge to elite cooperation’ (Andeweg, 2000: 522). The third is the existence of a small number of ethnicities. A state that includes too many groups might make negotiations and agreement over the distribution of state positions and revenues almost impossible (Lijphart, 1996: 263).

The fourth background condition concerns the existence of ethnic groups that are of relatively the same demographic size which can create a balance of power between them, preferable the existence of at least three ethnic groups that are of roughly the same size (Lijphart, 1977a: 56). The fifth is a relatively small population. The political leaders ‘[i]n small countries […] are more likely to know each other personally than in larger countries, [and] the decision-making process is less complex’ (Lijphart, 1985: 123). The sixth is the existence of foreign threats which might promote internal unity (Lijphart, 1996: 263). External threats should be conceived as a common threat ‘in order to have a unifying effect’ (Lijphart, 1977a: 67). The seventh is the presence of overarching loyalties which aim to counter the effects of segmental loyalties (Lijphart, 1996: 262–3). The eighth concerns the geographical concentration of the groups (Lijphart, 1996: 263). With geographic separation, the ‘subcultures with widely divergent outlooks and interests may coexist without necessarily being in conflict; conflict arises only when they are in contact with each other’ (Lijphart, 1969: 219). The last background condition refers to pre-existing traditions of political accommodation which make political elites’ behaviour moderate and cooperative (Lijphart, 1977a: 100).

Several scholars have discussed and elaborated on the background conditions listed by Lijphart. Adriano Pappalardo (1981), for instance, criticizes Lijphart's background conditions, especially the cases (Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands) that he investigated to develop his set of background conditions. Pappalardo argues that there are two main conditions that led to the success of the consociational model in these European states: stability among subcultures and elite predominance. Stability among subcultures means the ethnic groups’ recognition of their diversity and therefore their readiness to accept each other as a reality which cannot be changed (Pappalardo, 1981: 369). Stability ‘is both the guarantor of the status of the blocs and the truly important condition for elite cooperation’ (Pappalardo, 1981: 369–70). By elite predominance, he means the existence of a ‘powerful leadership’ (Pappalardo, 1981: 381). The power of political elites is derived from the wide popular support that they enjoy from their constituencies. Such a type of leadership ‘does not have to fear resistance from below and is highly likely to conduct and bring negotiation to a conclusion’ (Pappalardo, 1981: 381). His focus on the role of elites is because Consociationalism demands powerful elites ‘to whom has been attributed a maximum of moderation and/or negotiating ability in comparison with mass publics and sub-elite political activists’ (Pappalardo, 1981: 381).

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1975) in turn offers to divide the background conditions to the success of Consociationalism into two main categories: (1) genetic conditions; and (2) sustaining conditions. He deduces this categorization from his analysis of several cases, such as Cyprus, Lebanon and Belgium. Genetic conditions are defined as conducive to consociational governance, while sustaining conditions can help explain its maintenance. According to Lehmbruch (1975: 380–1), the genetic conditions are: a tradition of elite accommodation, intensive formal and informal communication between elites, and the absence of a majority group. The only sustaining factor is a ‘neutral’ foreign policy that aims to avoid conflicts with neighbouring and international states which can help in preventing foreign powers’ intervention in domestic politics (Lehmbruch, 1975: 381–4). To achieve a ‘neutral’ foreign policy, there should be no internal conflicts between subcultures that might entice foreign interference. For instance, if there is an internal ethnic conflict which has implications on neighbouring states, this might encourage the neighbouring countries to interfere which could fuel the conflict instead of resolving it (Lehmbruch, 1975: 382). However, Lehmbruch's classification of the factors is not completely clear. Lijphart (cited in Bogaards, 1998: 484) rightly remarks in this context ‘a factor that is favourable for the establishment of a consociation will be also a positive condition for its maintenance’. For instance, the role of elite accommodation is necessary for both: establishing and maintaining the consociational form of governance. If the elite accommodation condition is absent after establishing the consociational model, the model will most likely fail.

In addition to the absence of a majority group condition suggested by Lehmbruch, Brendan O'Leary (1989: 574) adds three more conditions to secure the establishment and maintenance of the consociational model: ‘a commonly perceived external threat, socioeconomic equality between the segments, and overarching society-wide loyalties’. His study of Northern Ireland concludes that the success of the consociational model depends on these four conditions, although he does not clarify why it is only these four that are needed (Bogaards, 1998: 485). He also maintains that the absence of the favourable factors does not necessarily mean that the consociational model will fail. He (1989: 574) argues that the political elites should ‘engineer the conducive conditions’ to facilitate the success of the consociational model. This point is supported by Lijphart (1975: 195) who claims that ‘the crucial factor in the establishment and preservation of democratic norms and democratic stability is the quality of leadership’.

Critique of the Four Components of Consociationalism

The four components, as conceptualized by Lijphart, suffer from several weaknesses. They are often unable to achieve their objectives without the existence of background conditions. Furthermore, the ethnic conflicts exacerbated by the application of the four components can cause political instability. What is noticeable with the four components is that they sometimes have the same implications, such as entrenching ethnic identity. For instance, the proportionality and segmental autonomy components can both help entrench the sense of ethnic identity. For this reason, the following critical analysis might repeat the same point of weakness, like the point about ethnic identity, but it will provide...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables
• List of Maps
• List of Abbreviations
• Chronology
• Acknowledgements
• Note on Transliteration
• Introduction
• 1. Consociation
• 2. Weaknesses of Lebanon’s Consociational Model in the Post-2005 Era
• 3. The Democratization Process in the Pre- and Post-Syrian Withdrawal
• 4. Domestic Variables and Political Parties since 2005
• 5. External Variables and Political Parties since 2005
• 6. The 2013 Parliamentary Elections and the Syrian Conflict
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography