The United States and Jordan

Middle East Diplomacy during the Cold War

Clea Lutz Hupp

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781786724649
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

US foreign policy in the Middle East has faced a challenge in the years since World War II: balancing an idealistic desire to promote democracy against the practical need to create stability. Here, Cleo Bunch puts a focus on US policy in Jordan from the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 to 1970 and the run up to 'Black September'. These years saw a phase where the Middle East became a stage on which Cold War rivalries were played out, as the US was keen to encourage and maintain alliances in order to counteract Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria. Bunch's analysis of US foreign policy and diplomacy vis-a-vis Jordan will appeal to those researching both the history and the contemporary implications of the West's foreign policy in the Middle East and the effects of international relations on the region.

CHAPTER 1

A KINGDOM OF DREAMS

It is difficult to conceive that the war-torn, politically and ideologically fragmented modern Middle East emerged from the grand dreams of generals, princes and politicians. Among them, Abdullah ibn Hussein of the Hijaz (Western Arabia) had high expectations for the future of his family and its ability to transform the Middle East. Abdullah belonged to an elite family and received his education in glittering, cosmopolitan Istanbul. During his youth in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Abdullah became acquainted with European principles of nationalism; these same ideas inspired elite Arabs in Damascus, who planned to create a nation based on their common Arab heritage and identity. The outbreak of World War I in 1914, and the Ottoman government’s collusion with the Central Powers, provided an opportunity for these nationalist schemes to come to fruition. In 1915 Abdullah’s father, Hussein the sharif of Mecca, entered into a partnership with the British government and agreed to lead a rebellion against the Ottoman Sultan in exchange for a promise of sovereignty for the Arab people of the Levant and Arabia. Britain provided advice, weaponry, and financial support to what came to be known as the Arab Revolt. The philosophical motives behind the Arab Revolt came from Damascene notables, but it was the Bedouin of the Hijaz, led by Abdullah’s family, who provided the strength needed to defeat the Ottoman armies. Abdullah enthusiastically joined the rebellion; however, British advisors in Arabia judged Abdullah to be “too civilized” for the unpleasant business of warfare.¹ While his younger brother Faisal gained accolades for his glamorous military triumphs, Abdullah led a few lackluster, unsuccessful campaigns. Following the war, the British government selected Faisal to represent the Hijaz at the Paris Peace Conference. Abdullah smarted at this slight and – in an attempt to replace Faisal – persuaded his father to recall his younger brother from Europe.²

Events in the Levant intervened in Abdullah’s plan to replace his brother. In 1920 the newly created Syrian congress selected Faisal as the king of a newly independent Syria, and a small group of Iraqi delegates to the same congress declared Abdullah the “King of Mesopotamia.” Finally, the elder brother believed he would emerge from Faisal’s shadow as the leader of a prosperous, strategically significant territory. Unfortunately for Abdullah, the declaration proved to be futile. French leaders had no intention of relinquishing Syria to an independent Arab government. French forces were sent to fight against a nascent Syrian resistance at the battle of Maysalun. Syria became a French Mandate and the nationalist movement was severely crippled. Abdullah’s title, “King of Mesopotamia” – merely ceremonial to begin with – became utterly meaningless.

Abullah refused to abandon his grand dream of a Hashemite-led Arab Middle East. In September 1920, he set out from Mecca with one thousand men to join his brother (and possibly the Turkish commander, Mustapha Kemal) in Syria, hoping that a combined Hijazi-Turkish force might dislodge the French. He never arrived in Damascus.³

A New Kingdom

As Abdullah moved toward Syria, British officials struggled with the profound issues of a post-War settlement in the Middle East. Despite their earlier promises to Abdullah’s father, the strategic importance of the region coupled with the significance of its vast oil resources made the issue of Arab independence a low priority. Prior to the end of the war, Britain, France and Tsarist Russia secretly conspired to divide any conquered Ottoman territory; this covert plan, commonly known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was revealed to the world by Vladimir Lenin in an effort to discredit the Allied powers during the Russian Civil War. When the war ended, Sykes-Picot became a British and French strategic blueprint for the Middle East. The League of Nations endorsed a mandate system that gave Britain and France free rein to occupy desirable territories in the former Ottoman lands. As had been outlined in Sykes-Picot, Britain gained control over a vast swath of territory that extended from the Nile to the Euphrates and beyond.

Governing these extensive lands would necessitate cooperation from local elites. Britain decided to secure its access to Mesopotamian oil reserves by creating a kingdom in Iraq governed by the exiled Faisal, whose leadership skills were highly regarded by powerbrokers in Whitehall. By placing the Ottoman wilayat of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra under Hashemite rule, the British ensured that the Iraqi monarchy would remain loyal and, hopefully, pliable. Palestine, with its highly contested sacred spaces, proved to be a bigger problem. Several British politicians and generals supported the goals of Zionism, but found the nascent dream of a Jewish state, as outlined in the Balfour Declaration, an insufficient reason to expend lives and resources. Palestine could prove useful as a conduit for Iraqi oil; thus, Britain’s interests could potentially dovetail with Zionist goals if the coastline of Palestine remained open to British shipping. As the Palestine mandate had both strategic and economic significance, Britain chose to keep it under direct military rule.

Between Palestine and Iraq lay an ecologically diverse, nearly uninhabited territory. It stretched from a hilly region of olive groves overlooking the Galilee in the north, to dramatic rock formations and flat plains at Wadi Rum in the south. In the west, near the Jordan River, the land was cultivable and welcoming; in the east, only a few dispersed Bedouin tribes ventured to live in the hostile desert. The land between Iraq and Palestine typically served as a highway for people traveling between more significant and developed locales; it had few alluring qualities. From this sparsely populated, somewhat untamed territory, British officials created the emirate of Transjordan.

The purpose of “Transjordania” was quite simple: to serve the British strategic requirements in the Middle East. The newly appointed Secretary of the Colonies, Winston Churchill, shaped the states of the region to suit British plans. Transjordanian land provided a geographic link between Iraq and Palestine, while also serving as a buffer between independent Arab tribes in the south and the French in occupied Syria. Britain’s plans were evident in the shape of the odd eastern panhandle of Jordan – still known in some circles as “Winston’s hiccup” – which connected British territory from the Persian Gulf to the port of Haifa. The British government, however, did not intend to expend significant amounts of blood and treasure governing this resource-poor land; as such, Churchill sought an alternative plan to direct British control.

Abdullah’s presence in the region of Transjordania provided a solution to governing this unwanted territory. British intelligence tracked Abdullah’s movements as his entourage slowly moved toward Syria to join Faisal’s fight against French forces. Sir Alec Kirkbride, who served as Britain’s official representative in the region, intercepted Abdullah’s entourage and invited him to meet with Churchill in Jerusalem on 28 March 1921. At that meeting, Churchill and Abdullah struck a deal that shaped the future of the region. British representatives convinced Abdullah to take responsibility for the governance of the territory between the Jordan River and Iraq, referred to as “Transjordania,” hinting that his successful stewardship might convince the French to expand his role in Damascus (a highly unlikely scenario – but one that capitalized on Abdullah’s sibling rivalry). As the ruler of Transjordania, he would be responsible for containing anti-British and anti-Zionist activities along the border of the Palestine mandate; in return, Britain would provide him with military and economic assistance. In exchange, however, Abdullah was required to relinquish all claims to the throne of Iraq, which the British offered to his brother, Faisal. Both parties considered the arrangement to be temporary. Abdullah agreed to take responsibility for the territory for a period of six months; ironically, he and his heirs would remain in power for the remainder of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.⁴

Abdullah returned from Jerusalem to a territory that lacked any of the basic characteristics of a nation state. The inhabitants of Transjordan consisted of a unique blend of Circassians, exiled Syrian nationalists and a large, fiercely independent nomadic population; forging a sense of cohesion in this infant state would prove to be an ongoing challenge during Abdullah’s reign.⁵ In addition, the small state of Transjordan remained in perpetual danger of being dismantled by its Arab neighbors, while Zionist leaders sought to include Transjordan in the Palestine mandate as land that could potentially become a Jewish nation. Abdullah faced the task of building a nation in a resource-poor territory: it lacked oil reserves, significant port facilities, and sufficient potable water and arable land. Few schools, roads, or government buildings existed in the 1940s and many Jordanians maintained a nomadic lifestyle that consisted of breeding goats, camels, sheep and horses in Jordan’s dry interior. Transjordan’s survival as a state, therefore, was largely dependent on the ingenuity and resourcefulness of its new leader. For over two decades, King Abdullah struggled with two competing impulses: his desire to create a strong, independent Arab kingdom and his need for external financial support.⁶ His vision of an independent Arab state was partially fulfilled when, following World War II, the British terminated their mandate and Jordanians celebrated their independence on 25 May 1946.⁷ But true independence, a secure and viable kingdom governed by the Hashemites, would remain a perpetual challenge for Abdullah and his heirs.

The Palestine Problem

Prior to World War II, the United States had little interest in the Middle East; however, the critical need for oil and the geographic-strategic significance of the region revolutionized American attitudes.⁸ The transformation of the American economy and lifestyle – fueled primarily by oil – initiated a greater awareness of the Middle East. In addition, in the post-World War II era a more powerful force than the need for oil shaped American policy: the Cold War. Yet neither oil nor geo-strategic rivalry with the Soviet Union brought Transjordan to the attention of the United States, but rather the issue of Zionism. Zionist demands for a Jewish state in Palestine, which quieted during World War II, became much more vocal and urgent following the war. Palestine, therefore, provided a context for communication between Transjordan and the United States.

Ever ambitious and proactive in his approach to regional affairs, King Abdullah wrote a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt on 10 March 1945, hoping to elucidate the Arab position on Palestine. Abdullah insisted that the land “. . . is not sufficient to hold any more people and can not admit an immigrant people whose intentions are not friendly and who ultimately aim at ousting the Arabs either partly or completely.” Abdullah’s words reflected the prevalent opinion in most Arab nations: the creation of a Jewish homeland would violate the right of self-determination for the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. Due to Roosevelt’s untimely death, the letter never reached him, but the State Department directed it to the newly inaugurated President Harry Truman for a response.⁹

Harry S. Truman entered the Oval Office at a time of tremendous geo-political upheaval. His administration experienced the satisfaction of victory over Germany and Japan, yet immediately confronted the complex challenges of the Cold War. The United States was at a distinct disadvantage in its relations with post-colonial nations due to its close ties to imperial powers like France and Great Britain. It was difficult to encourage social change in the Middle East when communists promoted their cause as a remedy to imperialism.¹⁰ Truman’s personal disdain for monarchies prejudiced his opinion of Transjordan; to the President and many other American officials, Transjordan was merely a British proxy state, a remnant of the decaying colonial world. Yet Truman’s desire to find a solution for the problems of Palestine eventually caused him to acknowledge Transjordan’s potential as an Arab partner for a Jewish state.

The issue of Palestine proved to be a pressing dilemma for the President. He wanted to assist individuals who were displaced by the war – primarily Jews who had survived the Holocaust – and he encountered overwhelming domestic political pressure to facilitate the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Letters poured in to the White House, Congress passed resolutions supporting the establishment of a Jewish state, and noted Zionist leaders like Chaim Weizmann made personal appeals to the President. Truman could not ignore the political power of these groups, as his close advisors Clark Clifford and Samuel Rosen were quick to point out in private counsel. The pro-Israeli lobby was a powerful and well-organized political entity that kept the Palestine issue at the forefront of political debates throughout 1946 and 1947. In addition to the external pressure exerted on the President, Truman was personally troubled by the horrors of Hitler’s concentration camps and firmly believed that the world had a moral obligation to care for the survivors of the Holocaust.¹¹

On the other side of the debate, the State Department continually reminded Truman that amicable relations with the Arab world would be essential in light of America’s energy needs and the emergent conflict with the Soviet Union. Yet the President’s lack of experience made him somewhat defensive on matters of foreign policy; he resented unsolicited advice from State Department officials and privately referred to them as “striped pants boys.” Rather than accept advice from diplomats, Truman preferred to rely on counsel from a close circle of trusted advisers and friends, as well as his personal notions about ethical policy. In addition, he tended to view the world in a simplistic set of paradigms: despite thousands of years of change in the Middle East, he tended to refer to Palestine in Biblical terms.¹²

When Abdullah’s letter arrived on Truman’s desk in the spring of 1945, acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew advised Truman to re-affirm President Roosevelt’s well-publicized assurance to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia that “no decision should be taken respecting the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.” The President responded as Grew suggested, but soon advocated an approach to Palestine that State Department officials, British leaders, and Arab heads of state found problematic. In 1945 he publicly called for the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine – a recommendation that directly contravened British policy. Truman’s initiative appeared to undermine his previous assurance, as Abdullah pointed out in a telegram dated from 29 September 1945: “. . . the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants is so important a decision that the Arabs consider that they ought to be consulted.” Truman responded to the King by insisting that there had been no change in the basic US policy, but he struggled with the incongruity of honoring Roosevelt’s commitment while promoting Palestine as a solution to the refugee problem.¹³

Abdullah’s interest in Palestine was far from altruistic; he sought to expand his small realm by any means possible. Palestine represented a choice prize for the King as it contained superior agricultural land and could facilitate his plan for a “Greater Syria” encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan. Ruling the holy city of Jerusalem, with the Haram al-Sharif, would lend additional credibility to the Hashemite monarchy. In his quest to gain control over part of Palestine, Abdullah petitioned Western governments, but also negotiated secretly with prominent Jewish leaders and prepared for the opportunity to “liberate” Arab lands.

As American policy on the Palestine issue continued to evolve, it became apparent that Truman would not implement Roosevelt’s promise of full consultation. Abdullah persisted in his attempt to lobby against an emergent Jewish state in Palestine and tried to appeal to Truman’s sense of fairness by arguing “. . . you will not be inclined to exterminate one community for the sake of providing happiness for another . . . you should be able to find a form of justice which will not, on the one hand, deprive the Arabs in Palestine of their home, their dignity and their supremacy and will not, on the other hand, deprive the other party of their happiness of peace and rest.” Truman, however, did not view the Palestinian question in terms of displacing Arabs, but rather as an issue of America’s strategic necessities, combined, of course, with his personal desire to find a safe haven for the displaced victims of Nazi persecutions. As other problems weighed heavily on Truman’s mind – primarily the disposition of the Soviet Union and the reconstruction of Europe – Palestine was of secondary importance. Thus, Truman had neither the time nor the motivation to fulfill Roosevelt’s promise of full consultation.¹⁴

Dividing the Land

Despite Truman’s interest in the Palestine issue, events in that remote territory were, for the most part, beyond his control. An escalation of violence in the Palestine mandate convinced British officials that the time had come for an expedient...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1. A Kingdom of Dreams
• 2. Containment and Contradictions
• 3. “It’s all Personal”
• 4. The New Frontier in Jordan
• 5. Balancing Acts
• 6. The Flight to Cairo
• 7. The Bitter Pill
• 8. Civil War
• Conclusion
• A Note on Sources
• Notes
• Bibliography