Women and TV Culture in Pakistan

Gender, Islam and National Identity

Munira Cheema

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781838609900
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Sciences sociales
• Subtopic: Étude des média

The television broadcasting culture of Pakistan was changed dramatically in 2002. The President, General Pervez Musharraf, introduced a policy of liberalisation that enabled controversial issues such as honour killings, adultery, stoning to death, domestic violence, marriage after divorce and homosexuality to be increasingly depicted on screen.
Women and TV Culture in Pakistan is the first in-depth analysis of this change in television content. Munira Cheema focuses on how `gender issues' are dealt with on TV and examines the impact this has on female viewers. In Pakistan, television is often the only way in which women can access the public sphere (except through male guardians) and this book evaluates how TV content allows them to navigate their intersecting identities as Muslims, women and Pakistanis. At a time when religious conservatism is on the rise in the country, this book investigates why producers choose to focus on gender-based issues and the extent to which religion dictates social behaviour and broadcasting choices. Based on interviews with women viewers in Karachi as well as industry professionals including writers, directors and ratings experts, the research is a much-needed and original contribution to global television studies and gender studies.

CHAPTER 1

AMIDST CULTURE,
ISLAMISATION AND POLITICS:
THE RISE OF NEW TV CULTURE

In 2016, 1,100 women died in the name of honour in Pakistan – from women living in rural areas to those enjoying celebrity status in the cities, honour victims emerge from any ethnicity, class and family background. However, lately several trends have changed. While growing up in Pakistan, I used to read news reports (in newspapers) on gendered crimes in society; now, I watch these reports on TV news and other genres. A very recent example of this change is the airing of Baaghi (Revolutionary), a drama serial based on the life of Qandeel Baloch, a social media celebrity killed by her brother. For the first time in television history, a Pakistani broadcaster has taken up the challenge of airing the real-life story of the victim of a so-called honour killing. Through such content, society seems ready to break its silence on gender-based crimes, and a lot of this results from changes in the media landscape of Pakistan. This deluge of change in content is a direct outcome of the liberalisation of the media, a policy introduced by General Pervez Musharraf in 2002. In the pre-liberalisation era, gender issues did not occupy the same space in television broadcasting as they do now. Historically, there have been programmes to raise awareness of gender-related issues, such as family planning, but television producers would not touch on the controversial topics considered taboo in Pakistani society.¹

Since 2002, there has been a distinct change in television content, and practices such as a woman's marriage to the Holy Qur'an,² incest, honour killings (karo kari),³ stoning to death, adultery, remarriage after divorce, domestic violence, marriages of minors, homosexuality and the rights of women living in joint families⁴ have been raised in the news and across different genres. The inclusion of such content makes television very different from what it was a decade ago. In the post-liberalisation era, it is difficult not to spot the change in gender-based content. This operates on two levels: firstly, in terms of gender-related issues that had not thus far been discussed on television and, secondly, in terms of giving access to the public sphere via the new interactive genre of the talk show. Producers have not only used drama serials to offer gender-specific issues, but have also incorporated new genres to entertain and inform gendered audiences. There are programmes that are exclusively based on raising awareness of gender issues in a serious manner, and there are other programmes that highlight such issues in an entertaining way. Gendered content has three defining features. First, it is about the re-negotiation of the relationship between the public and the private realm. Second, it grants its audiences access to the mediated public sphere without dislocating them from the privacy of their homes. Third, it opens spaces for practising cultural citizenship, an aspect that can have far-reaching consequences for the female citizenry in Pakistan. At the same time, I identify two contradictory waves in this content: one that transcends the silence on gender-based issues in the name of culture and religion, and another that seeks the answer to these issues in Shari'a.⁵

Despite the phenomenal growth of television in Pakistan, there has been no in-depth study to date that examines why television producers have felt the need to introduce new genres dealing specifically with gender-based content, nor has much academic attention been paid to the question of how Pakistani women feel about this new wave of content on Pakistani television. The aim of this book is driven by my motivation to acknowledge this change in broadcast culture and decipher the agendas of producers in bringing changed content vis-à-vis gender, as well as to discover how female audiences react to this change. In tracing the motivations of the producers, this book attempts to locate spaces for public sphering in commercially driven media. By examining audiences' engagement with gendered content, this book demonstrates how viewers can be understood in terms of publics and cultural citizens. This chapter describes the broad context of my research in terms of prevalent gender politics and media culture in Pakistan and against the tensions between a liberalisation agenda in the media and the rise of religious conservatism.

Between Politics and Privatisation: Evolution of Television Culture in Pakistan

Before the liberalisation of television in 2000, Pakistan had one terrestrial channel, the Pakistan Television Corporation channel, commonly known as PTV, which had been the state broadcaster since 1964. As state broadcaster, content on PTV reflected the policies of government in power. In the case of news, the state channel was used as the mouthpiece of the government, with hardly any screen space provided to opposition parties. However, with regards to gendered representations on screen, it is observed that the liberal governments relaxed the control on content (for example, women can be seen without dupatta),⁶ whereas the religiously inclined governments introduced their own agendas, with restrictions on the appearance of women such as the dupatta policy⁷ (see, for example, Ali, 1986; Suleman, 1999; Kothari, 2005; and Nasir, 2012).

From 1964 to the early 1990s, Pakistani viewers could only watch one television channel owned by the government. In the early 1990s, the Pakistani government began to relax its control over the broadcasting culture in Pakistan by allowing Network Television Marketing (NTM) to launch as the first-ever private channel. This was an entertainment channel known for music, celebrity anchors and drama serials. After three years of broadcasting, the channel suspended its services, which left a craving for liberal media among its viewers (PEMRA, 2009).

Furthermore, in 1998, the Kargil War⁸ was instrumental in drawing people towards buying satellite dishes, mainly because the official version of the war was not adequate for the citizens of Pakistan (Khan and Joseph, 2008). Crabtree (2009) claims that Pakistanis ‘in desperation bought illegal satellite dishes, tuning in to Indian television during the war’. Through dishes, Pakistanis could watch, not only foreign news channels but also Indian entertainment channels. Nevertheless, soon the popularity of satellite television ‘was eclipsed by a thriving cable industry that was cheaper and easily accessible in Pakistan's cities and small towns’ (Proffitt and Rasul 2013: 598). At the time, Pakistani viewers were tuned into Indian channels, specifically Star Plus, to watch daily soap operas, a genre alien to Pakistani viewers. Indian channels were becoming readily available through cable operators, and their stories were based on issues facing joint family households. Additionally, the narratives were somewhat liberal for Pakistani society, with extramarital affairs as one of the central themes.

On the political front, in the period from 1997 to 1999, the Pakistani government proposed implementing the Shari'a, which was followed by a coup d’ etat led by General Musharraf on 12 October 1999. By 1999, Pakistan had become vulnerable to several challenges both globally and at home. At the same time, it became an ally of the USA in the ‘war on terror’, which was followed by the mushrooming of extremist elements in society. Radical elements, such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, gained prominence in the province of Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, only to gain further hold in the cities. Amidst these crises, the country needed a strong media base to reflect a softer image of Pakistan on the global level. Pakistan needed a television culture of its own, different from PTV's culture, and similar or better than what was offered at the time by other foreign satellite channels (including Indian news channels). Additionally, it was the time when the Cold War had ended and globalisation had escalated, when Pakistanis could access information not only through satellite channels but also through internet technologies.

In 2002, the Independent Media Corporation launched its channel, Geo News, followed by other networks. Their direct competitor was not PTV, but foreign satellite channels. Since the military regime had already legalised cable television operations in 2000, the government welcomed the proliferation of new channels. The new private channels, launched in the subsequent decade, reflect a strong television culture, characterised by distinctiveness in its content and free from the direct influence of the government. However, there is still a code of conduct for these channels. The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) was founded on 1 March 2002 to issue licences and suspend services in cases of violation of its charter.⁹ In the last 15 years, PEMRA has issued 91 licences, of which 50 are entertainment channels and 35 are news and current affairs channels (PEMRA 2010–2014).¹⁰

There are five media groups that have a monopoly over the Pakistani media industry, including electronic and print media. These are the Independent Media Corporation, Pakistan Herald Publications Limited, ARY Group, Waqt Group, and Lakson Group (see, for example, Rasul and McDowell, 2012). Interestingly, it has been observed that these media houses took advantage of the post-9/11 situation and clearly chose to take sides, either with the Islamist elements or the state. As an ally in the ‘war on terror’, Musharraf's government was considered to be pro-American. In this scenario, private media emerged ‘as an informal power player in Pakistan's domestic politics’ (Hassan 2014: 66). ‘The anti-Americanism of the political parties inclined them to side with the extremist clergy on television, thus reinforcing the Islamisation of the electronic media’ (Ahmed, 2006, cited in Hassan 2014: 74). In this regard, the role of PEMRA is controversial, and the content of Pakistani cable channels is regulated under PEMRA mostly when content explicitly challenges not just religion, but the State and the judiciary.¹¹ There have been instances in the post-liberalisation era when transmissions of certain channels have been suspended for challenging and criticising the government (Walsh, 2007; Reporters without Borders, 2010). At times, political parties force cable operators to suspend their services, or the sitting government influences the content of certain private channels.¹² If PEMRA does not take into account content that is objectionable to a set of viewers, then, pressure groups such as religion-based parties, the independent clergy and even influential citizens take to the streets to protest or file complaints.

Likewise, on 20 May 2014, Geo TV's licence was suspended on the charge of airing blasphemous content on one of its breakfast shows.¹³ Furthermore, there is an increase in the moral policing of the media landscape. In a recent study on Pakistan's journalistic culture, Pintak and Nazir (2013) note that the overall approach of journalists ‘is a synthesis of Western practices and the development journalism of Southeast Asia: objective but respectful, independent but cooperative … this approach is, in part, expressed within the idiom of Islam’ (2013: 662). In this regard, I argue that the policy of liberalisation should not be confused with complete freedom of expression in Pakistani television culture. Instead, it should be seen as somewhat liberal compared to the content on PTV.

Moreover, gender-related policy changed along with changes in government or society. During Zia's Islamist government (1979–88), several initiatives were taken by the State to restrict freedom of expression in popular culture. This was the first time that the dupatta policy was introduced in relation to the appearance of women on screen (Kothari 2005: 291). In his second tenure (1997–9) as prime minister of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif reinforced the conservative dupatta/stole scarf policy on PTV. At the time, television in Pakistan was facing multiple additional restrictions, including restrictions on the depiction of performing arts, popular culture and Western attire (see, for example, Ali, 1986; Kothari, 2005; Nasir, 2012). It was the second time in PTV's history that a government had imposed such a restriction on the appearance of female actors and hosts. Additionally, it was the first attempt to impose a Shari'a-led policy on women's representation on television (Blood 1994: 243).

In 2004, the MMA, a coalition of religious parties that were part of the Opposition in Parliament (2002–7), launched an ‘anti-obscenity campaign for the protection of women, which their youth-wing (Shabab-e-Milli) claimed was a feminist act’ (Brohi 2006: 71, quoted in Zia 2009: 91). At the time, MMA was the ruling party in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, and proposed a Prohibition of Indecent Advertisements Bill 2005, which ‘would make publishing indecent and humiliating advertisements a criminal offence’ (Zia 2009: 91). As part of this campaign, activists would deface the images of women on billboards all over the country. Such campaigns were launched in the name of protection of women from objectification. At present, there may be no official policy in relation to the appearance of women on screen, but other pressure groups, such as religion-based groups, have gained strength of late. In 2012, in response to a petition filed by the religious parties, the Supreme Court directed PEMRA to define obscenity and vulgarity in the media. This was the first move towards including a definition of obscenity in PEMRA laws, as there was no precedent definition in the Constitution of Pakistan.¹⁴ Recently, in August 2012, the ex-chairman of Jamaat-e-Islami (a political party) filed a petition to the Apex Court against vulgarity and obscenity on screen. This was taken up by the Chief Justice, who then advised PEMRA to redefine obscenity on the screen in the Pakistani context. This issue was later directed towards the Parliament and the Council for Islamic Ideology as the principal stakeholders to define ‘obscenity’. In parallel, other issues raised in this debate were those of vulgar and immoral programming. In the debates to define obscenity, PEMRA declared that ‘any content which is unacceptable while viewing with the family transpires obscenity’.¹⁵ There was a clear divide in opinion between the conservative and liberal stakeholders. Whereas liberal participants were of the view that it was impossible to detract foreign influence from Pakistani television (Indian and Western) and that the understanding of obscenity had evolved, conservatives sought to define obscenity in the light of the Qur'an and the Sunnah (Prophet's acts). This issue remains outstanding in Parliament, for there is no consensus on how to approach the matter. Here, it is pertinent to mention that even members of secular and liberal parties have expressed concern about how Indian content has corrupted Pakistani television, referring to the free viewing of Indian channels and borrowing from Indian content. However, no attempt has so far been made to set limits to the ‘obscene’ content in Indian soap operas. Added recently to this media landscape are the Turkish soap operas dubbed into Urdu, which run on several Pakistani entertainment channels. The United Producers Association (UPA) has criticised PEMRA for its double standards towards foreign content, where it allows greater liberty in terms of what can be shown in Turkish soap operas (intimate scenes), and less towards local channels, where similar content is deemed obscene (Mahmood, 2012).¹⁶ Still, within this media ecology, religion is by far the strongest of all factors that influence the context of production and reception. Therefore, in this book I approach the production and reception of gender-based content in relation to a social environment where religious conservatism is garnering public appeal.

What Defines the Public/Private Distinction in Pakistani Society?

Gendered content revolves around the public/private distinction in Pakistani society, as defined under Shari'a, as well as the viewers' sense of who they are, which partly depends on their engagement with religion. Therefore, in this section I offer a brief account of the duties and rights of women prescribed under Shari'a.

Abul Ala Maududi, one of the founders of the Pakistani right-wing political party, Jamaat-e-Islami, has played an instrumental role in defining modern day Islam in Pakistan. Along with other South Asian public intellectuals of Islam, such as Israr Ahmed and Amin Ehsan Islahi, who were campaigning for political Islam, Maududi did not initially approve of women's participation in the public sphere. However, he eventually mellowed his stance on women's participation in the public sphere based on the need of the hour (Jamal 2010: 334).

Maududi (2010) discussed the restrictions that Islam imposes on women in a book titled Al Hijab Purdah – The Role of Women in Islam (where purdah is translated as ‘veil’ or ‘separation’). When referring to the private sphere, he stresses that ‘in this organisation, the woman has been made queen of the house. Earning a living for the family is the res...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Amidst Culture, Islamisation and Politics: The Rise of New TV Culture
• 2. Breach in the Culture of Shame: Openness in Gender-Based Content
• 3. Understanding the Dynamics of the Production of Gendered Content
• 4. Empowering Women or Bringing Change through Drama Serials: Producers' Perspectives
• 5. Interactive TV: Is Empowering Women and Bringing Change on Producers' Agendas?
• 6. Women Empowered or Disciplined through Gendered Content: The Case of Drama Serials
• 7. Interactive TV: Viewers Empowered or Disciplined
• Conclusion
• Appendix 1 Focus Groups
• Appendix 2 Interviews
• Appendix 3 Case Studies
• Appendix 4 List of Interviewees
• Appendix 5 Brief Survey
• Appendix 6 Focus Groups
• Appendix 7 Transcribing Data
• Notes
• Bibliography