Persuasion and Power

The Art of Strategic Communication

James P. Farwell

• Publisher: Georgetown University Press
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781589019430
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Now more than ever, in the arenas of national security, diplomacy, and military operations, effective communication strategy is of paramount importance. A 24/7 television, radio, and Internet news cycle paired with an explosion in social media demands it.

According to James P. Farwell, an expert in communication strategy and cyber war who has advised the U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND and the Department of Defense, and worked nationally and internationally as a media and political consultant, this book examines how colorful figures in history from Julius Caesar to Winston Churchill, Napoleon to Hugo Chavez, Martin Luther to Barack Obama and Ronald Reagan, have forged communication strategies to influence audiences.

Mark Twain said that history doesn't repeat itself, but rhymes. In showing how major leaders have moved audiences, Farwell bears out Twain's thesis. Obama and Luther each wanted to reach a mass audience. Obama used social media and the Internet. Luther used the printing press. But the strategic mindset was similar. Hugo Chavez identifies with Simon Bolivar, but his attitude towards the media more closely echoes Napoleon. Caesar used coins to build his image in ways that echo the modern use of campaign buttons. His "triumphs, " enormous parades to celebrate military victories, celebrated his achievements and aimed to impress the populace with his power and greatness. Adolph Hitler employed a similar tactic with his torchlight parades.

The book shows how the US government's approach to strategic communication has been misguided. It offers a colorful, incisive critical evaluation of the concepts, doctrines, and activities that the US Department of Defense and Department of State employ for psychological operations, military information support operations, propaganda, and public diplomacy.

Persuasion and Power is a book about the art of communication strategy, how it is used, where, and why. Farwell's adroit use of vivid examples produce a well-researched, entertaining story that illustrates how its principles have made a critical difference throughout history in the outcomes of crises, conflicts, politics, and diplomacy across different cultures and societies.

PART I
The Forms of Strategic Communication

CHAPTER 1
Psychological Operations

THE TRAP THAT THE US GOVERNMENT, AND ESPECIALLY THE DEPARTMENT of Defense, has put itself into in its approach to defining forms of communication is notable in its queasy attitude toward psychological operations (PSYOP). Several points are relevant. First, PSYOP is a form of strategic communication aimed at foreign audiences. It is carried out through the use of words, actions, images, or symbols. It aims to mold or shape public opinion in order to influence behavior. Second, the government’s current tendency to treat PSYOP as a ticking bomb that could blast its reputation for honesty, integrity, and credibility is unnecessary—although unless properly conceived, monitored, controlled, and exercised, it could backfire. Worse, its efforts to disassociate PSYOP from propaganda, as the Defense Department defines that term, make it look hypocritical. The effect is to create the problem the US government seeks to avoid.

There is a need for a pragmatic, consistent approach to defining PSYOP that differentiates it clearly from propaganda, which in the modern world is viewed pejoratively as an effort to lie, trick, deceive, or manipulate. Although the terms have been used interchangeably, drawing the distinction makes sense. Protecting US credibility in communication merits obvious priority to preserve the government’s flexibility in acting to leverage its power, as well as to avoid tainting strategic communication that the United States employs. Experience shows that this goal is easily achievable.

What Are Psychological Operations?

The Defense Department defines PSYOP as “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.”¹

For some, the term had, as Col. (ret) Alfred H. Paddock Jr., former director for psychological operations in the Office of Secretary of Defense put it, “a nefarious connotation.”² Some equate psychological operations with lies and deception. In response, in June 2010 the Pentagon rebranded the term and now calls it Military Information Support Operations (MISO). The definition of MISO employs the same language that defines PSYOP; only the name has been changed. Indeed, many in the military continue to use the term PSYOP colloquially to mean action aimed at demoralizing the enemy. In this book I use the term PSYOP, with the understanding that the Department of Defense has renamed it.³

As PSYOP expert Joe Meissner, editor of Perspectives and the Daily Front Post publications directed to the PSYOP community points out, “MISO is not a good name for what we do. It does not describe our work, nor does it limit our work by its words of Military Information Support Operations. The term is both overinclusive and underinclusive.”⁴ It encompasses activities that public affairs or public information officers do. You can be certain they would object to any suggestion that their activities comprise MISOs. MISO is too narrow a term. Those who are engaged in psychological operations understand that PSYOP is conducted to support other military operations. But it can also be the main activity, not just a supporting activity. On this count, as well, critics argue that the term MISO is unsatisfactory.

Meissner criticizes the words “military information” as unclear. “What does ‘military information’ mean?” he asks. “Does this mean only information on military topics? What about social, economic, and cultural information? Must MISO personnel all be military—or merely have a military goal and perspective? The notion of PSYOP has no such limitations.”⁵

A competing school of thought views the transformation of PSYOP into MISO as a way to broaden, not narrow, the notion. PSYOP (MISO) units were extremely helpful in the New Orleans area in the aftermath of Katrina, providing support to civilian relief efforts. Many concluded that the military’s considerable talents and expertise in this area could be applied more broadly. The term MISO is gaining adherents in many quarters.

Britain’s Approach

Britain resolved the debate over a name change to MISO in favor of PSYOP. Commander Steve Tatham, a senior officer in Britain’s influence development organization, notes that in 1999 the 15 (UK) PsyOps group, which had been established in 1996, announced that it would change its name to the Information Support Group. The name change was brought about because of the perception that Psyops was a pejorative term, somehow associated with brainwashing and mind-bending. “However,” Tatham points out, “the name lasted less than three years and in 2002 it was changed back to PsyOps. In that intervening period the group had been plagued by three problems as a direct result of the change: The British army had presumed that it now possessed no PsyOps capability and the group was written out of routine exercises and, worse, inclusion in operations; second, NATO had decided not to change its name and fellow NATO members were unhappy; finally, the group became plagued by phone calls and e-mails from around the UK armed forces for requests to help fix IT and computer problems!”⁶

He adds: “In 2010, when the US changed from PsyOps to MISO the MoD convened a meeting to discuss whether the UK should follow suit. In almost undue haste there was widespread agreement amongst various senior officers that this was a good idea until the Commanding Officer of 15 (UK) PsyOps Group was finally asked to comment. After relaying the group’s history the matter was quickly closed and the meeting adjourned; the UK would not be changing its name anytime soon.”⁷

PSYOP Is Strategic Communication

Aimed at influencing and shaping the behavior of foreign audiences through words, actions, images, or symbols, PSYOP qualifies as strategic communication. The Defense Department acknowledges that PSYOP’s mission is to influence perceptions and the subsequent behavior of audiences, although it cautions against confusing “psychological impact with PSYOP.” Actions “such as strikes or shows of force have psychological impact but they are not PSYOP [MISO] unless their primary purpose is to influence the perceptions and behavior of a TA [target audience].”⁸ In short, the test for whether an action is PSYOP is intent. If it’s PSYOP, it is strategic communication.

Christopher Lamb of the National Defense University distinguishes PSYOP from other forms of influence communication. He states: “PSYOP supports military operations and aims to modify behavior directly. Toward that end it will use emotion as well as reason; it employs truth but selectively; it will omit facts and on occasion, may mislead the audience. It is inherently biased and the interests of the target audience are incidental compared to the objective of supporting military operations.⁹ Public diplomacy is directed at foreign publics. It seeks to modify perceptions indirectly by presenting issues from the US government point of view. In terms of techniques it appeals to reason and only subtly and infrequently to emotions. Relevant facts may be omitted, but Public Diplomacy never seeks consciously to mislead, lie or deceive. Public Affairs attempts to influence by creating a better informed public. In addition to emphasizing accuracy, Public Affairs officers take care to avoid omitting facts critical to a story even if they are inconvenient, although once disclosed, they are presented in ways that are favorable to US interests if possible.”¹⁰

The issue over whether PSYOP should mislead has engendered controversy. Many argue that because it is advocating a message, it is selective about the facts it uses and its presentation, aimed squarely at persuasion and influence, is inherently biased. The extent to which it may properly mislead is unresolved. The notion of “misleading” is also subjective. Is it misleading to influence an audience to oppose an enemy by characterizing the enemy in very strong, negative terms? Suppose we call an opposition a gang of murderers. Or criminals masquerading as political leaders, interested merely in gaining power and lining their pockets. Others may view those forces very differently. What is appropriate? The answer depends upon one’s perspective.

Joseph Meissner argues that this is why “truth is the best PSYOP. Truth should be the guideline. It is the key to maintaining credibility.”¹¹ Meissner raises an important point. People will accept disagreement with your point of view. But credibility is irretrievably lost once they cease to trust because they feel you are lying or misleading them. Political campaigns offer a cogent analogy. The first thing consultants do when assessing communications from opponents is to identify any misstatements or distortions of fact, misleading assertions, untruths, or lies. That affords a basis for discrediting the opponent with either of two simple messages about what the opponent has stated. First, ask a target audience: If they would mislead you on this, can we trust them on anything else? Second, declare to a target audience: Some people will say or do anything to win (or, advance their own self-interests), at your expense.

Effective PSYOP requires a more careful, measured, and nuanced approach than it may at first appear. Truth is an ally, but the truth communicated must resonate as plausible to an audience. Meissner notes wryly that one of the ironies about PSYOP is that on occasion the truth is not accepted: “In World War I, a piece was put out showing German POW’s eating eggs, to show they were well treated. Unfortunately, the Germans, who had limited access to such food, found that not at all believable.”¹²

Such concerns help frame the anxiety over psychological operations and the related notion of propaganda (discussed in the next chapter) and are understandable, but misguided. Historically, the US government has recognized that both notions are neutral in content. Whether good or bad, prudent or imprudent, it depends upon the context in which the tools are employed, the character of the message, and how PSYOP or propaganda is used. We have always tried to influence foreign target audiences, from the time of the Declaration of Independence. A key issue, especially today, is whether communications that are employed to exert influence are factual, accurate, or consciously misleading. That issue is entwined in whether people perceive that statements are truthful.

Truth is an essential quality to the credibility of any communication. PSYOP’s mission is not, it bears noting, to serve the best interests of a target audience. As Christopher Lamb has observed, “PSYOP may provide information that is helpful to a target audience, but fundamentally it exists to further the interests of our military personnel and their endeavors, not those of the target audience.”¹³ He notes as well that “this is why PSYOP is ethically suspect in public affairs [PA] and public diplomacy [PD] circles,” where it is viewed with suspicion. But the history and use of PSYOP suggests that PA and PD concerns are overstated.

The Historical Context

The legendary Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which existed between 1942 and 1945, offers a good starting point to examine the evolution of US official thinking on psychological operations and propaganda. OSS’s chief, Bill Donovan, believed them to be powerful weapons, and he drew no distinction between the two. Both tactics employ words, actions, images, or symbols to mold or shape attitudes and opinions in order to influence audience behavior. Both qualify as strategic communication.

Donovan was impressed by the British Special Operations Executive, which integrated intelligence activity, special operations, and psychological warfare.¹⁴ He persuaded Roosevelt to adopt the approach of the Special Operations Executive. In 1941, the president established the office of Coordination of Information (COI) under Donovan’s leadership. From the start, a heated debate broke out over what strategies and tactics were appropriate for the United States. This debate continues today. The pivotal issues include how closely US government communication should stick to the truth, and whether the source of communication should be disclosed or attributable.

On one side stood New Deal supporter and playwright Robert Sherwood, a personal friend of Roosevelt and head of the Foreign Information Service (FIS) unit within COI. Sherwood supported psychological operations—which he, too, thought of as propaganda—for democratic education. He considered neither term pejorative. Sherwood hoped to mobilize Americans by contrasting good American values with the evil of the Nazis. But he believed that all communications should be true and attributable. Today, Sherwood’s view is called “white” strategic communication.¹⁵ White communication acknowledges US government communication as emanating from US official sources.

Sherwood disdained “black” or “gray” propaganda—covert communication that could be untrue and whose source was unattributable or unattributed.¹⁶ Donovan favored both. He saw the Nazis as a tough foe whose defeat required brass knuckles. For Donovan, what counted was winning, not how you won. Deception struck him as fair game. He embraced black propaganda that concealed the true source and could appear to come from a party hostile to the United States, as well as gray propaganda in which the true source, such as the US government, is not revealed. Gray propaganda may have no attribution or come from a nonofficial source.

Neither Sherwood nor Donovan gave ground, and Roosevelt tended to like having things both ways. He gave each man his own turf. On June 11, 1942, he transferred Sherwood and his FIS to the Office of War Information (OWI). He dissolved COI, formed the OSS, and installed Donovan in charge. OSS engaged in intelligence, espionage, propaganda, and various forms of direct action and special operations. OWI communication was directed at US audiences. OSS focused on external audiences, such as South America, where turf battles with Nelson Rockefeller and J. Edgar Hoover shut Donovan out, and the Pacific, from which Douglas MacArthur excluded OSS. (The organization did operate in Southeast Asia and China, although in 1944 MacArthur created his own psychological warfare branch that dropped over 400 million leaflets and secured the surrender of 20,000 Japanese troops.¹⁷)

Donovan was determined to subvert enemy morale, and his efforts were adventurous. The OSS operation named the “League of Lonely German Women” epitomized the organization’s deviousn...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword
• Acknowledgments
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I: The Forms of Strategic Communication
• Part II: Words, Images and Symbols, and Deeds
• Part III: Campaigns of Influence
• Part IV: Weapons of Strategic Communication
• Part V: More Effective Strategic Communication
• Notes
• About the Author
• Index