Moral Relativism

A Short Introduction

Neil Levy

• Publisher: Oneworld Publications
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781780744544
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

On September 11 2001, thousands of people died in the attacks on the United States. How could the terrorists justify these acts?
A young man kills his sister to protect his family's honour. How could this be 'right'
These are just some of the questions tackled by Neil Levy in an incisive and elegant guide to the philosophy of moral relativism - the idea that concepts of 'rightness' and 'wrongness' vary from culture to culture, and that there is no such thing as an absolute moral code. Opening with a comprehensive definition of this controversial theory, the book examines all the arguments for and against moral relativism, from its implications for ethics to the role of human biology and the difficulty of separating cultural values from innate behaviour

1

WHAT IS MORAL RELATIVISM AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

Few of the stock controversies of philosophy arouse much passion outside the academy – or, for the most part, even within its walls. Few people, apart from philosophers, are excited by the question of whether mathematical objects exist independently of us or not, for example, or even by questions that have a bearing on our lives, such as whether or not we have free will. Not even the major questions of moral philosophy – whether utilitarianism or Kantianism is true, for instance – excite much interest outside philosophy. But with regard to relativism, passions run high. Much of the left and the right is united in its denunciation, if in little else. For conservative theologian Michael Novak, for instance, ‘[t]he most perilous threat to the free society today […] is the poisonous, corrupting culture of relativism’,⁴ while for Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, relativism opens the way for any crime, even genocide.⁵

The advocates of relativism are hardly less passionate. For them, too, adherence to relativism is a matter of morality as much as intellectual conviction: one should be a relativist not only because relativism is true, but because it is right. Thus, for instance, for the American anthropologist Melville Herskovits, adopting a relativistic position is the only way to express the respect justifiably demanded by other cultures and their members:

The very core of cultural relativism is the social discipline that comes of respect for differences – of mutual respect. Emphasis on the worth of many ways of life, not one, is an affirmation of the values in each culture.⁶

Discovering the truth about relativism is therefore not just of intellectual interest. Relativism matters, or so many people believe.

Relativism differs from other issues in philosophy in another way, which also contributes to the importance of discovering the truth about it. It is one of the few philosophical questions upon which most thoughtful people seem to have a position. Students beginning philosophy are often already convinced relativists of some kind or another. They believe nothing more strongly than they believe that there are no right answers in ethics, and that, in any case, we must respect differences of opinion.

We need to know what relativism is, why it matters, why it arouses such passions – and whether it is true. The purpose of this book is to answer these questions. How did relativism come to be such a pervasive feature of the contemporary world? What are its moral and political implications, if any? Can it be stated consistently, or is it, as some philosophers believe, completely incoherent? What is the truth about relativism?

What is relativism?

Before we can make a first approach to these many and difficult questions, we need to know what relativism is. We must be sure that the term is being used consistently and in the same sense by all the parties in the debate, or our arguments will be futile. What, then, do people mean when they claim to be – or accuse one another of being – relativists?

To say that something is relative is to say that what it is is, in some way, dependent upon – relative to – something else. If I say that something has a property in a relative fashion, I might mean my attribution of that property to be understood in a comparative manner. Imagine, for instance, someone stepping outside their house on a spring morning and remarking that the air is relatively warm. By this they might mean that though the air is quite cool compared to a midsummer’s day, it is warm compared to – relative to – recent days. Thus a relative judgement makes essential reference to something else, to which it is compared. The truth of such a judgement depends upon the context in which it is made. The truth of the statement ‘It is relatively warm today’ therefore depends not only upon the current air temperature, but also on the temperature of preceding days.

Relative judgements are to be contrasted with absolute judgements. A judgement is absolute if its truth (or falsity) is dependent only on facts about the object the judgement concerns, and not facts about the context beyond it. We can illustrate this, once more, with the example of a statement about temperature. If I were to say, not that ‘it is relatively warm today’, but that ‘the ambient temperature is currently 18° Celsius’, I would be making an absolute claim. The truth of the claim depends only on the current air temperature, and not on facts about preceding days, or anything else for that matter.

Now, no one disputes that the kind of relative judgement under discussion so far is often appropriate. As our example shows, some kinds of relativisms are clearly innocuous. No harm is done by claiming that the weather is relatively warm, or that the programmes on TV are relatively bad. Such relative claims are more or less explicitly comparative: they do not assert that X is (absolutely) Y, (that the air is warm, or the programmes bad) but that X is (relatively) Y; that is, it is more Y than something else, to which it is compared. Relative claims such as these do not arouse anyone’s passions. But some relative claims are importantly different. When someone asserts that morality or truth is relative, this person does not just mean that some such statements are true (or false) relative to some framework to which they are compared, but that such statements can only be understood relativistically. Whereas with regard to temperature we have available to us an absolute measure, with reference to which we can compare all relative claims, with regard to morality no independent standards are available. Or so the moral relativist claims.

If morality really is relative, then, moral statements are only true or false relative to some standard. There is no absolute standard available, against which all the relative claims might be measured. When someone asserts that morality is relative, what kind of relative standard does this person have in mind? What is morality relative to? There are two major candidates for this position. We might think that moral statements are true relative to the feelings or opinions of individuals. Or we might think that they are true relative to cultures. The first position is often called subjectivism, since it holds that subjective opinions set the standards of truth and falsity. It is this kind of position that people seem to have in mind when they say that morality is just a matter of opinion. The second kind of position is often known as cultural relativism, since it claims that cultures set the standards of moral truth.

We need to add one further point before we have full-blown moral relativism, the relativism that so many people find infuriating and dangerous. For relativism to be threatening, it must be true, not only that all the judgements made concerning a particular subject matter are true only relative to some standard, but also that the standard cannot itself be shown to be uniquely correct. If this were not the case, then relativism would, once again, be innocuous. No one would worry if all moral claims were relative to some standard, but that standard was itself known to be true, or the best available. Subjectivism and cultural relativism are threatening precisely because they suggest that the standards with reference to which we judge are not themselves justified. Subjectivism judges the truth of moral statements by reference to individual opinion; cultural relativism by reference to the standards of a culture. In both cases, there are multiple such standards. In the absence of any way of deciding between such standards, we have full-blown relativism.

We shall therefore define moral relativism as the conjunction of the following two theses:

a. Moral claims are true only relative to some standard or framework; and

b. This standard or framework is not itself uniquely justified.

The framework in question is almost always the culture of some group of people; this is how we shall understand it in most of what follows.

Kinds of relativism

Relativism comes in many varieties. That is, there are different kinds of things about which we can be relativists. We can be relativists about morality, about knowledge, about art, and so on. The two most important kinds of relativism, however, are relativism about knowledge and relativism about morality. We already have some notion of what is meant by moral relativism. We will now look very briefly at relativism about knowledge.

Relativism about knowledge is called epistemic relativism, from the Greek word for knowledge. The claims made by an epistemic relativist are very similar, structurally, to those made by a moral relativist. Thus, an epistemic relativist claims that:

1. All knowledge claims are true (or false) only relative to some standard; and

2. This standard cannot itself be known to be true.

Thus, epistemic relativists believe not only that our morality is no better than that of the Aztecs, but also that our science is merely one local system of knowledge among others. Epistemic relativists are usually cultural relativists; hence, they hold that every belief system reflects the way of life or the culture of a particular people, and none can be said to be better than any of the others. Generally speaking, epistemic relativists are also moral relativists. If we cannot have absolute knowledge about any subject matter, then we cannot have absolute knowledge about morality. Thus epistemic relativism is usually held to entail moral relativism.

Though there are a few philosophers who advocate epistemic relativism, it is not a widely held view. The overwhelming success of our science in making accurate predictions, in controlling our environment and in making our lives easier is hard to reconcile with the belief that, nevertheless, that science is no more true than premodern or Navaho physics. Worse still for epistemic relativism, it seems to be an incoherent position. People who claim that they believe in epistemic relativism seem to be contradicting themselves.

To see how epistemic relativism seems to be self-contradictory, we need to ask ourselves what the status of the relativist’s own knowledge claim is supposed to be. The epistemic relativist asserts that all factual claims are true only relative to a standard or a framework. But this is itself a factual claim, and therefore must itself be subject to the strictures it imposes on knowledge claims. If all factual claims are only true relative to a framework, then the claim ‘all factual claims are only true relative to a framework’ is itself true only relative to a framework! But if it is only true relative to a framework, then we have no reason to have any confidence in it. After all, the point of the epistemic relativist doctrine is to convince us to stop believing that any knowledge claims are true at all times and everywhere. But if the claims of epistemic relativism are not themselves true at all times and everywhere, then it may be that other knowledge claims are absolutely true. At least, the epistemic relativist gives us no reason to believe that this is not the case.

The only way the epistemic relativist can avoid these mindboggling paradoxes is by somehow excepting her own principle from the rule it states. That is, a full and non-paradoxical statement of epistemic relativism would have to claim something like the following:

All factual claims are only true or false relative to some framework, with the exception of this very claim.

Though this version of epistemic relativism avoids the problems of self-contradiction, it does so only at the cost of creating new dilemmas. What reason do we have for thinking that this knowledge claim, alone of all such claims, is exempt from the effects of epistemic relativism? What features of the claim make it the case that it is so exempt? If there is one such claim that avoids relativism, might there not be more? Until the relativist provides convincing answers to these questions, her doctrine seems to be rather implausible.

There is a reply to this line of argument available to the epistemic relativist. She might hold that her view is correct, that all factual statements are only true relative to some framework. But, she might add, this claim itself is true relative to all frameworks. It is, at the moment, hard for us to evaluate this claim, since the notions of ‘framework’ and ‘standards’ we have been utilizing so far are vague. Nevertheless, at this stage we can at least say this much: if it is true that some factual statements are true relative to all possible (or plausible) frameworks, then this in itself seems a sufficient basis for suspecting that any interesting relativism is false. If some statements are true relative to all frameworks, then we can concentrate our attention on these. It might, for instance, turn out that some moral statements are true relative to all plausible moral frameworks. Perhaps ‘murder is wrong’ is one such claim. In that case, though, we seem to have a sufficient basis to begin elaborating a morality that is, if not absolutely true, at least true for all people and at all times. What absolutist could want more? Such a morality would disarm those relativists who argue that we should never interfere with the practices of other cultures. Formulating a cross-culturally valid morality would provide us with the criteria for deciding when such intervention was justified.

Since epistemic relativity (in any strong form) is regarded by most philosophers as implausible, and since it is vulnerable to the contradiction argument, I will from now on ignore it. I will focus all my attention on moral relativism. This form of relativism is not vulnerable to the contradiction argument in the form we have so far presented it. The moral relativist claims that:

a. Moral claims are true only relative to some standard or framework.

Since this is not itself a moral claim, it is not contradictory to assert it. We can, without contradiction, say that no moral claim is (absolutely) true, while holding that nevertheless a. is (absolutely) true. Thus the moral relativist avoids the contradiction argument, at least in the form in which we have examined it.

Varieties of moral relativism

The rest of this book will focus on moral relativism almost exclusively. But moral relativism is itself a broad category. We can distinguish three basic kinds of relativism that fall under the general category of moral relativism.⁷

Descriptive relativism

By descriptive relativism, we simply mean that, as a matter of fact, different cultures or (rational) individuals hold different fundamental moral principles, which sometimes conflict. So described, descriptive relativism seems to be obviously true: we only have to look at the diversity of practices and beliefs across the world (or even within our own society) to be convinced of it. As we shall see, however, things are not so simple. Descriptive relativism is true only if moral disagreement is really fundamental; very often, however, apparent moral disagreement can be fully explained by pointing to a factual (and therefore non-moral) disagreement upon which it rests. Thus, for example, apparent moral disagreement concerning the permissibility of pornography might be fully explained in terms of a disagreement about a matter of fact: does pornography lead men to objectify women?

Moral-requirement relativism

Moral-requirement relativism is the view that what is morally required of individuals varies from group to group, culture to culture, and so forth. Thus, if moral requirement relativism is true, I may be morally required to do some things (treat everyone equally, for example, regardless of their gender or race) that some other individuals are not required to do. There may even be some things that some people are required to do that are impermissible for others. Thus, for example, it might be that an Aztec priest is morally required to sacrifice human beings to the gods, whereas similar acts are absolutely impermissible for me. As we shall see, moral-requirement relativism is true only if the kinds of moral principles that are binding upon some people, but not others,...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1 What is Moral Relativism and Why Does it Matter?
• 2 Moral Relativism: The Intellectual Case
• 3 The Moral Implications of Relativism
• 4 Descriptive Relativism
• 5 Biology and Human Interests
• 6 The Problem of False Consciousness
• 7 Incommensurability and The Shared Core of Morality
• 8 Beyond Relativism and Absolutism
• Suggestions for Further Reading
• Notes
• Index