New England Dogmatics

A Systematic Collection of Questions and Answers in Divinity by Maltby Gelston (1766–1865)

Maltby Gelston, Robert L. Boss

• Publisher: Pickwick Publications
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781532637766
• Topic: Theologie & Religion
• Subtopic: Christliche Theologie

Jonathan Edwards' (1703-58) ideas are among the most significant to the development of Reformed Theology in America. However brief the life of his intellection tradition, Edwards' ideas and their reception remain an integral part of contemporary theological dialogue. Hitherto no work has appeared that sheds as much systematic light on the reception of Edwards' ideas than Maltby Gelston's (1766-1865) Systematic Collection of Questions and Answers in Divinity. As a ministerial aspirant under the tutelage of Jonathan Edwards the younger, Gelston received catechetical instruction through an exhaustive series of 313 questions, tailor made by early New England theologians. To this point, researches have mused over the significance of these questions and what they tell us about the development of the New England theological tradition. With the publication of this manuscript, researchers may now, for the first time, muse over the significance of Gelston's answers.

Questions and Answers 1–313

Question 1 [2]. How does it appear that something existed from eternity?

Answer 1. Had nothing existed from eternity nothing would have existed to eternity. It is impossible in the nature of things, that something should bring itself into existence: otherwise, were it to bring itself into existence it must act, put forth an exertion of power, before it had a being. But there can be no power where there is no existence: neither can there be an exertion of power where there is no power: consequently there can be no exertion of power where there is no existence. For a creature to bring itself into existence, it must be and not be at the same time: it must be both the cause and effect of the same action. No effect can take place without some cause. It is perfectly inconceivable, how a thing should start into existence without some ground or cause of its existence or how any effect should take place without some antecedent cause. Since then there are existences they must be effects of some cause or causes. Creatures evidently are not capable of creating each other. They are not possessed of power sufficient. Nor does there appear to be that regular gradation and subordination between the several species and individuals which there must be in case they created each other. There must therefore be at least one being whose existence has no cause without or beyond itself, who is unproduced, uncreated, and consequently from eternity.

Question 2 [3]. How does it appear that this earth and visible system are not from eternity?

Answer 2. This earth and visible system evidently consist of matter, sluggish and inactive, incapable of beginning motion in itself or of communicating it to anything else. That, whose ground or reason of existence is within itself, must be possessed of some power within itself. But matter, evidently, has no power but what is communicated. There cannot then, be any ground or reason of its existence within, but it must be without itself. Its existence must be derived and dependent. If so, this earth and visible system, which consists of matter are the effect of some cause. They were brought into existence by some power superior to themselves. The existence of an effect produced by some cause presupposes the exertion of power. No power can be exerted for this purpose without beginning to be exerted and consequently no effect can be produced without being begun to be produced and that which once began is not from eternity.

Besides, the most authentic histories can extend the antiquity of the world back to but a few thousand years. Every appearance favors the idea that its duration has been but short. Those parts which most probably were never inhabited appeared to be but a little superior to that which has been produced by cultivation. Every part bears evident marks of decay and ruin. But were it from eternity, its existence must be from some ground or reason within itself: it must be underived and independent and consequently might continue to exist to eternity.

Question 3 [5]. How does it appear that the existence of man is derived and dependent?

Answer 3. Man’s existence is evidently recent and of short duration. He could not have brought himself into existence because it is absurd and inconsistent to suppose him to act before he had being: to be both the cause and effect of the same action. Nor was there any ground or reason for his existence in his nature originally. Otherwise, he would’ve been from, and might continue to eternity. Since he did not bring himself into being, his existence most evidently is derived: and since he cannot, agreeably to his own wishes, continue himself in existence it is equally evident, he is dependent, for his continuance in existence.

Question 4 [6]. How do you prove the natural perfections of God; intelligence, omnipotence, omniscience, immutability, omnipresence, and unity?

Answer 4. All being is divided into matter and mind, or intelligence. Matter appears to be dispossessed of every power which might render it capable of creating or producing any effects independently. It is impossible, indeed, to conceive how an unintelligent substance should produce intelligence: how a lifeless lump should produce life and activity; or how one being should communicate a greater perfection and excellence then itself possesses. The greatest argument, however, in favor of God’s intelligence, is the evident marks of design and skill which appear in every work of his hands. More particularly, the nature, construction, and situation of this Earth, the variety of its inhabitants, their curious frames, and the means of their support, the proportion kept up, between the sexes; above all, the human constitution, the union of soul and body, and the great and enlarging powers and faculties of the soul are all decisive demonstrations that he who created things and especially human intelligence must himself be possessed of this perfection in the highest degree.

Since all creatures are dependent upon God for their being, continuance in existence, and for all the powers they possess, it is evident, none can resist him and prosper, none can thwart and frustrate his designs. That power then, which created the present system of creatures, might still go on to create systems of creatures, ad infinitum. Nor can anything be conceived to be beyond the limits of his power, which implies no contradiction; which is all that is required to be omnipotent.

From similar considerations the omniscience of God appears equally clear. As he gave two creatures their powers and faculties, he is surely acquainted with the extent of these powers; for the meanest workman is acquainted with the work he performs. He is perfectly acquainted with what he has done, can or will do. Since he gave to his creatures all their powers and faculties and since they are constantly dependent upon, and act, in subservience to him it is necessary he should know all things they do otherwise they might counteract and defeat his purposes and introduce confusion and disorder. If then, he is acquainted with all things respecting himself and creatures he is omniscient with respect to all real existences and from what he has done and what we know of his knowledge, we may infer his knowledge of all possible existences.

The ground or reason of his existence speaking in his very nature he must be necessarily existent. The necessity of his existence must be antecedent to, in the order of nature, and independent of his will. And being beyond the reach of change from any other being this necessity of his existence must remain so long as his nature remains. Since then he’s not subject to change from his own will or that of any other being he is immutable.

He is over and above all and therefore can be limited by none. Necessity of existence must be unlimited: for as nothing can be conceived of to bound or limit it; so that which is the ground or reason of it must be uniformly the same everywhere. If we might suppose one degree of possible existence unnecessary we might another and consequently every degree. No place therefore can be mentioned where God’s existence is not necessary, and consequently where it is not. Besides, not only is God from his very nature necessarily existent everywhere, but he must be in all places to support, uphold and govern all things.

If God be self existent or necessarily existent and consequently infinite, it would be absurd to suppose two gods. If we supposed two beings, self existent and necessarily existent, the ground or reason of their existence must be in their very nature and must be uniformly the same: consequently the beings must be both alike in every respect. If so, then they are not two but one. If they be different one must have what the other has not: and therefore one at least must be imperfect. It is absurd to suppose two infinities in every respect. There can be only one infinite in power or knowledge and consequently but one God.80

Question 5 [10]. How do you prove the moral perfections of God; that he is a friend to virtue, absolutely holy, just, good, and true?

Answer 5. Judging from the present appearance of things we should not perhaps be led to determine what is the true moral character of God. From the mixture of good and evil which take place in the world, and the indiscriminate and similar treatment of the virtuous and vicious, we should be at a loss or perhaps suppose him to be of a mixed character. But reasoning from his natural perfections we might rather conclude him to be a friend to virtue; holy, just, good, and true.

Being omniscient and omnipotent we cannot suppose him subject to disappointment. His all sufficiency would place him beyond the reach of want or weakness. In creatures these appear to be sources of depravity and weakness, in part, at least; and since these do not affect him, we should not on account of them suppose him to be evil.

From his giving his creatures capacities of distinguishing between good and evil and morally good and evil character, we might be led to conclude he must himself be good. For were he not so, he must certainly know all his virtuous creatures would hate and detest him, and we should naturally suppose it would be directly repugnant to the feelings and wishes of the supreme being to suffer this from those of his creatures. We might then be led to conclude he must himself be a friend to virtue. He who in heart is a friend to virtue is himself virtuous or holy. Once supp...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Foreword
• Preface
• Editor’s Introduction
• Theological Questions
• Questions and Answers 1–313
• Bibliography