Building Inclusive Democracies in ASEAN

Ronald U Mendoza, Edsel L Beja Jr.;Julio C Teehankee

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9789813236509
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Political Economy
• Index: Economics

Containing the latest research and insights of academics and development practitioners pursuing political and economic reforms in the ASEAN region, Building Inclusive Democracies in ASEAN recognizes that a well-functioning democracy is part of what ultimately fosters inclusive growth and development. Inequitable access to democratic processes and mechanisms produce government policies and initiatives that are inconsistent with the needs of the majority.

The chapters include empirical research on the symptoms and effects of traditional patron-client politics, experiences, insights, analyses, and policy recommendations, as well as reflections, on reform efforts along the lines of citizens' participation, transparency, and evidence-based policymaking.

Contents:

• Patron Client Politics in the Philippines and ASEAN:
  • Political Dynasties in the Philippine Congress (Ronald U Mendoza, Edsel L Beja Jr, Victor S Venida, and David B Yap II)
  • Vote Secrecy and Democracy in the Philippines (Cesi Cruz)
  • The Local Electoral Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers in the Philippines: Evidence from a Field Experiment (Julien Labonne)
  • Pork & Typhoons: The Influence of Political Connections on Disaster Response in the Philippines (Allen Hicken, James Atkinson, and Nico Ravanilla)
  • Who Votes for Dynastic Candidates? Philippine Senatorial Elections (Clarissa C David and Ma Rosel S San Pascual)
  • The 2013 Philippine Mid-Term Election: An Empirical Analysis of Dynasties, Vote Buying, and the Correlates of Senate Votes (Ronald U Mendoza, Mario Antonio G Lopez, David B Yap II, and Tristan A Canare)
  • The Political-Economic Sentiments of the People: What the 2007 Senatorial Electron Says (Luis F Dumlao)
  • Political Change and the Business Elite in Indonesia (Anders C Johansson)
  • Social Media, Power, and Democratization in Malaysia: Weapons of the Weak? (Wong Mun Loong)
  • Political Control and Corruption in Thai Bureaucracy (Prijono Tjiptoherijanto)
  • Coalition Politics and Reform Dynamics in Thailand (Veerayooth Kanchoochat)
  • Lootable Resources and Political Virtue: The Economic Governance of Lee Kuan Yew, Ferdinand Marcos, and Chiang Kai-shek Compared (Hilton L Root)
  • Freedom of Information and Governance in Indonesia and the Philippines (Monica C Ang)
  • Legislative Malapportionment in Asia (Yuko Kasuya and Yuta Kamahara)
• Reforms to Promote Inclusiveness:
  • Democratizing Elections through Campaign Finance Reforms (Joy Aceron and Antonio G M La Viña)
  • Institutionalizing Political Party Reforms in the Philippines (Julio C Teehankee)
  • Shopping for Politicians: Insights from Market Basket Analysis of Senatoriables (Reina Reyes and Sheena Valenzuela)
  • 'Imperial Manila' and Local Autonomy (Michael Henry Ll Yusingco)
  • Inclusive Education (Edilberto De Jesus)
  • In Search of Youth-opia: Nurturing the Next Generation Catalysts, Collaborators, and Change-makers (Leon G Flores III)
  • The Promise and Perils of Filipino Migratory Labor (Lila Shahani)
  • Competition Policy: Key Pillar for Inclusive Growth (Cielito F Habito)
  • Responsible Media, Democracy, and Inclusive Growth (Melinda Quintos De Jesus)
  • Anti-Corruption and Third Party Monitoring (Albert Alejo, Jess Lorenzo, and Ronald U Mendoza)

Readership: Readers in political science, Southeast Asian studies, political economy, and governance reform. Patron-Client Politics;ASEAN;Governance;Democracy;Political Science;Economic Inequality;Political Inequality00

Part 1

Patron Client Politics in the Philippines and ASEAN

Political Dynasties in the Philippine Congress

Ronald U. Mendoza,¹ Edsel L. Beja Jr.,² Victor S. Venida,² and David B. Yap II;¹ [1] Asian Institute of Management and [2] Ateneo de Manila University

The relationship between democracy and inclusive growth is rather complicated. On the one hand, democracies are built with mechanisms and processes to enable the state to respond to the needs of its citizenry. It can be argued that this setup could lead to greater investments in human capital and equitable socioeconomic outcomes. On the other hand, democracies are vulnerable to policy paralysis and myopia. For instance, insecure tenures and term limits make it challenging to reconcile short-term aspirations and personal interests with the pursuit of reforms essential for the promotion of inclusive growth.

Even if it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between democracy and inclusive growth, there is nonetheless reason to suppose that democracy has the capacity to foster wide-ranging participation toward a desired end. Democracy enables the citizenry to effect changes in both policy formulation and implementation at both the local and national levels. A well-functioning democracy—one that is underpinned by an electoral system that guarantees fair and competitive elections—can give the citizens plenty of opportunities to direct policies towards equitable socioeconomic outcomes. A malfunctioning democracy, however, can deprive citizens of these opportunities to influence government policymaking.

Political dynasties seem to be a ubiquitous feature of the democratic landscape. Some would say that political dynasties are symptoms of malfunctioning democracies. A brief survey of the literature suggests that the share of legislators with dynastic links to legislators belonging to preceding parliaments ranges from as low as 6% in the United States (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009) or 10% in Argentina (Rossi, 2009) to as high as 37–40% in Japan and Mexico (Asako et al., 2010). For the Philippines, which is the focus of this chapter, approximately 60% of legislators elected in 2010 had kinship ties to past representatives and/or governors (Querubin, 2010a).

The prevalence of political dynasties could be viewed as an indication of increasing political inequality that, in turn, signals a deterioration of socioeconomic outcome. Moreover, given the implicit breakdown of the tacit accountability mechanisms that exist between public officials, dynastic officials can use the powers of the state for self-serving interests without fear of replacement or administrative sanctions. Political dynasties also have the capacity to skew the selection of political leaders during elections, given the advantages in human, economic, and social capital that they possess. The concentration of political power within the hands of political dynasties creates barriers to entry that could prevent the best and the brightest from serving in the government.

Another view suggests that political dynasties afford genuine reformists an extended time horizon that enables more effective planning and implementation of policies with long-term goals. Politicians with shorter tenures often yield to populist demands and shun difficult but necessary long-term reforms that are critical to sustained, robust, and inclusive growth. It is possible that dynastic politicians possess legacy-related motivations that are strongly linked with overall outcomes in their respective jurisdictions. They may thus be more inclined to care about long-term outcomes the longer their tenure becomes. In contrast, purely rent-seeking dynastic politicians, upon recognizing the pecuniary benefits of adopting growth-oriented policies and strategies, might also be inclined towards enacting reforms that would result in considerable and sustainable economic growth in their own jurisdictions. From these two views, however, the net impact of political dynasties on socioeconomic outcomes remains an empirical question.

This chapter presents metrics on the size of political dynasties in local government units in the Philippines as of 2013. It represents one of the most comprehensive works in mapping political dynasties in the Philippines. The underlying motivation behind the development of this dataset is to lay the foundation for an empirical evaluation of the relationship between political dynasties and socioeconomic outcomes. In particular, the chapter seeks to present initial answers to several questions. What is the share of political dynasties in local government positions in the Philippines? What is the share of political dynasties in the major political parties? What is the net worth of political dynasties in the 16th congress? Are representatives, on average, significantly wealthier than the majority of Filipinos? Could wealth represent an impediment to political participation? Put differently, could economic inequality translate to sociopolitical inequality? Do provinces with more political dynasties have higher levels of poverty and inequality as well as lower levels of human development outcomes? Similarly, is the standard of living lower in provinces dominated by political dynasties?

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a brief survey of literature on political dynasties. Section 2 describes the methodology. Section 3 provides a brief analysis of the results gleaned from the dynasties dataset. A final section reiterates and elaborates upon the most salient findings of this study.

The Setting of Political Dynasties

Democratic institutions and the market economy are inexorably linked. Deepening political inequality could thus be argued to have the potential to aggravate existing socioeconomic inequalities. Conversely, socioeconomic inequalities could also worsen political inequality. The result is a type of low-level democratic equilibrium where mutually reinforcing forces of weakened democratic institutions lead to poor socioeconomic outcomes and vice versa. Empirical analyses of political dynasties could be viewed as crucial in understanding the nature of the relationships between political and socioeconomic inequalities.

Many modern democracies can be characterized by dynastic leadership to some degree. The more interesting issue, especially for policy, is the characterization of the relationship between political dynasties and socioeconomic outcomes. Studies that focus on the link between democracy and economic growth have still not settled the direction of causation (e.g. Burkhart, 1997; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008; Rodrik, 2007; Lee, 2005; Morrisson and Murtin, 2003) and need to be differentiated from those that examine political dynasties within democratic regimes more specifically. With the possible exception of Dal Bo, Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder (2009), Rossi (2009), and Asako et al. (2010), and a few path-breaking studies in the Philippines (e.g., Balisacan and Fuwa, 2004; Querubin, 2010a, 2010b), there is little empirical evidence on how political dynasties affect socioeconomic outcomes and vice versa.

Why study the political dynasties in the Philippines?

Political dynasties in the Philippines have been the topic of a growing number of studies. Sidel (1997), for example, provided an overview of the family history of two particularly prominent and enduring political dynasties: the Osmeñas of Cebu and the Remullas of Cavite. Similarly, Cullinane (1994) discusses the manner in which the Duranos of Danao have entrenched themselves in power for half a century. Teehankee (2007) argues that the emergence and persistence of political dynasties stems from the highly unequal socioeconomic structure of Philippine society and the failure of the country to develop a truly democratic electoral system and cultivate genuine political parties. The inability of the majority to contest the rule of the elite is one of the explanations offered for the continued dominance and preponderance of political dynasties in contemporary Philippine politics. Coronel (2007) further suggests that a combination of factors like wealth, popularity, political machinery, alliances, myth, and violence contribute to the formation of political dynasties. The argument is centered on how political dynasties, given their protracted tenures, can, in essence, accumulate more of the physical, human, social, and political capital that ultimately determine the outcome of elections. Sidel (1997) further emphasizes the centrality of wealth in elections, saying that Philippine politicians spend an inordinate amount of money on political campaigns because of the need to compete and/or engage in vote-buying, electoral fraud, and coercion. Political success, in turn, affords political dynasties with more opportunities to consolidate and expand their economic and power bases (McCoy, 1994).

Wealth and popularity, however, are not sufficient to form political dynasties. These resources have to be channeled through political machinery. Coronel (2007) argues that the success of a political campaign is contingent on the creation of a political network capable of transforming wealth and influence into votes. Coronel notes that political dynasties often consolidate their power through mergers with other political families or operators. Alternatively, Sidel (1997) notes that several dynasties survive because of their affiliation with powerful political families and/or entities. Forging alliances allows political dynasties to tap into even larger pools of resources and further broaden the scope of their influence. Some political dynasties are also known to complement these resource advantages or compensate for their disadvantages with the systemic use of violence and intimidation. The long history of politically motivated assassinations in the Philippines indicates that violence provides some dynastic politicians the opportunity to eliminate or grievously cripple their rival political dynasties.

Recent analyses on Philippine political dynasties are consistent with the hypotheses put forward in literature. Querubin (2010a) estimates that the capacity for self-perpetuation of Filipino legislators is thrice that of legislators in the United States. Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) provide evidence that the presence of political dynasties negatively influences the growth in expenditure, but not the reduction in poverty. In addition, they find that political dynasties are negatively associated with subsequent income growth.

Possible Framework for Political Dynasties Research

In forging an agenda for an empirical analysis of political dynasties, it would be useful to outline its possible linkages with socioeconomic outcomes. In theory, democracies promote political equality through the one-person-one-vote arrangement, equality before the law, and free speech, among others. These provisions are designed to enhance the capacity of the citizenry to communicate their needs to the state and, conversely, empower the state to be more responsive to the needs of its constituents. In countries where the vast majority is from the lower income segment of society, democratic institutions open the door for more responsive and pro-poor policymaking. This setting is critical in terms of investments in human capital, which are important for long-term economic growth. Democracy could therefore contribute to the reduction of poverty and income inequality as well as to the promotion of inclusive economic growth.

At this junction, it is important to mention that there are factors that can weaken political participation and representation. Put differently, there are many de jure democracies but fewer de facto democracies. The contention then is that political dynasties constitute an important element of any discussion regarding political participation and the state of a democracy.

Various factors contribute to the rise of political dynasties, including the prohibitive cost of running for office, rising influence of political lobbies, and factors influencing voting behavior such as name recall. As noted earlier, membership to a political dynasty increases one’s chances of being elected into office and essentially constrains competition by excluding most citizens from participating in political leadership roles. Once in the position of power, dynastic officials could promote narrower class interests. Political participation can be further curtailed (and political dynasties strengthened) through imperfect information and voter disillusionment. The people may misinterpret political platforms, vote for candidates who do not represent their interests, or altogether dismiss the need to scrutinize political platforms and vote based on personality or along patronage lines.

The lack of political competition and the prevalence of political dynasties could be argued to affect socioeconomic outcomes through at least three channels. First, the prevalence of political dynasties prevents the majority of the citizenry from effectively communicating their needs to the government. As a result, the government is not equipped with the information necessary to craft and implement the necessary interventions and responses to address the needs of its people. The misrepresentation (or inadequate representation) of the excluded groups could skew poverty reduction policies and income redistribution mechanisms, worsen poverty and income inequality, and ultimately compromise the capacity of the government to provide the most necessary public goods. Second, democratic institutions could be compromised if dynastic officials use the powers of the state for self-serving interests. Finally, political dynasties could skew the selection of political leaders by favoring those with influence.

On the other hand, dynastic rule can be argued to provide longer time horizons with which to plan and implement reforms with long-term development objectives. One possible outcome is that a politician with short tenure seeking reelection may opt for projects and policies with immediate results, rather than long-term projects and policies, the results of which might be realized under subsequent regimes. The recognition of longer time horizons may induce improved performance even from rent-seeking politicians. Upon recognizing that their personal pecuniary interests are inimitably tied to the social and economic outcomes of their jurisdictions, these politicians could be inclined to invest in the productive capacities of their jurisdictions. As with the so-called “stationary bandits” argument (Olson, 2000), rent-seeking politicians would work toward ensuring their continued survival through the expansion of the productive...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables, Graphs, Figures, and Appendices
• List of Acronyms
• Acknowledgment
• Introduction
• Part 1: Patron Client Politics in the Philippines and ASEAN
• Part 2: Reforms to Promote Inclusiveness
• About the Authors