The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil

Justin P. McBrayer, Daniel Howard-Snyder

• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781118607978
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Philosophie de la religion

The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil presents a collection of original essays providing both overview and insight, clarifying and evaluating the philosophical and theological "problem of evil" in its various contexts and manifestations.

• Features all original essays that explore the various forms of the problems of evil, offering theistic responses that attempt to explain evil as well as discussion of the challenges facing such explanations
• Includes section introductions with a historical essay that traces the developments of the issues explored
• Acknowledges the fact that there are many problems of evil, some of which apply only to those who believe in concepts such as hell and some of which apply to non-theists
• Represents views from the various religious traditions, including Hindu, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim

Part I

PROBLEMS OF EVIL

1

A Brief History of Problems of Evil

Michael W. Hickson

Introduction

If we understand “evil” broadly, as most contemporary philosophers do, to mean “all bad things” – for example, physical and mental suffering, intentional wrongdoing, error, and poverty – then it goes without saying that every Western philosopher and religious thinker has found evil problematic and has attempted, at least partially, to explain its origin and the means of overcoming or escaping it. To give an exhaustive survey of problems of evil in the West, therefore, would amount to writing a fairly complete history of 2500 years of philosophy and religion.

In what follows, therefore, I do not attempt to offer such a complete history, but rather to present several important moments of it in an attempt to track the emergence of what philosophers today call “the problem of evil.” In contemporary parlance, “the problem of evil,” despite the definite article, denotes a family of challenges to belief in a God who is supremely benevolent and powerful (van Inwagen 2006, 4–10): how can belief in such a God be justified given the vast extent and often horrendous nature of the suffering and moral depravity of human beings?

This family of problems, depending on logical presentation and authorial intent, can be considered either aporetically or atheologically (Adams and Adams 1990, 2–3). In the former case, the problems are presented as challenging human reason to think more deeply about the nature of God and his causal relation to the world (see Chapters 9 and 10). In the latter case, the problems are presented such that evil is explicitly offered as strong evidence against the very existence of God (see Chapters 4 and 5). Such atheological arguments, which are the primary focus of contemporary philosophers, have lately been referred to as “arguments from evil” in order to distinguish them from broader problems of evil that do not explicitly threaten belief in God's existence (Howard-Snyder 1996, xi–xvi). The goal of this chapter is to trace the historical origin of arguments from evil. The question I wish to answer is this: has the existence of evil always been treated by philosophers as a challenge to God's existence, or is this a more recent trend in thinking about evil?

Since authorial intent is very difficult to determine with any confidence, I focus on the presentation of the problems of evil that have been treated over the centuries, and ask whether the authors in question link evil to the denial of God's existence. The problems of evil that must be considered are those in which evil is used as the basis of an objection to an account of the origin of the universe according to which some God is the principal cause. In considering such problems, I return to the same question: is evil being used to discredit belief in the existence of God, or is evil being opposed to some other element of the causal theory?

Another Footnote to Plato

Western philosophical reflection on the problem of evil is, not surprisingly, another footnote to Plato (429–347 BC). But a footnote to which dialogue or dialogues? A single passage in the Republic has been identified as “the first distinct statement in Greek literature of the problem of evil” (Chase Greene 1944, 298): “since a god is good, he is not – as most people claim – the cause of everything that happens to human beings but of only a few things, for good things are fewer than bad ones in our lives. He alone is responsible for the good things, but we must find some other cause for the bad ones, not a god” (Plato [1018] 1997; 379c).

The problem of evil is certainly lurking in the background of this passage, where the concern is to avoid charging the gods with any involvement in evil. However, this text does not yet explicitly state or engage any problem of evil; rather, the text sets up an elegant evasion of all such problems, an evasion that will be elaborated in the sequel to the Republic, the dramatic cosmological story of the Timaeus. In both dialogues, Plato advances a dualistic account of the origin of the universe. There is not a single, supremely powerful, and perfectly good original cause that is responsible for all that exists, and that must therefore be justified in the face of so much evil in the world; instead, Plato conveniently places all the blame for evil on a second eternal cause, which can be “persuaded” by the power of the good cause only to a limited extent.

In the Timaeus, the two original causes of the universe are named “Mind” and “Necessity.” Mind acts on Necessity (by which Plato means the eternal disorderly motion of an unformed mass) “persuading it to direct most of the things that come to be toward what is best” (Plato [1250] 1997; 48a). The Demiurge, the anthropomorphic representation of Mind in the dialogue, first created because “He was good, and one who is good can never become jealous of anything. And so, being free of jealousy, he wanted everything to become as much like himself as was possible” (Plato [1236] 1997; 29e). In so far as the universe was created by the Demiurge, therefore, it is “as excellent and supreme as its nature would allow” (Plato [1236] 1997; 30b). But the Demiurge, though powerful, is not omnipotent, so disease¹ and vice, both of which arise from the eternal and corruptive disorderly motion of matter, still exist. Even moral evil is blamed in Plato's Timaeus on Necessity: “[J]ust about every type of succumbing to pleasure is talked about as something reproachable, as though the evils are willfully done. But it is not right to reproach people for them, for no one is willfully evil. A man becomes evil, rather, as a result of one or another corrupt condition of his body and an uneducated upbringing” (Plato [1286] 1997; 86d–e).

Evil is not presented in the Timaeus as a possible threat to belief in the Demiurge. Nor is the Demiurge's goodness or activity in the world ever doubted on the basis of evil: “the existence of evil is not of the Demiurge's choosing; it exists in spite of the best demiurgic actions” (Mohr 1978, 575). Plato's Timaeus is certainly not, therefore, the first text to raise an argument from evil.

There are at least two separate statements of problems of evil, however, in the later Laws, in the theological 10th book of that dialogue. The origin and extent of evil becomes undeniably problematic for Plato in this work because his earlier dualism is largely set aside in this new account of the governance of the universe, summarized in this passage: “A soul or souls – and perfectly virtuous souls at that – have been shown to be the cause of all [celestial] phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we shall insist that these souls are gods” (Plato [1556] 1997; 899b). Whereas in the Timaeus, disorderly matter was coeternal with and independent of the benevolent Demiurge, in Laws X “soul is prior to matter, and … matter came later and takes second place. Soul is the master, and matter its natural subject” (Plato [1553] 1997; 896c).

The dualistic dissolution of the problem of evil still tempts Plato in Laws X, however, where an evil World Soul is posited in addition to the good World Soul: “[Is there] one soul, or more than one? I'll answer for you both: more than one. At any rate, we must not assume fewer than two: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity” (Plato [1553] 1997; 896e). This dualism is not exploited by Plato, however, for he believes the whole rational order of the universe points to the predominant activity of the good World Souls, who are described as “supremely good” gods who “know and see and hear everything”; who “can do anything which is within the power of mortals and immortals”; who are “supremely wise, and willing and able to superintend the world”; and who, like a good physician, look after the whole body, but also after every minor detail of it in order to keep it healthy (Plato [1558–1560] 1997; 901d–903a). Goodness is effectively unlimited and omnipotent in Laws X.

Given the supremacy of the virtuous gods in Laws X, it is unsurprising that Plato was forced to raise explicit problems of evil against this causal theory. The first he puts into the mouths of people who believe that the gods exist, but who claim that they take no notice of human affairs. In other words, the presence of evil is used as a reason to deny divine Providence. The particular evils that drive people to such “impiety” are “the good fortune of scoundrels and criminals in private and public life” and “the many ghastly acts of impiety which … are the very means by which some of these people have risen from humble beginnings to supreme power and dictatorship” (Plato [1556–1557] 1997; 899d–900a). When the problem of evil first explicitly enters Western thought, therefore, it has anti-Providential, not fully atheistic, force.

The second problem of evil in the Laws likewise challenges divine Providence, but of a more particular sort. Evils such as those just mentioned are indeed reproachable, Plato says, but “the universe has [been] arranged with an eye to its preservation and excellence, and its individual parts play appropriate active or passive roles according to their various capacities.” To an imagined “impious” interlocutor, the Athenian sharply asserts: “You forget that creation is not for your benefit: you exist for the sake of the universe.” Yet the Athenian understands the basis of his interlocutor's worry: “you're grumbling because you don't appreciate that your position is best not only for the universe but for you too” (Plato [1560] 1997; 903b–d). It is not Providence in general that strikes the alleged impious man as improbable, but rather beneficent Providence toward himself.

Following but slightly adapting Peter van Inwagen's terminology, the first problem of evil in Laws X might be called “Plato's Global Problem of Evil,” while the second might be called “Plato's Local Problem of Evil.” The global problem challenges divine Providence in general on the basis of the broad presence of evil in human affairs, while the local variation challenges divine Providence toward certain individuals on the basis of their more-difficult-than-average lot in life (van Inwagen 2006, 56). Plato, like van Inwagen, found the two problems of evil sufficiently different to warrant separate attention; but unlike van Inwagen, Plato did not explicitly link either problem to the question of God's existence.

“Epicurus' Old Questions” and Ancient Skepticism

In his treatment of the problem of evil in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, David Hume (1711–1776) repeats what he calls “Epicurus' old questions” about God: “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?” (Hume 1993, 100). This is indeed an elegant and succinct, and therefore eminently quotable, statement of the problem of evil, and so it is unsurprising that since Hume's time it has been customary to begin articles and books on evil with this passage. This puzzle of Epicurus (341–270 BC) is often taken to be one of the first statements of an argument from evil (see, e.g., Plantinga 2004, 3).

A minor problem with this bit of popular history is that there is no extant Epicurean work containing this text. Hume's source for the now-famous passage was probably the Dictionary article “Paulicians,” remark E, of Pierre Bayle (see Bayle 1991, 169), whose source in turn was chapter 13 of On Anger by the ancient (240–320) church Father, Lactantius (see Lactantius 1871, 28). Epicurus was among the most prolific ancient authors (Diogenes Laertius credits him with over 300 books), however, and we possess very few fragments of his works, so he may well have uttered the old questions in a work that is now lost, perhaps in Of the Gods, which is referred to by Diogenes Laertius as one of Epicurus' best books (Diogenes 2005, 557).

A more serious problem with this popular history is the supposition, assuming Epicurus framed his problem of evil in the words Lactantius reports, that there could have been atheistic intent behind his questions. For one thing, it is questionable whether anyone could have been an atheist in the Hellenistic period, so pervasive was re...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Dedication
• Notes on Contributors
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Part I: PROBLEMS OF EVIL
• Part II: THEODICIES
• Part III: SKEPTICAL RESPONSES
• Index