Chapter One
Failure Is Not Predictive
The Story of Bob Gibson
On April 15, 1959, Bob Gibson played in his first major league game, coming in as a relief pitcher for the Cardinals as they trailed the Dodgers 3â0. Gibson gave up a home run to the very first batter he facedâan ignominy suffered by only 65 pitchers in the history of the game.1 In the next inning, Gibson gave up another home run. Gibson got a chance to redeem himself coming in as a relief pitcher the next evening, but again was hit hard by the Dodgers. Two nights later, Gibson was brought in against the Giants with two outs and two runners on in the eighth inning and promptly gave up a double. After that game, Gibson sat on the bench for a week, and then was sent back to the minors. It is hard to imagine a more demoralizing beginning.
Despite his dismal start, Gibson ultimately went on to become one of the best pitchers in baseball history. He is widely considered among the top 20 pitchers of all time. Gibson played 17 seasons in the majors, winning 251 games, with 3,117 strikeouts and a 2.91 earned run average (ERA). In 1968, he posted an unbelievably low 1.12 ERAâthe lowest such figure since 1914. He won two Cy Young awards, twice was named as the World Series most valuable player (MVP), played on nine All-Star teams, and was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame in his first year of eligibility.
If at First You Fail
One of the surprises I found in doing the Market Wizards books was how many of these spectacularly successful traders started with failure. Stories of wipeouts, or even multiple wipeouts, were not uncommon. Michael Marcus provided a classic example.
Michael Marcus was enticed into trading futures when he was a junior in college. There he met John, a friend of a friend, who dangled the prospect of being able to double his money in two weeks by trading commodities. Marcus fell for the pitch, hired John as a trading adviser for $30 a week, and opened a futures account with the money he had scraped together in savings.
Standing in the customer gallery of the brokerage firm, watching the clicking prices on the wall-size commodity board (this was back in the 1960s), Marcus quickly realized that his âadviser,â John, was clueless about trading. Marcus lost money on every trade. Then John came up with the idea that was âgoing to save the day.â The trade was buying August pork bellies and selling February pork bellies of the following year because the price spread between the two contracts was greater than the carrying charges (the total cost of taking delivery in the nearby contract, storing the commodity, and redelivering it in the forward contract). It seemed like a canât-lose trade. After placing the trade, Marcus and John went to lunch. When they returned, Marcus was shocked to find that his account had been almost completely wiped out. (Marcus would later discover that August pork bellies were not deliverable against the February contract.) At that point, Marcus told John that he thought he knew as much as he didâwhich was nothingâand fired his adviser.
Marcus then managed to rustle up another $500, which he lost as well. Unwilling to give up and accept failure, Marcus decided to cash in $3,000 from the life insurance left to him by his father, who had died when he was 15. He then started reading up on grains and making some winning trades. In 1970, he bought corn based on a recommendation in a newsletter he subscribed to. By sheer luck, 1970 was the year of the corn blight. By the end of that summer, Marcus had turned the $3,000 into $30,000.
In the fall, Marcus started graduate school, but found himself so preoccupied by trading that he dropped out. He moved to New York, and when asked what he did for a living, he told people rather pompously that he was a âspeculator.â
In the spring of 1971, there was a theory around that the blight had wintered over and would infect the corn crop again. Marcus believed this theory as well, and he intended to capitalize on it. He borrowed $20,000 from his mother, adding it to his $30,000 account. He then used the entire $50,000 to buy the maximum number of corn and wheat contracts he could on margin. For a while, the market held steady because of the blight fears, but it didnât go higher. Then one morning, there was a financial headline that read, âMore Blight on the Floor of the Chicago Board of Trade Than in Midwest Cornfields.â The corn market opened sharply lower and fairly quickly moved to and locked limit down.2 Marcus stood by paralyzed, hoping the market would rebound, and watching it stay locked limit down. Given that his position had been heavily margined, he had no choice but to liquidate everything the next morning. By the time he was out, he had lost his entire $30,000 plus $12,000 of the $20,000 his mother had lent him.
I would look up and say, âAm I really that stupid?â And I seemed to hear a clear answer saying, âNo, you are not stupid. You just have to keep at it.â So I did.
Michael Marcus
I asked Marcus whether with all these failures he ever thought of just giving up. Marcus replied, âI would sometimes think that maybe I ought to stop trading because it was very painful to keep losing. In Fiddler on the Roof, there is a scene where the lead looks up and talks to God. I would look up and say, âAm I really that stupid?â And I seemed to hear a clear answer saying, âNo, you are not stupid. You just have to keep at it.â So I did.â
He did, indeed. Eventually, it all clicked for Marcus. He had an amazing innate talent as a trader. Once he combined this inner skill with experience and risk management, he was astoundingly successful. He took a trading job at Commodities Corporation. The firm initially funded his account with $30,000, and several years later added another $100,000. In about 10 yearsâ time, Marcus turned those modest allocations into $80,000,000! And that was with the firm withdrawing as much as 30 percent of his profits in many years to pay the companyâs burgeoning expenses.
âOne-Lotâ Persists
Although many of the Market Wizards started off with some degree of failure, perhaps none reached the depth of despondency over their losses as did Tony Saliba. At the start of his career when he was a clerk on the floor, one of the traders staked him with $50,000. Saliba went long volatility spreads (option positions that gain if the market volatility increases). In the first two weeks, Saliba ran the account up to $75,000. He thought he was a genius. What he didnât realize was that he was buying these options at very high premiums because his purchases followed a highly volatile period. The market then went sideways and the market volatility and option premiums collapsed. In six weeks Saliba had run the account down to only $15,000.
Recounting this episode, Saliba said, âI was feeling suicidal. Do you remember the big DC-10 crash at OâHare in May 1979, when all those people died? That was when I hit bottom.â
âWas that a metaphor for your mood?â I asked.
âYes,â answered Saliba. âI would have exchanged places with one of those people in that plane on that day. I felt that bad. I thought, âThis is it; Iâve ruined my life.â . . . I felt like a failure.â
Notwithstanding this dismal start, Saliba had one important thing going for him: persistence. After his disastrous beginning, he came close to quitting the world of trading, but ultimately decided to keep trying. He sought the advice of more experienced brokers. They taught Saliba the importance of discipline, doing homework, and a goal of consistent, moderate profitability, rather than trying to get rich quick. Saliba took these lessons to heart and switched from trading options in Teledyne, which was extremely volatile, to trading options in Boeing, which was a narrow-range market. When he did go back to trading Teledyne, his standard conservative order size led to ridicule by the other brokers and the sobriquet âOne-Lot.â Once again, Saliba persisted, this time putting up with all the ribbing and not being goaded into departing from his cautious approach. Ultimately, the persistence and attention to risk control paid off. At one point, Saliba put together a streak of 70 consecutive months with profits in excess of $100,000.
Two Key Lessons
There are two key lessons that can be drawn from this chapter.
First, failure is not predictive. Even great traders often encounter failureâand even repeated failuresâearly in their careers. Failure at the start is the norm, even for those who ultimately become Market Wizards. As a related comment, the fact that most people who attempt trading fail at the beginning suggests that all novice traders should start with small amounts of cash because they might as well pay less for their market education.
Second, persistence is instrumental to success. Most people faced with the types of failures encountered by the traders detailed in this chapter would have given up and tried some other endeavor. It would have been easy for the traders in this chapter to have done the same. Were it not for their relentless persistence, many of the Market Wizards would never have discovered their ultimate potential.
Notes
1. www.baseball-almanac.com/feats/feats23.shtml.
2. In many futures markets, the maximum daily price change is restricted by a specified limit. Limit down refers to a decline of this magnitude, while limit up refers to the equivalent gain. If, as in this case, the equilibrium price that would result from the interaction of free market forces lies below the limit-down price, then the market will lock limit downâthat is, trading will virtually cease. Reason: There will be an abundance of sellers, but virtually no willing buyers at the constrained limit-down price.
Chapter Two
What Is Not Important
Before considering what is important to trading success, letâs start with whatâs not important, because what many novice traders believe is essential to trading success is actually a diversion. Many would-be traders believe that trading success is all about finding some secret formula or system that explains and predicts price moves, and that if only they could uncover this solution to market price behavior, success would be assured. The idea that trading success is tied to finding some specific ideal approach is misguided. There is no single correct methodology.
Let me illustrate this point by comparing the trading philosophies and trading approaches of two of the traders I interviewed: Jim Rogers and Marty Schwartz.
Jim Rogers
Jim Rogers is a phenomenally successful trader, although he would insist on calling himself an investor, as opposed to trader, because of the long-term nature of his market positions. In 1973, he partnered with George Soros to start the Quantum Fund, one of the most successful hedge funds of all time. Rogers left Quantum in 1980 because the firmâs success had led to expansion and with it unwanted management responsibilities. Rogers just wanted to focus on market research and investment, so he âretiredâ to manage his own money.
Rogers is particularly skilled in seeing the big picture and anticipating major long-term trends. When I interviewed him in 1988, gold had been declining for eight years, but Rogers seemed certain the bear market would carry on for another decade.
âGenerals always fight the last war,â he said. âPortfolio managers always invest in the last bull market. The idea that gold has always been a great store of value is absurd. There have been times in history when gold has lost purchasing powerâsometimes for decades.â
Rogers was absolutely right, as gold continued to slide for another 11 years. Another market he was particularly opinionated about was the Japanese stock market. At the time, Japanese equities were in the midst of an explosive bull market. Yet Rogers was convinced there would be a tremendous move in the opposite direction.
âI guarantee that the Japanese stock market is going to have a major collapseâpossibly within the next year or two . . . [Japanese stocks] are going to go down 80 to 90 percent.â
This forecast seemed preposterous, yet it was absolutely correct. A little over a year after our conversation, the Japanese stock market peaked, beginning a slide that would see the Nikkei index lose about 80 percent of its value over th...