The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche

Christine Swanton

• Publisher: Wiley
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781118939383
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Éthique et philosophie morale

This ground-breaking and lucid contribution to the vibrant field of virtue ethics focuses on the influential work of Hume and Nietzsche, providing fresh perspectives on their philosophies and a compelling account of their impact on the development of virtue ethics.

• A ground-breaking text that moves the field of virtue ethics beyond ancient moral theorists and examines the highly influential ethical work of Hume and Nietzsche from a virtue ethics perspective
• Contributes both to virtue ethics and a refreshed understanding of Hume's and Nietzsche's ethics
• Skilfully bridges the gap between continental and analytical philosophy
• Lucidly written and clearly organized, allowing students to focus on either Hume or Nietzsche
• Written by one of the most important figures contributing to virtue ethics today

Part I
A Virtue Ethical Map

Chapter 1
Interpretation as a Map

1.1 The Notion of an Interpretative Map

In recent times there has been a broadening and enrichment of the church of virtue ethics: Aristotle and neo-Aristotelianism are no longer seen as the sole inspiration for modern developments of a virtue ethical tradition.¹ Hume and Nietzsche are now important figures in this trend, but to fully justify this view we need to see how their philosophies can reasonably be seen as species of virtue ethics.

Placing philosophers within certain philosophical traditions is a fraught business, which requires some justification. To situate Hume and Nietzsche within a virtue ethical tradition in particular may raise eyebrows. Marcia Baron puts the problem this way:

The history of ethics is not generally well served by asking whether Kant, or Rousseau or Hume counts as a –ist, where the relevant “ism” was developed in an entirely different era, responding to very different concerns from those that animated the work of the person in question.²

To classify Hume as a sentimentalist or as a moral sense theorist is acceptable. To classify him as a virtue ethicist, however, may fall foul of the worry: it may unhelpfully employ a category whose home in a modern context is a protagonist in modern debates about, for example, consequentialism versus deontology, conducted in books such as Three Methods of Ethics.³ In Hume’s day the central debates were between moral sense theorists and the Rationalists. In Nietzsche’s times cultural critique within a historicist Volkisch tradition emphasizing concepts such as heritage and decadence held sway.

As the hermeneutic tradition has taught us, however, interpreting texts is an ongoing process, characterized not only by a sensitivity to the historical conditions of the writer but also by a critique of patterns of interpretation that themselves have been conditioned by the then prevailing theoretical preconceptions and concerns. Such critique may transform earlier interpretation in the light of new possibilities opened up by new ways of understanding. For as Ricoeur argues, the process of interpretation is “ill represented by a personification of the text as a conversational partner,” for with writing, the conditions of dialogue are no longer fulfilled.⁴ So how can we conceptualize more precisely the requirements of both historical sensitivity and meaning relative to the world of the interpreter?

I address this problem by employing David Schmidtz’s helpful notion of moral theory as a map.⁵ A map offers an interpretation of a terrain or subject matter that is “stylized,” “abstract,” and “simplified.”⁶ A virtue ethical reading of Hume then, as a map of the terrain of Hume’s texts, is a somewhat abstract simplified reading of that terrain. In essence, the idea of a map enables us to conceive of interpretation as satisfying the twin desiderata of accuracy, understood in terms of sensitivity to historical context and authorial intent, and meaningfulness within the world of the interpreter. For Schmidtz such meaningfulness is essentially helpfulness: indeed for a map to be a good map it must be, according to Schmidtz, both accurate and helpful.

How can the notion of moral theory as a map resolve the problems posed above? In response to any charge that a virtue ethical map is historically insensitive it may be claimed that not only is virtue ethics a well established and indeed ancient tradition, or set of traditions, but that it need not be constrained by the modern debates, which are even now developing an “old fashioned” feel. Virtue ethics has moved on from debates about virtue versus duty and rules for example. Nonetheless, the objection goes, even where use of a virtue ethical framework is not distorted by modern concerns of little relevance to Hume and Nietzsche, reading Nietzsche and Hume as virtue ethicists is untimely, for virtue ethics was not a category salient in their philosophical context. However that does not imply that the category is not applicable: the accuracy of that claim depends on one’s conception of virtue ethics, discussed in the next chapter.

Whether or not the application of the category is appropriate depends on the second desideratum of interpretation: meaningfulness relative to the world of the interpreter. Interpretation is not only a creative critique of past patterns of interpretation of the text by deploying possibly new or neglected understandings and theoretical media (such as virtue ethics). It is also contextualized by implicit criticism of the manner in which those very media are currently understood. In particular I shall open up new understandings and developments of virtue ethics which are arguably more suitable for interpreting Nietzsche and Hume.

We have seen that for Schmidtz a good map is (a) accurate and (b) helpful. Let us consider each of these requirements in more detail. The requirement of accuracy implies that there is a definite terrain or subject matter of a map, and that it is therefore possible for maps to be inaccurate. In arguing against subjectivist or irrationalist interpretations of Hume’s ethics, then, one argues that these readings are inaccurate and should be discarded. However the requirement of accuracy allows for the possibility that several different maps may be good maps of the same terrain. For example I argue in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that a virtue ethical map of Hume is not incompatible with a map that reads him as a sentimentalist or as a moral sense theorist. I shall also argue in Chapter 7 that a virtue ethical reading of Nietzsche is not incompatible with an existentialist reading. Indeed requirement (a) is the more satisfied ceteris paribus the richer and less simplified is the map. Integrating several different maps within the overall category of one map (such as virtue ethics) is ceteris paribus the way to make the overarching map more accurate. However requirement (a) is constrained by requirement (b): to maintain helpfulness a map must remain simplified and abstract. There will then be a creative tension between accuracy and helpfulness, precluding an extreme reading of the requirement of accuracy where there is a refusal to categorize at all.

The requirement of helpfulness addresses the worry that only categories current at the time of Hume and Nietzsche be applied to those figures. Helpfulness is a contextual notion. An extremely important context is the need to bring into salience features of Hume and Nietzsche which have been systematically ignored, neglected, or distorted as a result of interpretations reflecting previous (or indeed current) moral theoretic tendencies, such as forms of moral skepticism, emotivism, or subjectivism. The provision of objectivist moral theoretic maps of these thinkers has proved difficult in a climate where virtue ethics was relatively invisible as a moral tradition, but where non-objectivist readings have continued.

Another aspect of helpfulness is the ability of a map to provide a sufficiently rich understanding. As suggested, richer understanding is gained by showing how various maps (e.g., the sentimentalist and virtue ethical maps of Hume) can be seen as compatible with each other. This feature harmonizes with the requirement of accuracy, but as already noted, at some point going for richness may come into tension with the requirement of helpfulness. As Schmidtz says, maps are not comprehensive, and in two ways. They do not map everything: “they do not say how to reach all destinations.”⁷ Nor do they show all the fine details. A virtue ethical map for example makes virtue and vice salient, and in so doing will fail to highlight other aspects of thought which are of concern in other maps. For example, my virtue ethical map does not emphasize Nietzsche’s relationship with Jonathan Ree and the progression of his thought from the “positivist” influence of Ree’s thought and Darwinism, to the rejection of this thought in later writings.⁸ Furthermore my virtue ethical map will concentrate on Nietzsche’s mature ethical writings which are of greatest importance for elucidation of the virtue ethical nature of Nietzsche’s ethics. Nor will my virtue ethical map emphasize or attempt to map in detail ongoing debates about differences between Hume’s Treatise and Enquiries except insofar as aspects of that debate impinge on interesting features in a virtue ethical interpretation.

1.2 A Metaphysical Map

A complete map of Nietzsche and Hume, whether or not it involves a virtue ethical map of their ethics, ideally requires a thoroughly explicated conception of their metaphysical perspective. Alas the issues surrounding both philosophers would take us so far afield that it would be too cumbersome to provide this. In this section therefore I will offer instead a very abstract ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• Part I: A Virtue Ethical Map
• Part II: The Virtue Ethics of Hume
• Part III: The Virtue Ethics of Nietzsche
• Part IV: New Directions
• Bibliography
• Index
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