Chapter 1
Perception and the Brain
What we are betting on is that the perceived risk exceeds the actual risk. That's fundamental to the theory of everything we do.
âWilbur Ross
Hurricane Katrina struck the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005, and it was followed by another category 5 hurricaneâHurricane Ritaâseveral weeks later. Following Katrina's impact, the media were saturated with tragic images of submerged residential neighborhoods. Videos cycled on major news networks of flooding victims stranded on their rooftops. They waved to news helicopters for help against a backdrop of dead bodies floating in the murky brown floodwaters. Katrina was the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history with total property damage estimated at $108 billion (in 2005 USD). At least 1,833 people died in Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent floods. Insurers were liable for billions of dollars in damage claims, and they raised their premiums over 50 percent in each of the following two years.
There was an increasing perception that category 5 hurricanes would devastate the Gulf Coast more frequently. An influential scientific study published in 2005 identified an acceleration in the rate of powerful hurricanes in the Atlantic Ocean. Al Gore's movie, An Inconvenient Truth, about the catastrophic environmental risks of global warming, was released shortly after the hurricanes struck. The devastating 2005 Atlantic hurricane season appeared to imply that worst-case scenarios were coming to fruition even faster than predicted.
Savvy investors, especially reinsurers, smelled opportunity in the heightened risk perceptions. Both Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway and billionaire investor Wilbur Ross poured money into Gulf Coast reinsurance enterprises. In a Wall Street Journal interview, Ross explained such investments by stating, âWhat we are betting on is that the perceived risk exceeds the actual risk. That's fundamental to the theory of everything we do.â1
Fear, by definition, is an emotional response to the perception of danger. Fear arises when humans anticipate threat, and the unpleasant feelings associated with fear motivate action to avoid those threats and eliminate the uncomfortable feelings (e.g., urgently buying insurance against the next storm). Savvy investors locate such fear-driven opportunities and exploit them.
It's worth considering what investors fear. They fear zombie investments that never live up to their potential. They fear fat fingers, hackers, and ghosts in the machinery of Wall Street that can bankrupt them in milliseconds. They fear debt, incompetent governance, and terrorist attacks. There are too many risks to track on Wall Street (and in life). And while investors cannot understand or anticipate every risk, they can strive to understand when others are going astray in their assessments of such risks.
This book examines the market price patterns created by investor psychology. Prices typically don't respond in an obvious way. Sometimes they respond to events within milliseconds, other times over days, and sometimes not at all. Sometimes prices fluctuate and sometimes a trend is born.
Price patterns are a result of collective investor buying and selling in response to new information. That dry description doesn't adequately embody the euphoria, anguish, and boredom behind the real-world market events that drive manias, panics, and price trends. This book's goal is to demonstrate how information flow in the media-through effects on investor psychology such as the increased risk perceptions following a hurricane-creates opportunities for investors.
A Long Estrangement
When I went to financial economist training school, I was taught the âPrime Directiveâ:
Explain asset prices by rational models. Only if all attempts fail, resort to irrational investor behavior.
âMark Rubinstein, from âRational Markets: Yes or No? The Affirmative Caseâ (2001)2
The academic disciplines of psychology and economics were largely estranged from the Second World War through the early 21st century, but it was not always thus. Josef De La Vega's book Confusion De Confusiones was the first to describe the market microstructure of a stock marketâthe Amsterdam exchangeâand it is also the first historical commentary on the emotions of market speculators. De La Vega notes that the Amsterdam bourse was dominated by the perpetual conflict between the liefhebbers (âlifters-upâ) who were âscared of nothingâ and the contremines (âunderminersâ) who were âcompletely ruled by fear, trepidation, and nervousness.â3 In ensuing centuries, such influential economists as David Hume (1780) analyzed the âmotivating passionsâ that drive human economic behavior.4 In 1939, John Maynard Keynes famously speculated that âanimal spiritsâ drive economic growth.5
Despite these early references to psychological forces driving stock traders and economic activity, another fieldâphysicsâserved as the inspiration for most postâWorld War II academic economists. Physicists were successfully applying complex mathematics to model natural phenomena, with the atomic bomb being the most dramatic example of the advances in that field. Emulating physicists, economists crafted overarching theories and employed complex mathematics to model economic processes. In order to streamline assumptions, economists adopted a view of human judgment and behavior as being purely rational. As Mark Rubinstein noted in the epigraph, many (if not most) academic economists consider this assumption the default position in theoretical models.
The assumption of the rational investor is generally quite useful in modeling, but it misses many important exceptions. As Peter L. Bernstein, a money manager and the first editor of The Journal of Portfolio Management, put it, âIndeed, as civilization has pushed forward, nature's vagaries have mattered less and the decisions of people have mattered more.â6 Overlooking the complexities and irrational nuances of human behavior has become a significant impediment to the advancement of academic economics.
Like economics, psychology was similarly beholden to theoretical orthodoxies in the latter half of the 20th century. Many psychologists worked based on the assumptions of Freudian theory and other unempirical dogmas. Behaviorists were an exception to this empirical drought, and research by experimental psychologists such as B. F. Skinner and Ivan Pavlov captured the public imagination. Their work demonstrated that human behavior could be systematically and predictably irrational, and it could be shaped with incentives such as rewards and punishments.
Rather than working on a grand unified theory of behavior, psychologists took a piecemeal approach to understanding human nature. They crafted independent theoriesâoften based on experimental resultsâto explain individual idiosyncrasies or to solve specific clinical problems (such as how to relieve paralyzing anxiety). Meanwhile in medicine, research on pharmaceuticals identified chemical compoundsâboth recreational and therapeuticâthat uniquely altered mood, judgment, and even financial risk taking. Based on work by empirical psychologists and psychopharmacologists, evidence-based treatments are currently deployed in the treatmen...