Falklands War

10 Key excerpts on "Falklands War"

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  Childhood and the Production of Security

  • J Marshall Beier(Author)
  • 2018(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  raison d’être of the modern state. The sovereignty of states is ‘produced and defined by organised violence’; states proffer citizens security in exchange for their compliance and it is war, therefore, that produces and defines political community (Edkins 2003, 6). As a ubiquitous aspect of the national story, war engenders tales about its history, about specific wars themselves, and about the aftermath of war. The 74 days of military violence in 1982 that has come to be known in Britain as The Falklands War and in Argentina as La Guerra de las Malvinas has been the subject of many stories. One especially salient telling for Argentina is of a breach of national sovereignty. The history of the War is of Las Islas Malvinas being forcibly seized in 1833 by a colonial power and of Argentina trying to regain its stolen territory ever since. The War in this story is a tale of reasserting a sovereign right to the Islands by sending troops there in 1982 to secure them, at the cost of an estimated 650 Argentine lives. Since the end of the War, a villainous Britain has consistently refused to engage in a legitimate dialogue with Argentina over the sovereignty of the Islands, which it continues to illegally colonize and militarize.

  For Britain, an alternative but equally salient telling of the Falklands War is that the Islands have been British sovereign territory since 1833. The War of 1982 came about because the security of the Britons who legitimately resided there came under threat from Argentine aggression. This necessitated sending troops to the Islands at the cost 255 British servicemen and merchant seamen’s lives, and the lives of 3 women Islanders.1 In Britain’s tale, the aftermath of the War has been characterized firstly by the suspension of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina until 1990 and, since then, by relations with Argentina that have shifted from dialogical to hostile due to Argentina’s refusal to accept the reality that the Falklands are British.

  While wars are the very condition of the state, they also have the capacity to unsettle the routinized temporality of social and political life (Edkins 2003). As something ‘unexpected’, war can constitute an affront to an everyday life imagined, performed, and experienced as continuity. For traumas like wars to be socially intelligible, therefore, re-imaginings are often necessary; and these frequently invoke ‘a linear narrative of national heroism’ (Edkins 2003, xv). This is especially apparent in Britain’s tale of the War. As Femenia (2000, 42) argues, when Argentine troops surrendered on 14 June 1982,

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  British Infantry In The Falklands Conflict: Lessons Of The Light Infantry In 1982

  • Major Andrew M. Pullan(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Tannenberg Publishing

    (Publisher)

  Britain started to settle the islands and formally declared a colonial administration in 1842 (see fig. 4). In 1908, Britain declared sovereignty over the uninhabited territory south of the Falklands, thus creating the Falkland Islands Dependencies, which included South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.

  Figure 4: History of the Falkland Islands

  Argentina continued to pursue her claim to the islands. In 1965, after a period of intense Argentinean lobbying, the United Nations passed Resolution 2065 specifying that the Falklands/Malvinas was a colonial problem and thus it fell to Britain and Argentina to find a peaceful solution. Talks continued off and on for the next seventeen years without satisfactory resolution. Britain argued that its right to ownership rested on her peaceful and continuous possession of the islands over a long period of time and upon the Islanders’ right of self-determination. In 1980 the Islanders and Argentina rejected the one remaining solution of lease-back and shared responsibility.

  The Argentinean decision to invade the Falklands was made in 1982 by a military junta that faced growing political and internal unrest and a call for a return to democracy. Capturing the Malvinas proved an irresistible way of stifling, in part, internal dissent and a means of uniting the country. Additionally, If the Falklands Islands were brought under Argentinean control by force of arms then it would also serve as a vindication of military rule.

  Annotated Chronology of the 1982 Conflict

  The following is an annotated chronology of the key events of the Falklands Campaign. Limited space precludes a more detailed description. The dates and events recorded are taken from a British perspective.

  2 April. Argentina launched Operation Azul (Blue), the invasion of the Falklands Islands.{13} At 9:25 A.M. Governor Hunt ordered the sixty-nine Royal Marines based on East Falklands to surrender to the invading force of approximately one thousand Argentinean marines and special forces supported by the Argentinean fleet.{14}

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  War In The Falklands: Perspectives On British Strategy And Use Of Air Power

  • Lt.-Col. John E. Marr USAF(Author)
  • 2015(Publication Date)
  • Tannenberg Publishing

    (Publisher)

  CHAPTER II — WAR AS AN EXTENSION OF POLITICS

  The Falklands conflict illustrates as well as any in the past few decades that war is, as Clausewitz says, “…a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” (7:87) To understand the Falklands War you must have an appreciation of the climate which lead to the shift from diplomatic to violent means in resolving this political conflict. To gain this appreciation, the policies of both nations have to be examined in their domestic and international contexts. In the end, it will be clear that the war was not Inevitable, but was caused largely by mutual misconceptions and miscalculations regarding each other's intentions and capabilities. (37:52; 22:100; 24:9)

  Britain's Decline as a Global Power

  Great Britain's role as a world power changed dramatically after World War II. A new bipolar world order emerged, led by the United States and the Soviet Union. Although England was victorious in the war, its economy was severely ravaged and it was no longer in a position to maintain its previous role as a leading world power. (16:62) In spite of this, Britain still attempted to maintain the commitments of its global empire. This was complicated by its new responsibility to provide occupation forces on the Continent. (16:62) Slowly, and with great pain, Britain came to realize and accept the decline of the empire. (16:63)

  British foreign and defense policies began a shift which refocused on the defense of Europe, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent force. (16:65) At the same time, Britain began the unpleasant process of untying itself from its colonial commitments, best demonstrated by its withdrawal from “East of Suez.” (16:65) Britain's ability to maintain colonial influence was exacerbated by its slow economic recovery, driven in part by its inability to gain membership in the European Community until 1970. (16:65) Throughout the 1970s, the British continued to concentrate on their NAT commitments, which emphasized defense in the East and North Atlantic, defense of England itself, maintaining the British Army on the Rhine (BOAR), providing its own nuclear capabilities, and basing for US nuclear assets. (16:66) The manner in which Britain transitioned from its global and colonial role was less than graceful and far from efficient. One expert comments:

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  The Crisis of the Twenty-First Century

  Empire in the Age of Austerity

  • Russell Foster, Matthew Johnson, Mark Edward(Authors)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  legal title to the territory was in dispute or that in 1968, plans had been drafted to transfer sovereignty to Argentina.

  Britain under attack: hauntings and threats

  Strategists in Argentina had studied British responses to former territories and concluded that the memory of Suez and the inherent risk of using disproportionate military action would constrain their response (Gamba 1987). This was a miscalculation, since they had misjudged the political climate, underestimated the mind of the Prime Minister and were oblivious to an unconscious psychological drive for re-enactment under the pressure of very specific ‘nostalgic’ forces. If the Falkland/Malvinas conflict was ‘the inevitable result of a collision of misperceptions’ (Gamba 1987, xi) important to both sides for what it symbolised, one has to enter a world of psychology and memory to delve into the cultural undercurrents of unexpressed fears and emotions to understand it.

  Britain was a country in decline and following ‘the winter of discontent’ in 1979, notions of ‘threat to sovereignty’, and ‘resistance to invasion’ would have invoked powerful memories from the relatively recent past. Although widespread ‘forgetting’ of empire abounded, the historical narrative of the Second World War and all its attendant mythology and associated fear was fully operational in 1982. The realisation that Britain had become a second-rate power was in stark contrast to the ‘economic miracle’ being performed in West Germany: a nation defeated by the Allies in 1945. Margaret Thatcher’s resistance to the hegemony of the European Economic Community throughout the 1980s was always expressed in coded communication, which was not lost on the British public. There was always a sense that the disparaging tone directed towards ‘Brussels’ for attempting to undermine British sovereignty was aimed at ‘Berlin’ (a haunting memory founded in the imaginings of an imperialist Germany). Such thoughts, however, could not be openly expressed in political discourse and, indeed, when this taboo was broken, it led to ministerial resignation (see Lawson 1990).

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  The Falkland Islands as an International Problem (Routledge Revivals)

  • Peter J. Beck(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  8

  It proves difficult to comprehend this ‘extraordinarily complex’ controversy without an appreciation of history, since ‘the situation in 1833 has to be determined by looking back’.9 The relevance of the historical perspective was conceded by Jeane Kirkpatrick, when addressing the UN in 1982:

  We have come to appreciate how deep the roots of the conflict are. Britain [has been] in peaceful possession of the Falkland Islands for 150 years … Yet we know too how deep is the Argentine commitment to recover islands they believe were taken from them by illegal force. This is not some sudden passion, but a long-sustained national concern that also stretches back 150 years.10

  In this manner, the study of the Falklands past provides a strong foundation for an informed evaluation of the causes and nature of the Anglo-Argentine dispute, while offering also an invaluable input to any discussion regarding the feasibility of future policy options.

  But what is the Falklands/Malvinas past? This is difficult, because of rival versions of the history of the islands (see Figure 2.1 ); indeed, in April 1982 Sir Anthony Parsons informed the UN Security Council that ‘my Argentine colleague and I could debate endlessly the rights and wrongs of history, and I doubt whether we would agree’.11 The Argentine response proved the point:

  The representative of the United Kingdom said that he had doubts about being able to arrive at an agreement with the representative of my country as to the historical vicissitudes. This is possible, but it would seem difficult for us not to agree on the facts of history which are absolutely indisputable.12

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  30 Years After

  Issues and Representations of the Falklands War

  • Carine Berbéri, Monia O'Brien Castro(Authors)
  • 2016(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  21 Successive cuts in Britain’s defence budget since the Falklands, many of them introduced by Margaret Thatcher, have undermined this very capability, including that of undertaking another Falklands-style expedition. As memories of the Falklands fade away, it is unlikely that Britain’s military success there will continue to play a role in American perceptions of Britain or increase its prestige internationally.

  Thirty years later, the Falklands appears today as a pyrrhic victory, one that has burdened Britain with an expensive commitment that still places a significant strain on the country’s finances and which detracts from other more important strategic and defence commitments elsewhere in the world. The war of 1982, with all its bloodshed, has also placed Britain in a diplomatic straitjacket of its own making. The commitment to defend the Falkland Islanders against Argentine claims cannot be easily shed. Any renewal of the pre-1982 considerations of a system of lease-back or joint sovereignty would now be fatal to the electoral fortunes of any government in London. This also highlights the ongoing differences between the United States and Britain over the Falklands. The underlying clash of national interests between the two countries when they consider the Falklands, which was at the root of the strains in the Anglo-American relationship in 1982, have not gone away. Recent declarations of support for the Argentine case from the American Secretaries of State, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, their reaffirmation of America’s neutrality on the key question of the sovereignty over the Falklands, and their calls for a negotiated settlement, have roused further angry responses in parts of the British media (Beattie, 2013 and Gardiner, 2013). This seems likely to continue to act as an irritant that will detract from the so-called ‘special relationship’.

  References

  Aldous, R., 2012. Reagan and Thatcher. The Difficult Relationship . New York: Norton.

  Baylis, J., 1997. Anglo-American Relations since 1939. The Enduring Alliance . Manchester: Manchester University Press.

  BBC, 2012. The Falklands Legacy (April 2012) . [clip] April 2012. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01fkc3v

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  The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On

  Lessons for the Future

  • Stephen Badsey, Mark Grove, Rob Havers, Stephen Badsey, Mark Grove, Rob Havers(Authors)
  • 2004(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  PART 1 The Falklands Conflict in History

  Passage contains an image

  1 The Impact of the Falklands Conflict on International Affairs

  LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

  INTRODUCTION

  There is an aspect to contemporary strategy that is impossible to quantify yet is of considerable significance, and is normally summed up by the word ‘legitimacy’. This is not quite the same as legality, although a backing in international law certainly helps; nor is it the same as morality, although conformity with traditional ‘just war’ principles is also an advantage. It needs to be gained abroad as well as at home, so just because a course of action has popular support does not give it legitimacy. Rather it is an amalgam of legality, morality and democracy, and it is the task of a government in a conflict to create a sense of legitimacy around its actions and to cope with the consequences of a failure to do so.

  Throughout the Falklands campaign the British Government was very conscious of the legitimacy issue. It barely attempted to make a strong case in terms of strategic or economic interests, avoiding claims to great benefit in terms of Cold War rivalries or future oil wealth. Instead it concentrated on key principles: self-determination for the islanders, the inadmissibility of force as a means of resolving disputes, the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the importance of not rewarding aggression. In making claims to foreign governments the emphasis was on the precedent set if the Argentinian occupation succeeded rather than the vital interests of the United Kingdom (UK).

  The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 502 had played a large part in conferring an aura of legitimacy on Britain’s action, while the various declarations of support by other governments and such concrete steps as economic sanctions supported the view that Britain was acting on behalf of a wider international interest. As the fighting became more serious, however, the issue inevitably moved away from whether Britain’s cause was just, to the means adopted by Britain in the name of this cause. The just war tradition argued not only that a war be undertaken to right a wrong, but also that the means employed should be proportionate. This is not straightforward. Any use of armed force has to take into account not only some notional relationship to the ends being employed but also the means available to the opponent. There is an issue of proportion in relation to the threat. Moreover, there was also a question of when the principles at stake could be said to have been honoured: was it enough to get the Argentinians off the islands, if necessary through offering some concessions to their concerns, or must they be denied any face-saving compensation? Abroad, the urge was to get a negotiated settlement as soon as possible: at home, the urge was to see honour satisfied, whatever the damage to Argentinian honour. How should the consequences of actions be included in the calculation? What was the price worth paying for success in terms of lives, military capacity, resources and political goodwill, and how much should it matter if those costs were being imposed on those less directly involved?

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  Cornell Studies in Security Affairs

  Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts

  • Alex Weisiger(Author)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Cornell University Press

    (Publisher)

  While it would be incorrect to ignore domestic politics, a closer look demonstrates that a purely domestic political explanation for the war would be woefully incomplete. The Argentines were willing to invade in large part because they underestimated British resolve and capability; thus, divergent expectations about the consequences of the use of force played a significant role in bringing about the conflict. Moreover, although temporarily successful, the diversionary strategy quickly backfired when the war went poorly for the Argentines. This case is thus consistent with the prediction that diversionary wars will typically be short.

  History of the Conflict

  The islands in question—known as the Falklands to the British and the Malvinas to the Argentines—lie several hundred miles off the coast of Argentina. Although of limited strategic significance—the famous Argentine novelist Jorge Luis Borges described the war as “a fight between two bald men over a comb”—the islands nonetheless have been the subject of disputes between several powers over the last few hundred years, including consistent Argentine claims over the entire period since the British established sole control in 1833.2 Over time, the symbolic significance of the islands increased, with the Argentines arguing that their transfer was necessary for the completion of decolonization, while the British argued that the principle of self-determination implied that the islanders—who wished to remain British—should be permitted to choose their own fate. British governments were to a significant degree entrapped, reluctant to anger the Argentines and entirely unwilling to pay the exorbitant costs that would be associated with funding an effective standing deterrent on the islands, but also unwilling to force the islanders, who had the support of a significant lobby in London, to acquiesce to a deal with which they were not comfortable.3

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  Argentine Foreign Policy during the Military Dictatorship, 1976–1983

  Between a Nationalist and Pragmatic Approach

  • Magdalena Lisi?ska, Magdalena Lisi?ska(Authors)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  © The Author(s) 2019 Magdalena Lisińska Argentine Foreign Policy during the Military Dictatorship, 1976–1983 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06215-6_7

  Begin Abstract

  7. The Falklands Dispute and the Argentine–British War

  Magdalena Lisińska

  1   

  (1) Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

   

    Magdalena Lisińska

  End Abstract

  Historical Background

  The beginnings of the Argentine–British dispute over the Falklands archipelago, known as the Malvinas in the Spanish speaking world, date back all the way to the great geographical discoveries. The lack of universal agreement as to the name of the explorer caused two versions of the history to emerge, presented differently by the Argentines, claiming that the islands were discovered by the Spanish, as well as the British, who believe that the first ones to notice the South Atlantic archipelago were the English (Etchepareborda 1983 ). Based on the existing sources it is impossible to establish with full certainty which side is right, and the tumultuous history of settlements in the Falklands , colonized by the Spaniards, British, and the Dutch at the same time contribute to the archipelago’s complicated history (Metford 1968 ). Spanish rule in the New World was marked by the constant dispute with Great Britain over rights to the islands and despite the recognition of Spain ’s sovereignty over the archipelago in 1771, difficult climatic conditions and the outlying location did not encourage the Spanish monarch’s subjects to settle in the Falklands (Reisman 1983 ). When the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata declared their secession from the Crown in 1810, the South Atlantic archipelago was an uninhabited territory, reflecting the term terra nullius (nobody’s land) (Greig 1978 ). Whereas the official takeover of the islands by the Argentines took place in 1820 and was not met with opposition from Great Britain . Great Britain was also the first country to recognize Argentina’s independence. In 1825, the Argentine–British treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was signed. The document does not mention anything about British claims to the sovereignty over the Falklands (Acuerdo de Amistad 1825

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  The Regionalization of Warfare

  The Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq Conflict

  • James Brown(Author)
  • 2023(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  The unit was believed to have been airlifted to the area by helicopter. Shortly thereafter, armored personnel carriers were observed advancing on Stanley from the old air strip. A few Argentine soldiers were killed and several wounded in this engagement; but by mid-morning, Argentine troops were ashore in force, and further resistance was useless. A cease-fire was negotiated with Admiral Carlos Busser, the commander of the Argentine forces, and the occupation of the islands began. On South Georgia, Argentine naval forces arrived offshore on April 2, and took the island on April 3, after a brief but fierce engagement between the British royal marines and a detachment of Argentine marines who were airlifted to land. 27 The Argentines lost two helicopters and suffered damage to a landing craft. Political Response For both Argentina and Great Britain, the conflict assumed symbolic and nationalistic dimensions beyond the reality of the cold, bare islands. Argentina’s tie to the islands was a longstanding, emotional commitment that school children learned in their geography lessons. The Malvinas symbolized centuries of European imperialism and oppression. As President Galtieri stated, the “origin of the conflict over the Malvinas, South Georgias, and South Sandwich Islands goes back to the usurpation by British government forces in 1833, seizing Argentine territory, thus openly violating the principle of territorial integrity and expelling the already established population, which was followed by the settlement of a population belonging to the aggressor power.” 28 British ties to the Falklands involved an equally emotional commitment, and the loss of the islands made their recapture an issue of national pride. The Argentine seizure of the islands was seen as a clear act of aggression that disregarded the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. “The victims were clearly British and the perpetrators fascistic and, fortunately, white and not too wretched

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